Decision Optimization of Four-Level Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under Different Power Structures
Taking the four-level supply chain participated by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper deeply studies the influence of different power structures on the optimal price and logistics service level decisions of the whole supply chain system. On this basis, this pa...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Jianjun Zhang [verfasserIn] Zhigang Song [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2021 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Mathematical Problems in Engineering - Hindawi Limited, 2002, (2021) |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
year:2021 |
Links: |
Link aufrufen |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1155/2021/5518840 |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ076257940 |
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10.1155/2021/5518840 doi (DE-627)DOAJ076257940 (DE-599)DOAJ96c94843576e425b8e3beb1b7aea526b DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Jianjun Zhang verfasserin aut Decision Optimization of Four-Level Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under Different Power Structures 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Taking the four-level supply chain participated by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper deeply studies the influence of different power structures on the optimal price and logistics service level decisions of the whole supply chain system. On this basis, this paper points out the optimal power structure of the whole supply chain system and then discusses the optimal cooperative decision-making mode to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain system under optimal power structure. The results show that compared with the two power structures of manufacturer-led and logistics service integrator-led, the retailer-led structure is the optimal power structure, whether from the perspective of maximizing the total profit of the supply chain or the surplus of consumers. When the supply chain is facing consumers who are less sensitive to the retail price of products and more sensitive to the logistics service level, the advantages of retail-led decentralized supply chain are more significant. The centralized decision of product supply chain (PSC) and logistics service supply chain (LSSC) under different power structures is the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium strategy is Nash game adopted by both parties. At this time, the total profit of the supply chain system is the largest and the total social welfare is the largest, while the total profit and consumer surplus of the supply chain under LSSC-led structure are the smallest. When the supply chain is facing consumers with low sensitivity of logistics service level and product retail price, PSC and LSSC have more significant advantages in Nash game rather than Stackelberg game. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Zhigang Song verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2021) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2021 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/96c94843576e425b8e3beb1b7aea526b kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2021 |
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10.1155/2021/5518840 doi (DE-627)DOAJ076257940 (DE-599)DOAJ96c94843576e425b8e3beb1b7aea526b DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Jianjun Zhang verfasserin aut Decision Optimization of Four-Level Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under Different Power Structures 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Taking the four-level supply chain participated by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper deeply studies the influence of different power structures on the optimal price and logistics service level decisions of the whole supply chain system. On this basis, this paper points out the optimal power structure of the whole supply chain system and then discusses the optimal cooperative decision-making mode to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain system under optimal power structure. The results show that compared with the two power structures of manufacturer-led and logistics service integrator-led, the retailer-led structure is the optimal power structure, whether from the perspective of maximizing the total profit of the supply chain or the surplus of consumers. When the supply chain is facing consumers who are less sensitive to the retail price of products and more sensitive to the logistics service level, the advantages of retail-led decentralized supply chain are more significant. The centralized decision of product supply chain (PSC) and logistics service supply chain (LSSC) under different power structures is the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium strategy is Nash game adopted by both parties. At this time, the total profit of the supply chain system is the largest and the total social welfare is the largest, while the total profit and consumer surplus of the supply chain under LSSC-led structure are the smallest. When the supply chain is facing consumers with low sensitivity of logistics service level and product retail price, PSC and LSSC have more significant advantages in Nash game rather than Stackelberg game. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Zhigang Song verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2021) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2021 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/96c94843576e425b8e3beb1b7aea526b kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2021 |
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10.1155/2021/5518840 doi (DE-627)DOAJ076257940 (DE-599)DOAJ96c94843576e425b8e3beb1b7aea526b DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Jianjun Zhang verfasserin aut Decision Optimization of Four-Level Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under Different Power Structures 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Taking the four-level supply chain participated by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper deeply studies the influence of different power structures on the optimal price and logistics service level decisions of the whole supply chain system. On this basis, this paper points out the optimal power structure of the whole supply chain system and then discusses the optimal cooperative decision-making mode to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain system under optimal power structure. The results show that compared with the two power structures of manufacturer-led and logistics service integrator-led, the retailer-led structure is the optimal power structure, whether from the perspective of maximizing the total profit of the supply chain or the surplus of consumers. When the supply chain is facing consumers who are less sensitive to the retail price of products and more sensitive to the logistics service level, the advantages of retail-led decentralized supply chain are more significant. The centralized decision of product supply chain (PSC) and logistics service supply chain (LSSC) under different power structures is the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium strategy is Nash game adopted by both parties. At this time, the total profit of the supply chain system is the largest and the total social welfare is the largest, while the total profit and consumer surplus of the supply chain under LSSC-led structure are the smallest. When the supply chain is facing consumers with low sensitivity of logistics service level and product retail price, PSC and LSSC have more significant advantages in Nash game rather than Stackelberg game. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Zhigang Song verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2021) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2021 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/96c94843576e425b8e3beb1b7aea526b kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2021 |
