Study on Design Optimization in Major Railway Projects with Fair Preference Based on Stackelberg Game

A contractor proposes design changes to achieve design optimization in the design stage of major railway projects, which can effectively solve problems such as project cost overruns. In order to promote cooperation between the construction party and the owner in the design stage, the fairness prefer...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Kai Liu [verfasserIn] Yuming Liu [verfasserIn] Xi Zhao [verfasserIn] Yuanyuan Kou [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2022

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Mathematical Problems in Engineering - Hindawi Limited, 2002, (2022)
Übergeordnetes Werk:	year:2022

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.1155/2022/5336591

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ076839168

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520			\|a A contractor proposes design changes to achieve design optimization in the design stage of major railway projects, which can effectively solve problems such as project cost overruns. In order to promote cooperation between the construction party and the owner in the design stage, the fairness preference theory was introduced. Based on the relationship characteristics of project participants in a major railway project, a Stackelberg game model between the owner and contractor was established. The influence of fairness preference psychology on both parties’ decision-making behavior and utility changes was discussed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulation analysis on the evolution results of the game model. The research results show the following: The project gain distribution coefficient of the owner and contractor will increase with the increase in their fairness perception strength. The acceptance rate of design changes will decrease with the increase in the contractor’s fairness perception strength, and the owner’s fairness perception intensity has no effect on the acceptance rate of design changes. When only one party has a fairness preference psychology, the project gain distribution coefficient will tilt towards that party. Fairness preference psychology can change the utility of the owner and contractor and narrow the utility gap between two parties.
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spelling	10.1155/2022/5336591 doi (DE-627)DOAJ076839168 (DE-599)DOAJe26c93ff18b54f47ba84013f8e9bb1d2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Kai Liu verfasserin aut Study on Design Optimization in Major Railway Projects with Fair Preference Based on Stackelberg Game 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier A contractor proposes design changes to achieve design optimization in the design stage of major railway projects, which can effectively solve problems such as project cost overruns. In order to promote cooperation between the construction party and the owner in the design stage, the fairness preference theory was introduced. Based on the relationship characteristics of project participants in a major railway project, a Stackelberg game model between the owner and contractor was established. The influence of fairness preference psychology on both parties’ decision-making behavior and utility changes was discussed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulation analysis on the evolution results of the game model. The research results show the following: The project gain distribution coefficient of the owner and contractor will increase with the increase in their fairness perception strength. The acceptance rate of design changes will decrease with the increase in the contractor’s fairness perception strength, and the owner’s fairness perception intensity has no effect on the acceptance rate of design changes. When only one party has a fairness preference psychology, the project gain distribution coefficient will tilt towards that party. Fairness preference psychology can change the utility of the owner and contractor and narrow the utility gap between two parties. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Yuming Liu verfasserin aut Xi Zhao verfasserin aut Yuanyuan Kou verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2022) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2022 https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/5336591 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/e26c93ff18b54f47ba84013f8e9bb1d2 kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/5336591 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2022
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allfieldsSound	10.1155/2022/5336591 doi (DE-627)DOAJ076839168 (DE-599)DOAJe26c93ff18b54f47ba84013f8e9bb1d2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TA1-2040 QA1-939 Kai Liu verfasserin aut Study on Design Optimization in Major Railway Projects with Fair Preference Based on Stackelberg Game 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier A contractor proposes design changes to achieve design optimization in the design stage of major railway projects, which can effectively solve problems such as project cost overruns. In order to promote cooperation between the construction party and the owner in the design stage, the fairness preference theory was introduced. Based on the relationship characteristics of project participants in a major railway project, a Stackelberg game model between the owner and contractor was established. The influence of fairness preference psychology on both parties’ decision-making behavior and utility changes was discussed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulation analysis on the evolution results of the game model. The research results show the following: The project gain distribution coefficient of the owner and contractor will increase with the increase in their fairness perception strength. The acceptance rate of design changes will decrease with the increase in the contractor’s fairness perception strength, and the owner’s fairness perception intensity has no effect on the acceptance rate of design changes. When only one party has a fairness preference psychology, the project gain distribution coefficient will tilt towards that party. Fairness preference psychology can change the utility of the owner and contractor and narrow the utility gap between two parties. Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) Mathematics Yuming Liu verfasserin aut Xi Zhao verfasserin aut Yuanyuan Kou verfasserin aut In Mathematical Problems in Engineering Hindawi Limited, 2002 (2022) (DE-627)320519937 (DE-600)2014442-8 1024123X nnns year:2022 https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/5336591 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/e26c93ff18b54f47ba84013f8e9bb1d2 kostenfrei http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/5336591 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 2022
