Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics
Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a m...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Katrin Daedlow [verfasserIn] Nahleen Lemke [verfasserIn] Katharina Helming [verfasserIn] |
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Englisch |
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2018 |
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In: Sustainability - MDPI AG, 2009, 10(2018), 8, p 2880 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:10 ; year:2018 ; number:8, p 2880 |
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DOI / URN: |
10.3390/su10082880 |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ072969202 |
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10.3390/su10082880 doi (DE-627)DOAJ072969202 (DE-599)DOAJd2ad46862ad14e248205fe3440152e07 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Katrin Daedlow verfasserin aut Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a major theoretical assumption is that landowners have higher incentives to maintain soil quality than leaseholders. By using data for German arable land at the county level, we contrast theoretical assumptions about the relationships between landowners, leaseholders and soil quality with empirical evidence based on correlations between arable land rent prices, rent proportions and yield potential. The main finding is that the empirical data contradict the theoretical assumptions to a large degree, i.e., no clear relationship could be discerned between the three parameters of arable land soil quality, rent price and rent proportion. We discuss possible explanations for the revealed contradictions based on the state of research and highlight the need for future research to better understand the potential of arable land tenancy as a governance mechanism for sustainable soil management. landowner tenant rent price rent proportion yield potential sustainable soil management Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences Nahleen Lemke verfasserin aut Katharina Helming verfasserin aut In Sustainability MDPI AG, 2009 10(2018), 8, p 2880 (DE-627)610604120 (DE-600)2518383-7 20711050 nnns volume:10 year:2018 number:8, p 2880 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082880 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/d2ad46862ad14e248205fe3440152e07 kostenfrei http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2880 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2018 8, p 2880 |
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10.3390/su10082880 doi (DE-627)DOAJ072969202 (DE-599)DOAJd2ad46862ad14e248205fe3440152e07 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Katrin Daedlow verfasserin aut Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a major theoretical assumption is that landowners have higher incentives to maintain soil quality than leaseholders. By using data for German arable land at the county level, we contrast theoretical assumptions about the relationships between landowners, leaseholders and soil quality with empirical evidence based on correlations between arable land rent prices, rent proportions and yield potential. The main finding is that the empirical data contradict the theoretical assumptions to a large degree, i.e., no clear relationship could be discerned between the three parameters of arable land soil quality, rent price and rent proportion. We discuss possible explanations for the revealed contradictions based on the state of research and highlight the need for future research to better understand the potential of arable land tenancy as a governance mechanism for sustainable soil management. landowner tenant rent price rent proportion yield potential sustainable soil management Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences Nahleen Lemke verfasserin aut Katharina Helming verfasserin aut In Sustainability MDPI AG, 2009 10(2018), 8, p 2880 (DE-627)610604120 (DE-600)2518383-7 20711050 nnns volume:10 year:2018 number:8, p 2880 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082880 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/d2ad46862ad14e248205fe3440152e07 kostenfrei http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2880 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2018 8, p 2880 |
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10.3390/su10082880 doi (DE-627)DOAJ072969202 (DE-599)DOAJd2ad46862ad14e248205fe3440152e07 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TD194-195 TJ807-830 GE1-350 Katrin Daedlow verfasserin aut Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics 2018 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a major theoretical assumption is that landowners have higher incentives to maintain soil quality than leaseholders. By using data for German arable land at the county level, we contrast theoretical assumptions about the relationships between landowners, leaseholders and soil quality with empirical evidence based on correlations between arable land rent prices, rent proportions and yield potential. The main finding is that the empirical data contradict the theoretical assumptions to a large degree, i.e., no clear relationship could be discerned between the three parameters of arable land soil quality, rent price and rent proportion. We discuss possible explanations for the revealed contradictions based on the state of research and highlight the need for future research to better understand the potential of arable land tenancy as a governance mechanism for sustainable soil management. landowner tenant rent price rent proportion yield potential sustainable soil management Environmental effects of industries and plants Renewable energy sources Environmental sciences Nahleen Lemke verfasserin aut Katharina Helming verfasserin aut In Sustainability MDPI AG, 2009 10(2018), 8, p 2880 (DE-627)610604120 (DE-600)2518383-7 20711050 nnns volume:10 year:2018 number:8, p 2880 https://doi.org/10.3390/su10082880 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/d2ad46862ad14e248205fe3440152e07 kostenfrei http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/10/8/2880 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2018 8, p 2880 |
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Arable Land Tenancy and Soil Quality in Germany: Contesting Theory with Empirics |
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Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a major theoretical assumption is that landowners have higher incentives to maintain soil quality than leaseholders. By using data for German arable land at the county level, we contrast theoretical assumptions about the relationships between landowners, leaseholders and soil quality with empirical evidence based on correlations between arable land rent prices, rent proportions and yield potential. The main finding is that the empirical data contradict the theoretical assumptions to a large degree, i.e., no clear relationship could be discerned between the three parameters of arable land soil quality, rent price and rent proportion. We discuss possible explanations for the revealed contradictions based on the state of research and highlight the need for future research to better understand the potential of arable land tenancy as a governance mechanism for sustainable soil management. |
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Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a major theoretical assumption is that landowners have higher incentives to maintain soil quality than leaseholders. By using data for German arable land at the county level, we contrast theoretical assumptions about the relationships between landowners, leaseholders and soil quality with empirical evidence based on correlations between arable land rent prices, rent proportions and yield potential. The main finding is that the empirical data contradict the theoretical assumptions to a large degree, i.e., no clear relationship could be discerned between the three parameters of arable land soil quality, rent price and rent proportion. We discuss possible explanations for the revealed contradictions based on the state of research and highlight the need for future research to better understand the potential of arable land tenancy as a governance mechanism for sustainable soil management. |
abstract_unstemmed |
Soils are under increasing utilization pressure, and soil governance is an important element to maintain soil functions and prevent the degradation of soil quality. However, scientific studies about soil governance are rare. In this paper, we focus on the governance mechanism of land rent. Here, a major theoretical assumption is that landowners have higher incentives to maintain soil quality than leaseholders. By using data for German arable land at the county level, we contrast theoretical assumptions about the relationships between landowners, leaseholders and soil quality with empirical evidence based on correlations between arable land rent prices, rent proportions and yield potential. The main finding is that the empirical data contradict the theoretical assumptions to a large degree, i.e., no clear relationship could be discerned between the three parameters of arable land soil quality, rent price and rent proportion. We discuss possible explanations for the revealed contradictions based on the state of research and highlight the need for future research to better understand the potential of arable land tenancy as a governance mechanism for sustainable soil management. |
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score |
7.4011087 |