Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations
Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Kelei Zhao [verfasserIn] Linjie Liu [verfasserIn] Xiaojie Chen [verfasserIn] Ting Huang [verfasserIn] Lianming Du [verfasserIn] Jiafu Lin [verfasserIn] Yang Yuan [verfasserIn] Yingshun Zhou [verfasserIn] Bisong Yue [verfasserIn] Kun Wei [verfasserIn] Yiwen Chu [verfasserIn] |
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E-Artikel |
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Englisch |
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2019 |
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In: BMC Biology - BMC, 2003, 17(2019), 1, Seite 15 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:17 ; year:2019 ; number:1 ; pages:15 |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ068794355 |
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520 | |a Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution. Results We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities. | ||
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700 | 0 | |a Xiaojie Chen |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
700 | 0 | |a Ting Huang |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
700 | 0 | |a Lianming Du |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
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700 | 0 | |a Bisong Yue |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
700 | 0 | |a Kun Wei |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
700 | 0 | |a Yiwen Chu |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
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10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 doi (DE-627)DOAJ068794355 (DE-599)DOAJ4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QH301-705.5 Kelei Zhao verfasserin aut Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution. Results We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities. Social biology Quorum sensing Public goods game Evolution Conditional defection Mathematical modeling Biology (General) Linjie Liu verfasserin aut Xiaojie Chen verfasserin aut Ting Huang verfasserin aut Lianming Du verfasserin aut Jiafu Lin verfasserin aut Yang Yuan verfasserin aut Yingshun Zhou verfasserin aut Bisong Yue verfasserin aut Kun Wei verfasserin aut Yiwen Chu verfasserin aut In BMC Biology BMC, 2003 17(2019), 1, Seite 15 (DE-627)377757241 (DE-600)2133020-7 17417007 nnns volume:17 year:2019 number:1 pages:15 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e kostenfrei http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1741-7007 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2019 1 15 |
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10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 doi (DE-627)DOAJ068794355 (DE-599)DOAJ4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QH301-705.5 Kelei Zhao verfasserin aut Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution. Results We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities. Social biology Quorum sensing Public goods game Evolution Conditional defection Mathematical modeling Biology (General) Linjie Liu verfasserin aut Xiaojie Chen verfasserin aut Ting Huang verfasserin aut Lianming Du verfasserin aut Jiafu Lin verfasserin aut Yang Yuan verfasserin aut Yingshun Zhou verfasserin aut Bisong Yue verfasserin aut Kun Wei verfasserin aut Yiwen Chu verfasserin aut In BMC Biology BMC, 2003 17(2019), 1, Seite 15 (DE-627)377757241 (DE-600)2133020-7 17417007 nnns volume:17 year:2019 number:1 pages:15 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e kostenfrei http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1741-7007 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2019 1 15 |
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10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 doi (DE-627)DOAJ068794355 (DE-599)DOAJ4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QH301-705.5 Kelei Zhao verfasserin aut Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution. Results We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities. Social biology Quorum sensing Public goods game Evolution Conditional defection Mathematical modeling Biology (General) Linjie Liu verfasserin aut Xiaojie Chen verfasserin aut Ting Huang verfasserin aut Lianming Du verfasserin aut Jiafu Lin verfasserin aut Yang Yuan verfasserin aut Yingshun Zhou verfasserin aut Bisong Yue verfasserin aut Kun Wei verfasserin aut Yiwen Chu verfasserin aut In BMC Biology BMC, 2003 17(2019), 1, Seite 15 (DE-627)377757241 (DE-600)2133020-7 17417007 nnns volume:17 year:2019 number:1 pages:15 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e kostenfrei http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1741-7007 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2019 1 15 |
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10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 doi (DE-627)DOAJ068794355 (DE-599)DOAJ4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QH301-705.5 Kelei Zhao verfasserin aut Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution. Results We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities. Social biology Quorum sensing Public goods game Evolution Conditional defection Mathematical modeling Biology (General) Linjie Liu verfasserin aut Xiaojie Chen verfasserin aut Ting Huang verfasserin aut Lianming Du verfasserin aut Jiafu Lin verfasserin aut Yang Yuan verfasserin aut Yingshun Zhou verfasserin aut Bisong Yue verfasserin aut Kun Wei verfasserin aut Yiwen Chu verfasserin aut In BMC Biology BMC, 2003 17(2019), 1, Seite 15 (DE-627)377757241 (DE-600)2133020-7 17417007 nnns volume:17 year:2019 number:1 pages:15 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e kostenfrei http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1741-7007 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2019 1 15 |
