Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds

This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Sourav Panda [verfasserIn] Yuanzhen Liu [verfasserIn] Gerhard Petrus Hancke [verfasserIn] Umair Mujtaba Qureshi [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2020

Schlagwörter:	side-channel attack personal identification number biometric verification PIN entry device

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Sensors - MDPI AG, 2003, 20(2020), 11, p 3015
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:20 ; year:2020 ; number:11, p 3015

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.3390/s20113015

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ085171344

Internformat


LEADER	01000caa a22002652 4500
001	DOAJ085171344
003	DE-627
005	20240412233051.0
007	cr uuu---uuuuu
008	230311s2020 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c
024	7		\|a 10.3390/s20113015 \|2 doi
035			\|a (DE-627)DOAJ085171344
035			\|a (DE-599)DOAJ4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba
040			\|a DE-627 \|b ger \|c DE-627 \|e rakwb
041			\|a eng
050		0	\|a TP1-1185
100	0		\|a Sourav Panda \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
245	1	0	\|a Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds
264		1	\|c 2020
336			\|a Text \|b txt \|2 rdacontent
337			\|a Computermedien \|b c \|2 rdamedia
338			\|a Online-Ressource \|b cr \|2 rdacarrier
520			\|a This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices.
650		4	\|a side-channel attack
650		4	\|a personal identification number
650		4	\|a biometric verification
650		4	\|a PIN entry device
653		0	\|a Chemical technology
700	0		\|a Yuanzhen Liu \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Gerhard Petrus Hancke \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Umair Mujtaba Qureshi \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
773	0	8	\|i In \|t Sensors \|d MDPI AG, 2003 \|g 20(2020), 11, p 3015 \|w (DE-627)331640910 \|w (DE-600)2052857-7 \|x 14248220 \|7 nnns
773	1	8	\|g volume:20 \|g year:2020 \|g number:11, p 3015
856	4	0	\|u https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113015 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u https://doaj.org/article/4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/11/3015 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	2	\|u https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220 \|y Journal toc \|z kostenfrei
912			\|a GBV_USEFLAG_A
912			\|a SYSFLAG_A
912			\|a GBV_DOAJ
912			\|a GBV_ILN_20
912			\|a GBV_ILN_22
912			\|a GBV_ILN_23
912			\|a GBV_ILN_24
912			\|a GBV_ILN_31
912			\|a GBV_ILN_39
912			\|a GBV_ILN_40
912			\|a GBV_ILN_60
912			\|a GBV_ILN_62
912			\|a GBV_ILN_63
912			\|a GBV_ILN_65
912			\|a GBV_ILN_69
912			\|a GBV_ILN_70
912			\|a GBV_ILN_73
912			\|a GBV_ILN_95
912			\|a GBV_ILN_105
912			\|a GBV_ILN_110
912			\|a GBV_ILN_151
912			\|a GBV_ILN_161
912			\|a GBV_ILN_170
912			\|a GBV_ILN_206
912			\|a GBV_ILN_213
912			\|a GBV_ILN_230
912			\|a GBV_ILN_285
912			\|a GBV_ILN_293
912			\|a GBV_ILN_370
912			\|a GBV_ILN_602
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2005
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2009
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2011
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2014
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2055
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2057
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2111
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2507
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4012
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4037
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4112
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4125
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4126
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4249
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4305
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4306
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4307
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4313
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4322
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4323
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4324
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4325
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4335
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4338
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4367
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4700
951			\|a AR
952			\|d 20 \|j 2020 \|e 11, p 3015