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callnumber-first	T - Technology
author	Kai Liu
spellingShingle	Kai Liu misc TA1-2040 misc QA1-939 misc Engineering (General). Civil engineering (General) misc Mathematics Study on Design Optimization in Major Railway Projects with Fair Preference Based on Stackelberg Game
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title	Study on Design Optimization in Major Railway Projects with Fair Preference Based on Stackelberg Game
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title_full	Study on Design Optimization in Major Railway Projects with Fair Preference Based on Stackelberg Game
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title_sort	study on design optimization in major railway projects with fair preference based on stackelberg game
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title_auth	Study on Design Optimization in Major Railway Projects with Fair Preference Based on Stackelberg Game
abstract	A contractor proposes design changes to achieve design optimization in the design stage of major railway projects, which can effectively solve problems such as project cost overruns. In order to promote cooperation between the construction party and the owner in the design stage, the fairness preference theory was introduced. Based on the relationship characteristics of project participants in a major railway project, a Stackelberg game model between the owner and contractor was established. The influence of fairness preference psychology on both parties’ decision-making behavior and utility changes was discussed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulation analysis on the evolution results of the game model. The research results show the following: The project gain distribution coefficient of the owner and contractor will increase with the increase in their fairness perception strength. The acceptance rate of design changes will decrease with the increase in the contractor’s fairness perception strength, and the owner’s fairness perception intensity has no effect on the acceptance rate of design changes. When only one party has a fairness preference psychology, the project gain distribution coefficient will tilt towards that party. Fairness preference psychology can change the utility of the owner and contractor and narrow the utility gap between two parties.
abstractGer	A contractor proposes design changes to achieve design optimization in the design stage of major railway projects, which can effectively solve problems such as project cost overruns. In order to promote cooperation between the construction party and the owner in the design stage, the fairness preference theory was introduced. Based on the relationship characteristics of project participants in a major railway project, a Stackelberg game model between the owner and contractor was established. The influence of fairness preference psychology on both parties’ decision-making behavior and utility changes was discussed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulation analysis on the evolution results of the game model. The research results show the following: The project gain distribution coefficient of the owner and contractor will increase with the increase in their fairness perception strength. The acceptance rate of design changes will decrease with the increase in the contractor’s fairness perception strength, and the owner’s fairness perception intensity has no effect on the acceptance rate of design changes. When only one party has a fairness preference psychology, the project gain distribution coefficient will tilt towards that party. Fairness preference psychology can change the utility of the owner and contractor and narrow the utility gap between two parties.
abstract_unstemmed	A contractor proposes design changes to achieve design optimization in the design stage of major railway projects, which can effectively solve problems such as project cost overruns. In order to promote cooperation between the construction party and the owner in the design stage, the fairness preference theory was introduced. Based on the relationship characteristics of project participants in a major railway project, a Stackelberg game model between the owner and contractor was established. The influence of fairness preference psychology on both parties’ decision-making behavior and utility changes was discussed. MATLAB software is used to perform numerical simulation analysis on the evolution results of the game model. The research results show the following: The project gain distribution coefficient of the owner and contractor will increase with the increase in their fairness perception strength. The acceptance rate of design changes will decrease with the increase in the contractor’s fairness perception strength, and the owner’s fairness perception intensity has no effect on the acceptance rate of design changes. When only one party has a fairness preference psychology, the project gain distribution coefficient will tilt towards that party. Fairness preference psychology can change the utility of the owner and contractor and narrow the utility gap between two parties.
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title_short	Study on Design Optimization in Major Railway Projects with Fair Preference Based on Stackelberg Game
url	https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/5336591 https://doaj.org/article/e26c93ff18b54f47ba84013f8e9bb1d2 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/5336591 https://doaj.org/toc/1563-5147
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up_date	2024-07-03T22:40:27.604Z
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