Communication and group size on bank run games

This study examines the impact of communication and group size on bank run games, with a strategic focus on three-player games. In the baseline treatment group, communication is not allowed in two-player and three-player games. The main treatment consists of costless communication, cheap communicati...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

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Autor*in:	Wenjie Zheng [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2024

Schlagwörter:	Belief-based Learning Model Logistic Regression Analysis

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: MethodsX - Elsevier, 2015, 12(2024), Seite 102600-
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:12 ; year:2024 ; pages:102600-

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ092654630

Internformat


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allfields	10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 doi (DE-627)DOAJ092654630 (DE-599)DOAJ5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Wenjie Zheng verfasserin aut Communication and group size on bank run games 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study examines the impact of communication and group size on bank run games, with a strategic focus on three-player games. In the baseline treatment group, communication is not allowed in two-player and three-player games. The main treatment consists of costless communication, cheap communication, and costly communication. The sender's action becomes more predictable with the increasing communication costs due to a lack of incentives to deceive. We find that in the non-cooperative, two-player bank run game, communication fosters cooperative behavior with the learning effect in the repeated interaction. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with Nash Pareto dominant equilibrium in three-player games due to its complexity in decision-making in larger groups. The ultimate result presents the limitation of communication as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism. A public recommendation is that policymakers should increase public transparency and ensure public confidence in banking systems to mitigate the risks and uncertainty of bank runs. In sum, the study presents the following: • In a three-player bank run game, communication is less effective than in a two-player scenario. • Policymakers should ensure public confidence and increase public transparency of banking systems. Belief-based Learning Model Logistic Regression Analysis Science Q In MethodsX Elsevier, 2015 12(2024), Seite 102600- (DE-627)832786675 (DE-600)2830212-6 22150161 nnns volume:12 year:2024 pages:102600- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 kostenfrei http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2215016124000542 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2215-0161 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 12 2024 102600-
spelling	10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 doi (DE-627)DOAJ092654630 (DE-599)DOAJ5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Wenjie Zheng verfasserin aut Communication and group size on bank run games 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study examines the impact of communication and group size on bank run games, with a strategic focus on three-player games. In the baseline treatment group, communication is not allowed in two-player and three-player games. The main treatment consists of costless communication, cheap communication, and costly communication. The sender's action becomes more predictable with the increasing communication costs due to a lack of incentives to deceive. We find that in the non-cooperative, two-player bank run game, communication fosters cooperative behavior with the learning effect in the repeated interaction. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with Nash Pareto dominant equilibrium in three-player games due to its complexity in decision-making in larger groups. The ultimate result presents the limitation of communication as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism. A public recommendation is that policymakers should increase public transparency and ensure public confidence in banking systems to mitigate the risks and uncertainty of bank runs. In sum, the study presents the following: • In a three-player bank run game, communication is less effective than in a two-player scenario. • Policymakers should ensure public confidence and increase public transparency of banking systems. Belief-based Learning Model Logistic Regression Analysis Science Q In MethodsX Elsevier, 2015 12(2024), Seite 102600- (DE-627)832786675 (DE-600)2830212-6 22150161 nnns volume:12 year:2024 pages:102600- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 kostenfrei http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2215016124000542 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2215-0161 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 12 2024 102600-
allfields_unstemmed	10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 doi (DE-627)DOAJ092654630 (DE-599)DOAJ5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Wenjie Zheng verfasserin aut Communication and group size on bank run games 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study examines the impact of communication and group size on bank run games, with a strategic focus on three-player games. In the baseline treatment group, communication is not allowed in two-player and three-player games. The main treatment consists of costless communication, cheap communication, and costly communication. The sender's action becomes more predictable with the increasing communication costs due to a lack of incentives to deceive. We find that in the non-cooperative, two-player bank run game, communication fosters cooperative behavior with the learning effect in the repeated interaction. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with Nash Pareto dominant equilibrium in three-player games due to its complexity in decision-making in larger groups. The ultimate result presents the limitation of communication as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism. A public recommendation is that policymakers should increase public transparency and ensure public confidence in banking systems to mitigate the risks and uncertainty of bank runs. In sum, the study presents the following: • In a three-player bank run game, communication is less effective than in a two-player scenario. • Policymakers should ensure public confidence and increase public transparency of banking systems. Belief-based Learning Model Logistic Regression Analysis Science Q In MethodsX Elsevier, 2015 12(2024), Seite 102600- (DE-627)832786675 (DE-600)2830212-6 22150161 nnns volume:12 year:2024 pages:102600- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 kostenfrei http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2215016124000542 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2215-0161 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 12 2024 102600-
