Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game

In the practice of watershed ecological compensation, due to the inconsistency between the interests of economic development and the objectives of ecological protection, there are typical game characteristics among the relevant stakeholders. Taking the ecological compensation between Henan and Shaan...
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Autor*in:	Quanxi Wang [verfasserIn] Ni Wang [verfasserIn] Haodong Wang [verfasserIn] Yuan Xiu [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2022

Schlagwörter:	ecological compensation for transboundary basins evolutionary game theory Yellow River Basin of Shaanxi Province stakeholder simulation analysis

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Sustainability - MDPI AG, 2009, 14(2022), 6, p 3374
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:14 ; year:2022 ; number:6, p 3374

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.3390/su14063374

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ064350673

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520			\|a In the practice of watershed ecological compensation, due to the inconsistency between the interests of economic development and the objectives of ecological protection, there are typical game characteristics among the relevant stakeholders. Taking the ecological compensation between Henan and Shaanxi in the Yellow River Basin as an example, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model, obtains the external conditions for various stakeholders to achieve stable cooperation from the perspective of the government, and demonstrates the necessity of combining vertical and horizontal ecological compensation. The sensitivity of each party’s decision making to key elements is analyzed through a simulation. The results show that: (1) the optimal strategy is mainly affected by the initial willingness of the upstream government and the central government; the strong regulatory power of the central government can eliminate the influence of the initial will; (2) development opportunity costs and vertical fiscal transfer payments have the most obvious influence on upstream government decision-making; (3) the effect on optimal decision state of downstream paying upstream ecological compensation is higher than that of upstream paying downstream ecological compensation; (4) the punishment of the central government should ensure the binding force on the lower governments, and the revenue and expenditure under its supervision strategy should ensure the effectiveness of the supervision public power. The above conclusions provide support for improving the ecological compensation mechanism of transboundary basins.
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allfieldsSound	10.3390/su14063374 doi (DE-627)DOAJ064350673 (DE-599)DOAJ5bf5d155e824488f80b5615e48d18859 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Quanxi Wang verfasserin aut Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier In the practice of watershed ecological compensation, due to the inconsistency between the interests of economic development and the objectives of ecological protection, there are typical game characteristics among the relevant stakeholders. Taking the ecological compensation between Henan and Shaanxi in the Yellow River Basin as an example, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model, obtains the external conditions for various stakeholders to achieve stable cooperation from the perspective of the government, and demonstrates the necessity of combining vertical and horizontal ecological compensation. The sensitivity of each party’s decision making to key elements is analyzed through a simulation. The results show that: (1) the optimal strategy is mainly affected by the initial willingness of the upstream government and the central government; the strong regulatory power of the central government can eliminate the influence of the initial will; (2) development opportunity costs and vertical fiscal transfer payments have the most obvious influence on upstream government decision-making; (3) the effect on optimal decision state of downstream paying upstream ecological compensation is higher than that of upstream paying downstream ecological compensation; (4) the punishment of the central government should ensure the binding force on the lower governments, and the revenue and expenditure under its supervision strategy should ensure the effectiveness of the supervision public power. The above conclusions provide support for improving the ecological compensation mechanism of transboundary basins. ecological compensation for transboundary basins evolutionary game theory Yellow River Basin of Shaanxi Province stakeholder simulation analysis Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences Ni Wang verfasserin aut Haodong Wang verfasserin aut Yuan Xiu verfasserin aut In Sustainability MDPI AG, 2009 14(2022), 6, p 3374 (DE-627)610604120 (DE-600)2518383-7 20711050 nnns volume:14 year:2022 number:6, p 3374 https://doi.org/10.3390/su14063374 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/5bf5d155e824488f80b5615e48d18859 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/14/6/3374 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 14 2022 6, p 3374
language	English
source	In Sustainability 14(2022), 6, p 3374 volume:14 year:2022 number:6, p 3374
sourceStr	In Sustainability 14(2022), 6, p 3374 volume:14 year:2022 number:6, p 3374
format_phy_str_mv	Article
institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	ecological compensation for transboundary basins evolutionary game theory Yellow River Basin of Shaanxi Province stakeholder simulation analysis Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences
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container_title	Sustainability
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Quanxi Wang @@aut@@ Ni Wang @@aut@@ Haodong Wang @@aut@@ Yuan Xiu @@aut@@
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callnumber-first	T - Technology
author	Quanxi Wang
spellingShingle	Quanxi Wang misc TD194-195 misc TJ807-830 misc GE1-350 misc ecological compensation for transboundary basins misc evolutionary game theory misc Yellow River Basin of Shaanxi Province misc stakeholder misc simulation analysis misc Environmental effects of industries and plants misc Renewable energy sources misc Environmental sciences Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game