Indexfelder

author_variant	s p sp y l yl g p h gph u m q umq
matchkey_str	article:14248220:2020----::eairlcutcmntostaknvrfctoopnn
hierarchy_sort_str	2020
callnumber-subject-code	TP
publishDate	2020
allfields	10.3390/s20113015 doi (DE-627)DOAJ085171344 (DE-599)DOAJ4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TP1-1185 Sourav Panda verfasserin aut Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices. side-channel attack personal identification number biometric verification PIN entry device Chemical technology Yuanzhen Liu verfasserin aut Gerhard Petrus Hancke verfasserin aut Umair Mujtaba Qureshi verfasserin aut In Sensors MDPI AG, 2003 20(2020), 11, p 3015 (DE-627)331640910 (DE-600)2052857-7 14248220 nnns volume:20 year:2020 number:11, p 3015 https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/11/3015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 20 2020 11, p 3015
spelling	10.3390/s20113015 doi (DE-627)DOAJ085171344 (DE-599)DOAJ4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TP1-1185 Sourav Panda verfasserin aut Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices. side-channel attack personal identification number biometric verification PIN entry device Chemical technology Yuanzhen Liu verfasserin aut Gerhard Petrus Hancke verfasserin aut Umair Mujtaba Qureshi verfasserin aut In Sensors MDPI AG, 2003 20(2020), 11, p 3015 (DE-627)331640910 (DE-600)2052857-7 14248220 nnns volume:20 year:2020 number:11, p 3015 https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/11/3015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 20 2020 11, p 3015
allfields_unstemmed	10.3390/s20113015 doi (DE-627)DOAJ085171344 (DE-599)DOAJ4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TP1-1185 Sourav Panda verfasserin aut Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices. side-channel attack personal identification number biometric verification PIN entry device Chemical technology Yuanzhen Liu verfasserin aut Gerhard Petrus Hancke verfasserin aut Umair Mujtaba Qureshi verfasserin aut In Sensors MDPI AG, 2003 20(2020), 11, p 3015 (DE-627)331640910 (DE-600)2052857-7 14248220 nnns volume:20 year:2020 number:11, p 3015 https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/11/3015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 20 2020 11, p 3015
allfieldsGer	10.3390/s20113015 doi (DE-627)DOAJ085171344 (DE-599)DOAJ4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TP1-1185 Sourav Panda verfasserin aut Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices. side-channel attack personal identification number biometric verification PIN entry device Chemical technology Yuanzhen Liu verfasserin aut Gerhard Petrus Hancke verfasserin aut Umair Mujtaba Qureshi verfasserin aut In Sensors MDPI AG, 2003 20(2020), 11, p 3015 (DE-627)331640910 (DE-600)2052857-7 14248220 nnns volume:20 year:2020 number:11, p 3015 https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/11/3015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 20 2020 11, p 3015
allfieldsSound	10.3390/s20113015 doi (DE-627)DOAJ085171344 (DE-599)DOAJ4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng TP1-1185 Sourav Panda verfasserin aut Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds 2020 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices. side-channel attack personal identification number biometric verification PIN entry device Chemical technology Yuanzhen Liu verfasserin aut Gerhard Petrus Hancke verfasserin aut Umair Mujtaba Qureshi verfasserin aut In Sensors MDPI AG, 2003 20(2020), 11, p 3015 (DE-627)331640910 (DE-600)2052857-7 14248220 nnns volume:20 year:2020 number:11, p 3015 https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/11/3015 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 20 2020 11, p 3015
language	English
source	In Sensors 20(2020), 11, p 3015 volume:20 year:2020 number:11, p 3015
sourceStr	In Sensors 20(2020), 11, p 3015 volume:20 year:2020 number:11, p 3015
format_phy_str_mv	Article
institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	side-channel attack personal identification number biometric verification PIN entry device Chemical technology
isfreeaccess_bool	true
container_title	Sensors
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Sourav Panda @@aut@@ Yuanzhen Liu @@aut@@ Gerhard Petrus Hancke @@aut@@ Umair Mujtaba Qureshi @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2020-01-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	331640910
id	DOAJ085171344
language_de	englisch
fullrecord	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ085171344</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240412233051.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230311s2020 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.3390/s20113015</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ085171344</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJ4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">TP1-1185</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sourav Panda</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">side-channel attack</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">personal identification number</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">biometric verification</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">PIN entry device</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Chemical technology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Yuanzhen Liu</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Gerhard Petrus Hancke</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Umair Mujtaba Qureshi</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">Sensors</subfield><subfield code="d">MDPI AG, 2003</subfield><subfield code="g">20(2020), 11, p 3015</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)331640910</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2052857-7</subfield><subfield code="x">14248220</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:20</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2020</subfield><subfield code="g">number:11, p 3015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113015</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/11/3015</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_170</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2057</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2507</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">20</subfield><subfield code="j">2020</subfield><subfield code="e">11, p 3015</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
callnumber-first	T - Technology
author	Sourav Panda
