Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment

The classic Cournot game ignores the influence of the players’ psychological behavior on the decision and cannot deal with the game problem of fuzzy information. To address such game situations, a credibilistic Cournot game is developed, where the optimistic value criterion derived from credibility...
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Autor*in:	Zhongwei Feng [verfasserIn] Yan Ma [verfasserIn] Yuzhong Yang [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2023

Schlagwörter:	Cournot game risk aversion credibility theory optimistic value criterion (

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Mathematics - MDPI AG, 2013, 11(2023), 4, p 1029
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:11 ; year:2023 ; number:4, p 1029

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.3390/math11041029

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ080219160

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520			\|a The classic Cournot game ignores the influence of the players’ psychological behavior on the decision and cannot deal with the game problem of fuzzy information. To address such game situations, a credibilistic Cournot game is developed, where the optimistic value criterion derived from credibility theory is used to describe risk-averse behavior of manufacturers and the associated parameters are characterized by fuzzy variables. Then, a concept of the (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity is proposed and its uniqueness is shown. Finally, the relevant results of the credibilistic Cournot game are applied to an example to illustrate the availability of our model, and a sensitivity analysis of the relationship between the (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity and confidence levels is performed. The results show that manufacturers’ (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity is positively related to the risk aversion level of their competitors and negatively to their own risk aversion level.
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language	English
source	In Mathematics 11(2023), 4, p 1029 volume:11 year:2023 number:4, p 1029
sourceStr	In Mathematics 11(2023), 4, p 1029 volume:11 year:2023 number:4, p 1029
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institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	Cournot game risk aversion credibility theory optimistic value criterion (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity Mathematics
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container_title	Mathematics
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Zhongwei Feng @@aut@@ Yan Ma @@aut@@ Yuzhong Yang @@aut@@
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callnumber-first	Q - Science
author	Zhongwei Feng
spellingShingle	Zhongwei Feng misc QA1-939 misc Cournot game misc risk aversion misc credibility theory misc optimistic value criterion misc (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity misc Mathematics Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment
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topic_title	QA1-939 Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment Cournot game risk aversion credibility theory optimistic value criterion (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity
topic	misc QA1-939 misc Cournot game misc risk aversion misc credibility theory misc optimistic value criterion misc (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity misc Mathematics
topic_unstemmed	misc QA1-939 misc Cournot game misc risk aversion misc credibility theory misc optimistic value criterion misc (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity misc Mathematics
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title	Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment
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title_full	Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment
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title_sort	credibilistic cournot game with risk aversion under a fuzzy environment
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title_auth	Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment
abstract	The classic Cournot game ignores the influence of the players’ psychological behavior on the decision and cannot deal with the game problem of fuzzy information. To address such game situations, a credibilistic Cournot game is developed, where the optimistic value criterion derived from credibility theory is used to describe risk-averse behavior of manufacturers and the associated parameters are characterized by fuzzy variables. Then, a concept of the (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity is proposed and its uniqueness is shown. Finally, the relevant results of the credibilistic Cournot game are applied to an example to illustrate the availability of our model, and a sensitivity analysis of the relationship between the (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity and confidence levels is performed. The results show that manufacturers’ (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity is positively related to the risk aversion level of their competitors and negatively to their own risk aversion level.
abstractGer	The classic Cournot game ignores the influence of the players’ psychological behavior on the decision and cannot deal with the game problem of fuzzy information. To address such game situations, a credibilistic Cournot game is developed, where the optimistic value criterion derived from credibility theory is used to describe risk-averse behavior of manufacturers and the associated parameters are characterized by fuzzy variables. Then, a concept of the (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity is proposed and its uniqueness is shown. Finally, the relevant results of the credibilistic Cournot game are applied to an example to illustrate the availability of our model, and a sensitivity analysis of the relationship between the (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity and confidence levels is performed. The results show that manufacturers’ (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity is positively related to the risk aversion level of their competitors and negatively to their own risk aversion level.
abstract_unstemmed	The classic Cournot game ignores the influence of the players’ psychological behavior on the decision and cannot deal with the game problem of fuzzy information. To address such game situations, a credibilistic Cournot game is developed, where the optimistic value criterion derived from credibility theory is used to describe risk-averse behavior of manufacturers and the associated parameters are characterized by fuzzy variables. Then, a concept of the (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity is proposed and its uniqueness is shown. Finally, the relevant results of the credibilistic Cournot game are applied to an example to illustrate the availability of our model, and a sensitivity analysis of the relationship between the (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity and confidence levels is performed. The results show that manufacturers’ (<i<α</i<<sub<1</sub<, <i<α</i<<sub<2</sub<)-optimistic equilibrium quantity is positively related to the risk aversion level of their competitors and negatively to their own risk aversion level.
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title_short	Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment
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Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment

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