Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics

Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a m...
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Autor*in:	Katrin Daedlow [verfasserIn] Nahleen Lemke [verfasserIn] Katharina Helming [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2018

Schlagwörter:	landowner tenant rent price rent proportion yield potential sustainable soil management

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Sustainability - MDPI AG, 2009, 10(2018), 8, p 2880
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:10 ; year:2018 ; number:8, p 2880

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.3390/su10082880

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ072969202

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callnumber-first	T - Technology
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spellingShingle	Katrin Daedlow misc TD194-195 misc TJ807-830 misc GE1-350 misc landowner misc tenant misc rent price misc rent proportion misc yield potential misc sustainable soil management misc Environmental effects of industries and plants misc Renewable energy sources misc Environmental sciences Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics
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title	Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics
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title_full	Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics
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title_sort	arable land tenancy and soil quality in germany: contesting theory with empirics
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title_auth	Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics
abstract	Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a major theoretical assumption is that landowners have higher incentives to maintain soil quality than leaseholders. By using data for German arable land at the county level, we contrast theoretical assumptions about the relationships between landowners, leaseholders and soil quality with empirical evidence based on correlations between arable land rent prices, rent proportions and yield potential. The main finding is that the empirical data contradict the theoretical assumptions to a large degree, i.e., no clear relationship could be discerned between the three parameters of arable land soil quality, rent price and rent proportion. We discuss possible explanations for the revealed contradictions based on the state of research and highlight the need for future research to better understand the potential of arable land tenancy as a governance mechanism for sustainable soil management.
abstractGer	Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a major theoretical assumption is that landowners have higher incentives to maintain soil quality than leaseholders. By using data for German arable land at the county level, we contrast theoretical assumptions about the relationships between landowners, leaseholders and soil quality with empirical evidence based on correlations between arable land rent prices, rent proportions and yield potential. The main finding is that the empirical data contradict the theoretical assumptions to a large degree, i.e., no clear relationship could be discerned between the three parameters of arable land soil quality, rent price and rent proportion. We discuss possible explanations for the revealed contradictions based on the state of research and highlight the need for future research to better understand the potential of arable land tenancy as a governance mechanism for sustainable soil management.
abstract_unstemmed	Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a major theoretical assumption is that landowners have higher incentives to maintain soil quality than leaseholders. By using data for German arable land at the county level, we contrast theoretical assumptions about the relationships between landowners, leaseholders and soil quality with empirical evidence based on correlations between arable land rent prices, rent proportions and yield potential. The main finding is that the empirical data contradict the theoretical assumptions to a large degree, i.e., no clear relationship could be discerned between the three parameters of arable land soil quality, rent price and rent proportion. We discuss possible explanations for the revealed contradictions based on the state of research and highlight the need for future research to better understand the potential of arable land tenancy as a governance mechanism for sustainable soil management.
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