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topic_title	TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game ecological compensation for transboundary basins evolutionary game theory Yellow River Basin of Shaanxi Province stakeholder simulation analysis
topic	misc TD194-195 misc TJ807-830 misc GE1-350 misc ecological compensation for transboundary basins misc evolutionary game theory misc Yellow River Basin of Shaanxi Province misc stakeholder misc simulation analysis misc Environmental effects of industries and plants misc Renewable energy sources misc Environmental sciences
topic_unstemmed	misc TD194-195 misc TJ807-830 misc GE1-350 misc ecological compensation for transboundary basins misc evolutionary game theory misc Yellow River Basin of Shaanxi Province misc stakeholder misc simulation analysis misc Environmental effects of industries and plants misc Renewable energy sources misc Environmental sciences
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title	Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game
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title_full	Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game
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title_sort	study on influencing factors and simulation of watershed ecological compensation based on evolutionary game
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title_auth	Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game
abstract	In the practice of watershed ecological compensation, due to the inconsistency between the interests of economic development and the objectives of ecological protection, there are typical game characteristics among the relevant stakeholders. Taking the ecological compensation between Henan and Shaanxi in the Yellow River Basin as an example, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model, obtains the external conditions for various stakeholders to achieve stable cooperation from the perspective of the government, and demonstrates the necessity of combining vertical and horizontal ecological compensation. The sensitivity of each party’s decision making to key elements is analyzed through a simulation. The results show that: (1) the optimal strategy is mainly affected by the initial willingness of the upstream government and the central government; the strong regulatory power of the central government can eliminate the influence of the initial will; (2) development opportunity costs and vertical fiscal transfer payments have the most obvious influence on upstream government decision-making; (3) the effect on optimal decision state of downstream paying upstream ecological compensation is higher than that of upstream paying downstream ecological compensation; (4) the punishment of the central government should ensure the binding force on the lower governments, and the revenue and expenditure under its supervision strategy should ensure the effectiveness of the supervision public power. The above conclusions provide support for improving the ecological compensation mechanism of transboundary basins.
abstractGer	In the practice of watershed ecological compensation, due to the inconsistency between the interests of economic development and the objectives of ecological protection, there are typical game characteristics among the relevant stakeholders. Taking the ecological compensation between Henan and Shaanxi in the Yellow River Basin as an example, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model, obtains the external conditions for various stakeholders to achieve stable cooperation from the perspective of the government, and demonstrates the necessity of combining vertical and horizontal ecological compensation. The sensitivity of each party’s decision making to key elements is analyzed through a simulation. The results show that: (1) the optimal strategy is mainly affected by the initial willingness of the upstream government and the central government; the strong regulatory power of the central government can eliminate the influence of the initial will; (2) development opportunity costs and vertical fiscal transfer payments have the most obvious influence on upstream government decision-making; (3) the effect on optimal decision state of downstream paying upstream ecological compensation is higher than that of upstream paying downstream ecological compensation; (4) the punishment of the central government should ensure the binding force on the lower governments, and the revenue and expenditure under its supervision strategy should ensure the effectiveness of the supervision public power. The above conclusions provide support for improving the ecological compensation mechanism of transboundary basins.
abstract_unstemmed	In the practice of watershed ecological compensation, due to the inconsistency between the interests of economic development and the objectives of ecological protection, there are typical game characteristics among the relevant stakeholders. Taking the ecological compensation between Henan and Shaanxi in the Yellow River Basin as an example, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model, obtains the external conditions for various stakeholders to achieve stable cooperation from the perspective of the government, and demonstrates the necessity of combining vertical and horizontal ecological compensation. The sensitivity of each party’s decision making to key elements is analyzed through a simulation. The results show that: (1) the optimal strategy is mainly affected by the initial willingness of the upstream government and the central government; the strong regulatory power of the central government can eliminate the influence of the initial will; (2) development opportunity costs and vertical fiscal transfer payments have the most obvious influence on upstream government decision-making; (3) the effect on optimal decision state of downstream paying upstream ecological compensation is higher than that of upstream paying downstream ecological compensation; (4) the punishment of the central government should ensure the binding force on the lower governments, and the revenue and expenditure under its supervision strategy should ensure the effectiveness of the supervision public power. The above conclusions provide support for improving the ecological compensation mechanism of transboundary basins.
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title_short	Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game
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Study on Influencing Factors and Simulation of Watershed Ecological Compensation Based on Evolutionary Game

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