spellingShingle	Sourav Panda misc TP1-1185 misc side-channel attack misc personal identification number misc biometric verification misc PIN entry device misc Chemical technology Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds
authorStr	Sourav Panda
ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv	@@773@@(DE-627)331640910
format	electronic Article
delete_txt_mv	keep
author_role	aut aut aut aut
collection	DOAJ
remote_str	true
callnumber-label	TP1-1185
illustrated	Not Illustrated
issn	14248220
topic_title	TP1-1185 Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds side-channel attack personal identification number biometric verification PIN entry device
topic	misc TP1-1185 misc side-channel attack misc personal identification number misc biometric verification misc PIN entry device misc Chemical technology
topic_unstemmed	misc TP1-1185 misc side-channel attack misc personal identification number misc biometric verification misc PIN entry device misc Chemical technology
topic_browse	misc TP1-1185 misc side-channel attack misc personal identification number misc biometric verification misc PIN entry device misc Chemical technology
format_facet	Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource
format_main_str_mv	Text Zeitschrift/Artikel
carriertype_str_mv	cr
hierarchy_parent_title	Sensors
hierarchy_parent_id	331640910
hierarchy_top_title	Sensors
isfreeaccess_txt	true
familylinks_str_mv	(DE-627)331640910 (DE-600)2052857-7
title	Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds
ctrlnum	(DE-627)DOAJ085171344 (DE-599)DOAJ4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba
title_full	Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds
author_sort	Sourav Panda
journal	Sensors
journalStr	Sensors
callnumber-first-code	T
lang_code	eng
isOA_bool	true
recordtype	marc
publishDateSort	2020
contenttype_str_mv	txt
author_browse	Sourav Panda Yuanzhen Liu Gerhard Petrus Hancke Umair Mujtaba Qureshi
container_volume	20
class	TP1-1185
format_se	Elektronische Aufsätze
author-letter	Sourav Panda
doi_str_mv	10.3390/s20113015
author2-role	verfasserin
title_sort	behavioral acoustic emanations: attack and verification of pin entry using keypress sounds
callnumber	TP1-1185
title_auth	Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds
abstract	This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices.
abstractGer	This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices.
abstract_unstemmed	This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices.
collection_details	GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700
container_issue	11, p 3015
title_short	Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds
url	https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113015 https://doaj.org/article/4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/11/3015 https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220
remote_bool	true
author2	Yuanzhen Liu Gerhard Petrus Hancke Umair Mujtaba Qureshi
author2Str	Yuanzhen Liu Gerhard Petrus Hancke Umair Mujtaba Qureshi
ppnlink	331640910
callnumber-subject	TP - Chemical Technology
mediatype_str_mv	c
isOA_txt	true
hochschulschrift_bool	false
doi_str	10.3390/s20113015
callnumber-a	TP1-1185
up_date	2024-07-04T02:06:49.247Z
_version_	1803612385968128000
fullrecord_marcxml	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ085171344</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240412233051.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230311s2020 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.3390/s20113015</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ085171344</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJ4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">TP1-1185</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sourav Panda</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper explores the security vulnerability of Personal Identification Number (PIN) or numeric passwords. Entry Device (PEDs) that use small strings of data (PINs, keys or passwords) as means of verifying the legitimacy of a user. Today, PEDs are commonly used by personnel in different industrial and consumer electronic applications, such as entry at security checkpoints, ATMs and customer kiosks, etc. In this paper, we propose a side-channel attack on a 4–6 digit random PIN key, and a PIN key user verification method. The intervals between two keystrokes are extracted from the acoustic emanation and used as features to train machine-learning models. The attack model has a 60% chance to recover the PIN key. The verification model has an 88% accuracy on identifying the user. Our attack methods can perform key recovery by using the acoustic side-channel at low cost. As a countermeasure, our verification method can improve the security of PIN entry devices.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">side-channel attack</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">personal identification number</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">biometric verification</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">PIN entry device</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Chemical technology</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Yuanzhen Liu</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Gerhard Petrus Hancke</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Umair Mujtaba Qureshi</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">Sensors</subfield><subfield code="d">MDPI AG, 2003</subfield><subfield code="g">20(2020), 11, p 3015</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)331640910</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2052857-7</subfield><subfield code="x">14248220</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:20</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2020</subfield><subfield code="g">number:11, p 3015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.3390/s20113015</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/4a970f9938e945da8cfa4a1c6aa0b5ba</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/20/11/3015</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/1424-8220</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_170</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2057</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2507</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">20</subfield><subfield code="j">2020</subfield><subfield code="e">11, p 3015</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
score	7.401991

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Schreiben Sie uns!

Behavioral Acoustic Emanations: Attack and Verification of PIN Entry Using Keypress Sounds

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Zugang & Verfügbarkeit

Vorhandene Bände

Nicht das Richtige dabei?