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10.1155/2021/5518840 doi (DE-627)DOAJ076257940 (DE-599)DOAJ96c94843576e425b8e3beb1b7aea526b DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Jianjun Zhang verfasserin aut Decision Optimization of Four-Level Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under Different Power Structures 2021 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Taking the four-level supply chain participated by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper deeply studies the influence of different power structures on the optimal price and logistics service level decisions of the whole supply chain system. On this basis, this paper points out the optimal power structure of the whole supply chain system and then discusses the optimal cooperative decision-making mode to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain system under optimal power structure. The results show that compared with the two power structures of manufacturer-led and logistics service integrator-led, the retailer-led structure is the optimal power structure, whether from the perspective of maximizing the total profit of the supply chain or the surplus of consumers. When the supply chain is facing consumers who are less sensitive to the retail price of products and more sensitive to the logistics service level, the advantages of retail-led decentralized supply chain are more significant. The centralized decision of product supply chain (PSC) and logistics service supply chain (LSSC) under different power structures is the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium strategy is Nash game adopted by both parties. At this time, the total profit of the supply chain system is the largest and the total social welfare is the largest, while the total profit and consumer surplus of the supply chain under LSSC-led structure are the smallest. When the supply chain is facing consumers with low sensitivity of logistics service level and product retail price, PSC and LSSC have more significant advantages in Nash game rather than Stackelberg game. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Zhigang Song verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2021) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2021 https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/96c94843576e425b8e3beb1b7aea526b kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X Journal toc kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2021 |
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TA1-2040 QA1-939 Decision Optimization of Four-Level Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under Different Power Structures |
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decision optimization of four-level supply chain with the participation of two-echelon logistics service providers under different power structures |
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Decision Optimization of Four-Level Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under Different Power Structures |
abstract |
Taking the four-level supply chain participated by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper deeply studies the influence of different power structures on the optimal price and logistics service level decisions of the whole supply chain system. On this basis, this paper points out the optimal power structure of the whole supply chain system and then discusses the optimal cooperative decision-making mode to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain system under optimal power structure. The results show that compared with the two power structures of manufacturer-led and logistics service integrator-led, the retailer-led structure is the optimal power structure, whether from the perspective of maximizing the total profit of the supply chain or the surplus of consumers. When the supply chain is facing consumers who are less sensitive to the retail price of products and more sensitive to the logistics service level, the advantages of retail-led decentralized supply chain are more significant. The centralized decision of product supply chain (PSC) and logistics service supply chain (LSSC) under different power structures is the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium strategy is Nash game adopted by both parties. At this time, the total profit of the supply chain system is the largest and the total social welfare is the largest, while the total profit and consumer surplus of the supply chain under LSSC-led structure are the smallest. When the supply chain is facing consumers with low sensitivity of logistics service level and product retail price, PSC and LSSC have more significant advantages in Nash game rather than Stackelberg game. |
abstractGer |
Taking the four-level supply chain participated by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper deeply studies the influence of different power structures on the optimal price and logistics service level decisions of the whole supply chain system. On this basis, this paper points out the optimal power structure of the whole supply chain system and then discusses the optimal cooperative decision-making mode to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain system under optimal power structure. The results show that compared with the two power structures of manufacturer-led and logistics service integrator-led, the retailer-led structure is the optimal power structure, whether from the perspective of maximizing the total profit of the supply chain or the surplus of consumers. When the supply chain is facing consumers who are less sensitive to the retail price of products and more sensitive to the logistics service level, the advantages of retail-led decentralized supply chain are more significant. The centralized decision of product supply chain (PSC) and logistics service supply chain (LSSC) under different power structures is the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium strategy is Nash game adopted by both parties. At this time, the total profit of the supply chain system is the largest and the total social welfare is the largest, while the total profit and consumer surplus of the supply chain under LSSC-led structure are the smallest. When the supply chain is facing consumers with low sensitivity of logistics service level and product retail price, PSC and LSSC have more significant advantages in Nash game rather than Stackelberg game. |
abstract_unstemmed |
Taking the four-level supply chain participated by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper deeply studies the influence of different power structures on the optimal price and logistics service level decisions of the whole supply chain system. On this basis, this paper points out the optimal power structure of the whole supply chain system and then discusses the optimal cooperative decision-making mode to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain system under optimal power structure. The results show that compared with the two power structures of manufacturer-led and logistics service integrator-led, the retailer-led structure is the optimal power structure, whether from the perspective of maximizing the total profit of the supply chain or the surplus of consumers. When the supply chain is facing consumers who are less sensitive to the retail price of products and more sensitive to the logistics service level, the advantages of retail-led decentralized supply chain are more significant. The centralized decision of product supply chain (PSC) and logistics service supply chain (LSSC) under different power structures is the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium strategy is Nash game adopted by both parties. At this time, the total profit of the supply chain system is the largest and the total social welfare is the largest, while the total profit and consumer surplus of the supply chain under LSSC-led structure are the smallest. When the supply chain is facing consumers with low sensitivity of logistics service level and product retail price, PSC and LSSC have more significant advantages in Nash game rather than Stackelberg game. |
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title_short |
Decision Optimization of Four-Level Supply Chain with the Participation of Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under Different Power Structures |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 https://doaj.org/article/96c94843576e425b8e3beb1b7aea526b http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/5518840 https://doaj.org/toc/1024-123X https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 |
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On this basis, this paper points out the optimal power structure of the whole supply chain system and then discusses the optimal cooperative decision-making mode to improve the operation efficiency of the supply chain system under optimal power structure. The results show that compared with the two power structures of manufacturer-led and logistics service integrator-led, the retailer-led structure is the optimal power structure, whether from the perspective of maximizing the total profit of the supply chain or the surplus of consumers. When the supply chain is facing consumers who are less sensitive to the retail price of products and more sensitive to the logistics service level, the advantages of retail-led decentralized supply chain are more significant. The centralized decision of product supply chain (PSC) and logistics service supply chain (LSSC) under different power structures is the dominant strategy, and the equilibrium strategy is Nash game adopted by both parties. At this time, the total profit of the supply chain system is the largest and the total social welfare is the largest, while the total profit and consumer surplus of the supply chain under LSSC-led structure are the smallest. When the supply chain is facing consumers with low sensitivity of logistics service level and product retail price, PSC and LSSC have more significant advantages in Nash game rather than Stackelberg game.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Engineering (General). 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