Research on the Coordination of Quality Behavior of Supply 3 Chain of E-Commerce Platform under C2B Model of High-Grade E-Commerce Based on Differential Game
With the increasing demands of consumers for product grade, the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce emerges as required. In order to solve the problem of coordination and cooperation between e-commerce platforms and manufacturers, and to further develop the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce, this pa...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Bin Xu [verfasserIn] Zhouhao Zhang [verfasserIn] Xinqi Li [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2022 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research - MDPI AG, 2021, 17(2022), 4, Seite 1409-1430 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:17 ; year:2022 ; number:4 ; pages:1409-1430 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.3390/jtaer17040071 |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ083125221 |
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10.3390/jtaer17040071 doi (DE-627)DOAJ083125221 (DE-599)DOAJ3edbde9804254e0e9239e44d57af3756 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng HF5001-6182 Bin Xu verfasserin aut Research on the Coordination of Quality Behavior of Supply 3 Chain of E-Commerce Platform under C2B Model of High-Grade E-Commerce Based on Differential Game 2022 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier With the increasing demands of consumers for product grade, the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce emerges as required. In order to solve the problem of coordination and cooperation between e-commerce platforms and manufacturers, and to further develop the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce, this paper studies the coordination of supply chain interests by establishing a differential game model considering product grade factors. By comparing the equilibrium solutions of differential games under different decision-making situations, a cooperative coordination mechanism is proposed. Next, the equilibrium solution is further analyzed by means of numerical simulation. Finally, the influence of several important parameters on the equilibrium solution is discussed through sensitivity analysis. It is found that (1) the supply chain parties have optimal quality behavior in the centralized decision-making situation, and the overall benefit is the greatest. (2) Compared with the Nash non-cooperative game, the optimal quality behavior of the dominant party remains unchanged, and the optimal quality behavior of the following party is enhanced after both parties move from the Stackelberg master-slave game, and the optimal profits of both parties, as well as the overall increase. (3) The cooperative coordination model can coordinate the quality behavior of both sides of the supply chain when the benefit distribution coefficient is within a specific range. E-commerce C2B model of high-grade E-commerce differential game quality behavior coordination mechanism Business Zhouhao Zhang verfasserin aut Xinqi Li verfasserin aut In Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research MDPI AG, 2021 17(2022), 4, Seite 1409-1430 (DE-627)523199058 (DE-600)2266832-9 07181876 nnns volume:17 year:2022 number:4 pages:1409-1430 https://doi.org/10.3390/jtaer17040071 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/3edbde9804254e0e9239e44d57af3756 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/0718-1876/17/4/71 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/0718-1876 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2022 4 1409-1430 |
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Research on the Coordination of Quality Behavior of Supply 3 Chain of E-Commerce Platform under C2B Model of High-Grade E-Commerce Based on Differential Game |
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With the increasing demands of consumers for product grade, the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce emerges as required. In order to solve the problem of coordination and cooperation between e-commerce platforms and manufacturers, and to further develop the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce, this paper studies the coordination of supply chain interests by establishing a differential game model considering product grade factors. By comparing the equilibrium solutions of differential games under different decision-making situations, a cooperative coordination mechanism is proposed. Next, the equilibrium solution is further analyzed by means of numerical simulation. Finally, the influence of several important parameters on the equilibrium solution is discussed through sensitivity analysis. It is found that (1) the supply chain parties have optimal quality behavior in the centralized decision-making situation, and the overall benefit is the greatest. (2) Compared with the Nash non-cooperative game, the optimal quality behavior of the dominant party remains unchanged, and the optimal quality behavior of the following party is enhanced after both parties move from the Stackelberg master-slave game, and the optimal profits of both parties, as well as the overall increase. (3) The cooperative coordination model can coordinate the quality behavior of both sides of the supply chain when the benefit distribution coefficient is within a specific range. |
abstractGer |
With the increasing demands of consumers for product grade, the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce emerges as required. In order to solve the problem of coordination and cooperation between e-commerce platforms and manufacturers, and to further develop the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce, this paper studies the coordination of supply chain interests by establishing a differential game model considering product grade factors. By comparing the equilibrium solutions of differential games under different decision-making situations, a cooperative coordination mechanism is proposed. Next, the equilibrium solution is further analyzed by means of numerical simulation. Finally, the influence of several important parameters on the equilibrium solution is discussed through sensitivity analysis. It is found that (1) the supply chain parties have optimal quality behavior in the centralized decision-making situation, and the overall benefit is the greatest. (2) Compared with the Nash non-cooperative game, the optimal quality behavior of the dominant party remains unchanged, and the optimal quality behavior of the following party is enhanced after both parties move from the Stackelberg master-slave game, and the optimal profits of both parties, as well as the overall increase. (3) The cooperative coordination model can coordinate the quality behavior of both sides of the supply chain when the benefit distribution coefficient is within a specific range. |
abstract_unstemmed |
With the increasing demands of consumers for product grade, the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce emerges as required. In order to solve the problem of coordination and cooperation between e-commerce platforms and manufacturers, and to further develop the C2B model of high-grade e-commerce, this paper studies the coordination of supply chain interests by establishing a differential game model considering product grade factors. By comparing the equilibrium solutions of differential games under different decision-making situations, a cooperative coordination mechanism is proposed. Next, the equilibrium solution is further analyzed by means of numerical simulation. Finally, the influence of several important parameters on the equilibrium solution is discussed through sensitivity analysis. It is found that (1) the supply chain parties have optimal quality behavior in the centralized decision-making situation, and the overall benefit is the greatest. (2) Compared with the Nash non-cooperative game, the optimal quality behavior of the dominant party remains unchanged, and the optimal quality behavior of the following party is enhanced after both parties move from the Stackelberg master-slave game, and the optimal profits of both parties, as well as the overall increase. (3) The cooperative coordination model can coordinate the quality behavior of both sides of the supply chain when the benefit distribution coefficient is within a specific range. |
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Research on the Coordination of Quality Behavior of Supply 3 Chain of E-Commerce Platform under C2B Model of High-Grade E-Commerce Based on Differential Game |
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(2) Compared with the Nash non-cooperative game, the optimal quality behavior of the dominant party remains unchanged, and the optimal quality behavior of the following party is enhanced after both parties move from the Stackelberg master-slave game, and the optimal profits of both parties, as well as the overall increase. 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