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10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 doi (DE-627)DOAJ068794355 (DE-599)DOAJ4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QH301-705.5 Kelei Zhao verfasserin aut Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution. Results We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities. Social biology Quorum sensing Public goods game Evolution Conditional defection Mathematical modeling Biology (General) Linjie Liu verfasserin aut Xiaojie Chen verfasserin aut Ting Huang verfasserin aut Lianming Du verfasserin aut Jiafu Lin verfasserin aut Yang Yuan verfasserin aut Yingshun Zhou verfasserin aut Bisong Yue verfasserin aut Kun Wei verfasserin aut Yiwen Chu verfasserin aut In BMC Biology BMC, 2003 17(2019), 1, Seite 15 (DE-627)377757241 (DE-600)2133020-7 17417007 nnns volume:17 year:2019 number:1 pages:15 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e kostenfrei http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1741-7007 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2019 1 15 |
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QH301-705.5 Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations Social biology Quorum sensing Public goods game Evolution Conditional defection Mathematical modeling |
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misc QH301-705.5 misc Social biology misc Quorum sensing misc Public goods game misc Evolution misc Conditional defection misc Mathematical modeling misc Biology (General) |
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misc QH301-705.5 misc Social biology misc Quorum sensing misc Public goods game misc Evolution misc Conditional defection misc Mathematical modeling misc Biology (General) |
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Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations |
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Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations |
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Kelei Zhao |
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Kelei Zhao Linjie Liu Xiaojie Chen Ting Huang Lianming Du Jiafu Lin Yang Yuan Yingshun Zhou Bisong Yue Kun Wei Yiwen Chu |
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behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations |
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Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations |
abstract |
Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution. Results We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities. |
abstractGer |
Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution. Results We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities. |
abstract_unstemmed |
Abstract Background Microbial communities are susceptible to the public goods dilemma, whereby individuals can gain an advantage within a group by utilizing, but not sharing the cost of producing, public goods. In bacteria, the development of quorum sensing (QS) can establish a cooperation system in a population by coordinating the production of costly and sharable extracellular products (public goods). Cooperators with intact QS system and robust ability in producing public goods are vulnerable to being undermined by QS-deficient defectors that escape from QS but benefit from the cooperation of others. Although microorganisms have evolved several mechanisms to resist cheating invasion in the public goods game, it is not clear why cooperators frequently coexist with defectors and how they form a relatively stable equilibrium during evolution. Results We show that in Pseudomonas aeruginosa, QS-directed social cooperation can select a conditional defection strategy prior to the emergence of QS-mutant defectors, depending on resource availability. Conditional defectors represent a QS-inactive state of wild type (cooperator) individual and can invade QS-activated cooperators by adopting a cheating strategy, and then revert to cooperating when there are abundant nutrient supplies irrespective of the exploitation of QS-mutant defector. Our mathematical modeling further demonstrates that the incorporation of conditional defection strategy into the framework of iterated public goods game with sound punishment mechanism can lead to the coexistence of cooperator, conditional defector, and defector in a rock-paper-scissors dynamics. Conclusions These findings highlight the importance of behavioral heterogeneity in stabilizing the population structure and provide a potential reasonable explanation for the maintenance and evolution of cooperation in microbial communities. |
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Behavioral heterogeneity in quorum sensing can stabilize social cooperation in microbial populations |
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https://doi.org/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 https://doaj.org/article/4bc187ad60c940e3a5f3ce62d0b8807e http://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12915-019-0639-3 https://doaj.org/toc/1741-7007 |
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