Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets

Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest using rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Egle Skliaustyte [verfasserIn] Matthias Weber [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2023

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: PLoS ONE - Public Library of Science (PLoS), 2007, 18(2023), 4
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:18 ; year:2023 ; number:4

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ089962435

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allfields	(DE-627)DOAJ089962435 (DE-599)DOAJc8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Egle Skliaustyte verfasserin aut Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest using rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a new way of providing incentives to originators, which is easier to implement. Our suggestion can be used if there is an additional market in which originators operate, where copying is not easily possible. In this case, intellectual property rights in one market can be replaced by subsidies in the other market. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies in the market for live performances. We develop a partial equilibrium model that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving and better for the originator. A numerical application example suggests that the subsidy scheme may indeed be better in the music industry. The subsidy scheme can be implemented as a voluntary option, which would even be possible without changing the legal framework of intellectual property rights. Medicine R Science Q Matthias Weber verfasserin aut In PLoS ONE Public Library of Science (PLoS), 2007 18(2023), 4 (DE-627)523574592 (DE-600)2267670-3 19326203 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:4 https://doaj.org/article/c8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 kostenfrei https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10124861/?tool=EBI kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_34 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_235 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 18 2023 4
spelling	(DE-627)DOAJ089962435 (DE-599)DOAJc8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Egle Skliaustyte verfasserin aut Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest using rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a new way of providing incentives to originators, which is easier to implement. Our suggestion can be used if there is an additional market in which originators operate, where copying is not easily possible. In this case, intellectual property rights in one market can be replaced by subsidies in the other market. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies in the market for live performances. We develop a partial equilibrium model that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving and better for the originator. A numerical application example suggests that the subsidy scheme may indeed be better in the music industry. The subsidy scheme can be implemented as a voluntary option, which would even be possible without changing the legal framework of intellectual property rights. Medicine R Science Q Matthias Weber verfasserin aut In PLoS ONE Public Library of Science (PLoS), 2007 18(2023), 4 (DE-627)523574592 (DE-600)2267670-3 19326203 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:4 https://doaj.org/article/c8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 kostenfrei https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10124861/?tool=EBI kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_34 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_235 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 18 2023 4
allfields_unstemmed	(DE-627)DOAJ089962435 (DE-599)DOAJc8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Egle Skliaustyte verfasserin aut Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest using rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a new way of providing incentives to originators, which is easier to implement. Our suggestion can be used if there is an additional market in which originators operate, where copying is not easily possible. In this case, intellectual property rights in one market can be replaced by subsidies in the other market. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies in the market for live performances. We develop a partial equilibrium model that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving and better for the originator. A numerical application example suggests that the subsidy scheme may indeed be better in the music industry. The subsidy scheme can be implemented as a voluntary option, which would even be possible without changing the legal framework of intellectual property rights. Medicine R Science Q Matthias Weber verfasserin aut In PLoS ONE Public Library of Science (PLoS), 2007 18(2023), 4 (DE-627)523574592 (DE-600)2267670-3 19326203 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:4 https://doaj.org/article/c8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 kostenfrei https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10124861/?tool=EBI kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_34 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_235 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 18 2023 4
allfieldsGer	(DE-627)DOAJ089962435 (DE-599)DOAJc8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Egle Skliaustyte verfasserin aut Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest using rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a new way of providing incentives to originators, which is easier to implement. Our suggestion can be used if there is an additional market in which originators operate, where copying is not easily possible. In this case, intellectual property rights in one market can be replaced by subsidies in the other market. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies in the market for live performances. We develop a partial equilibrium model that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving and better for the originator. A numerical application example suggests that the subsidy scheme may indeed be better in the music industry. The subsidy scheme can be implemented as a voluntary option, which would even be possible without changing the legal framework of intellectual property rights. Medicine R Science Q Matthias Weber verfasserin aut In PLoS ONE Public Library of Science (PLoS), 2007 18(2023), 4 (DE-627)523574592 (DE-600)2267670-3 19326203 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:4 https://doaj.org/article/c8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 kostenfrei https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10124861/?tool=EBI kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_34 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_235 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 18 2023 4
allfieldsSound	(DE-627)DOAJ089962435 (DE-599)DOAJc8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Egle Skliaustyte verfasserin aut Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest using rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a new way of providing incentives to originators, which is easier to implement. Our suggestion can be used if there is an additional market in which originators operate, where copying is not easily possible. In this case, intellectual property rights in one market can be replaced by subsidies in the other market. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies in the market for live performances. We develop a partial equilibrium model that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving and better for the originator. A numerical application example suggests that the subsidy scheme may indeed be better in the music industry. The subsidy scheme can be implemented as a voluntary option, which would even be possible without changing the legal framework of intellectual property rights. Medicine R Science Q Matthias Weber verfasserin aut In PLoS ONE Public Library of Science (PLoS), 2007 18(2023), 4 (DE-627)523574592 (DE-600)2267670-3 19326203 nnns volume:18 year:2023 number:4 https://doaj.org/article/c8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 kostenfrei https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10124861/?tool=EBI kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_34 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_235 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 18 2023 4
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title	Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets
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title_full	Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets
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title_sort	subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets
title_auth	Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets
abstract	Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest using rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a new way of providing incentives to originators, which is easier to implement. Our suggestion can be used if there is an additional market in which originators operate, where copying is not easily possible. In this case, intellectual property rights in one market can be replaced by subsidies in the other market. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies in the market for live performances. We develop a partial equilibrium model that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving and better for the originator. A numerical application example suggests that the subsidy scheme may indeed be better in the music industry. The subsidy scheme can be implemented as a voluntary option, which would even be possible without changing the legal framework of intellectual property rights.
abstractGer	Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest using rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a new way of providing incentives to originators, which is easier to implement. Our suggestion can be used if there is an additional market in which originators operate, where copying is not easily possible. In this case, intellectual property rights in one market can be replaced by subsidies in the other market. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies in the market for live performances. We develop a partial equilibrium model that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving and better for the originator. A numerical application example suggests that the subsidy scheme may indeed be better in the music industry. The subsidy scheme can be implemented as a voluntary option, which would even be possible without changing the legal framework of intellectual property rights.
abstract_unstemmed	Intellectual property rights are monopoly rights, which have undesirable welfare properties. Therefore, several studies suggest using rewards as incentives for innovation instead. However, these studies have thus far had little effect on actual policy, possibly because such rewards may be difficult to implement in practice. We suggest a new way of providing incentives to originators, which is easier to implement. Our suggestion can be used if there is an additional market in which originators operate, where copying is not easily possible. In this case, intellectual property rights in one market can be replaced by subsidies in the other market. Taking the music industry as example, copyrights in the records market could be replaced by subsidies in the market for live performances. We develop a partial equilibrium model that can be used to analyze in which cases the replacement of intellectual property rights in one market with subsidies in another market is welfare improving and better for the originator. A numerical application example suggests that the subsidy scheme may indeed be better in the music industry. The subsidy scheme can be implemented as a voluntary option, which would even be possible without changing the legal framework of intellectual property rights.
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title_short	Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets
url	https://doaj.org/article/c8de405caeb24907aeff5b5a5d76fdd7 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10124861/?tool=EBI https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203
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Subsidies versus intellectual property rights when innovators operate in two markets

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