allfieldsGer	10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 doi (DE-627)DOAJ092654630 (DE-599)DOAJ5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Wenjie Zheng verfasserin aut Communication and group size on bank run games 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study examines the impact of communication and group size on bank run games, with a strategic focus on three-player games. In the baseline treatment group, communication is not allowed in two-player and three-player games. The main treatment consists of costless communication, cheap communication, and costly communication. The sender's action becomes more predictable with the increasing communication costs due to a lack of incentives to deceive. We find that in the non-cooperative, two-player bank run game, communication fosters cooperative behavior with the learning effect in the repeated interaction. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with Nash Pareto dominant equilibrium in three-player games due to its complexity in decision-making in larger groups. The ultimate result presents the limitation of communication as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism. A public recommendation is that policymakers should increase public transparency and ensure public confidence in banking systems to mitigate the risks and uncertainty of bank runs. In sum, the study presents the following: • In a three-player bank run game, communication is less effective than in a two-player scenario. • Policymakers should ensure public confidence and increase public transparency of banking systems. Belief-based Learning Model Logistic Regression Analysis Science Q In MethodsX Elsevier, 2015 12(2024), Seite 102600- (DE-627)832786675 (DE-600)2830212-6 22150161 nnns volume:12 year:2024 pages:102600- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 kostenfrei http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2215016124000542 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2215-0161 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 12 2024 102600-
allfieldsSound	10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 doi (DE-627)DOAJ092654630 (DE-599)DOAJ5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Wenjie Zheng verfasserin aut Communication and group size on bank run games 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study examines the impact of communication and group size on bank run games, with a strategic focus on three-player games. In the baseline treatment group, communication is not allowed in two-player and three-player games. The main treatment consists of costless communication, cheap communication, and costly communication. The sender's action becomes more predictable with the increasing communication costs due to a lack of incentives to deceive. We find that in the non-cooperative, two-player bank run game, communication fosters cooperative behavior with the learning effect in the repeated interaction. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with Nash Pareto dominant equilibrium in three-player games due to its complexity in decision-making in larger groups. The ultimate result presents the limitation of communication as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism. A public recommendation is that policymakers should increase public transparency and ensure public confidence in banking systems to mitigate the risks and uncertainty of bank runs. In sum, the study presents the following: • In a three-player bank run game, communication is less effective than in a two-player scenario. • Policymakers should ensure public confidence and increase public transparency of banking systems. Belief-based Learning Model Logistic Regression Analysis Science Q In MethodsX Elsevier, 2015 12(2024), Seite 102600- (DE-627)832786675 (DE-600)2830212-6 22150161 nnns volume:12 year:2024 pages:102600- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 kostenfrei http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2215016124000542 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2215-0161 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 12 2024 102600-
language	English
source	In MethodsX 12(2024), Seite 102600- volume:12 year:2024 pages:102600-
sourceStr	In MethodsX 12(2024), Seite 102600- volume:12 year:2024 pages:102600-
format_phy_str_mv	Article
institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	Belief-based Learning Model Logistic Regression Analysis Science Q
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container_title	MethodsX
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Wenjie Zheng @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2024-01-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	832786675
id	DOAJ092654630
language_de	englisch
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author	Wenjie Zheng
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topic_title	Communication and group size on bank run games Belief-based Learning Model Logistic Regression Analysis
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title	Communication and group size on bank run games
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title_full	Communication and group size on bank run games
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title_sort	communication and group size on bank run games
title_auth	Communication and group size on bank run games
abstract	This study examines the impact of communication and group size on bank run games, with a strategic focus on three-player games. In the baseline treatment group, communication is not allowed in two-player and three-player games. The main treatment consists of costless communication, cheap communication, and costly communication. The sender's action becomes more predictable with the increasing communication costs due to a lack of incentives to deceive. We find that in the non-cooperative, two-player bank run game, communication fosters cooperative behavior with the learning effect in the repeated interaction. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with Nash Pareto dominant equilibrium in three-player games due to its complexity in decision-making in larger groups. The ultimate result presents the limitation of communication as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism. A public recommendation is that policymakers should increase public transparency and ensure public confidence in banking systems to mitigate the risks and uncertainty of bank runs. In sum, the study presents the following: • In a three-player bank run game, communication is less effective than in a two-player scenario. • Policymakers should ensure public confidence and increase public transparency of banking systems.
abstractGer	This study examines the impact of communication and group size on bank run games, with a strategic focus on three-player games. In the baseline treatment group, communication is not allowed in two-player and three-player games. The main treatment consists of costless communication, cheap communication, and costly communication. The sender's action becomes more predictable with the increasing communication costs due to a lack of incentives to deceive. We find that in the non-cooperative, two-player bank run game, communication fosters cooperative behavior with the learning effect in the repeated interaction. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with Nash Pareto dominant equilibrium in three-player games due to its complexity in decision-making in larger groups. The ultimate result presents the limitation of communication as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism. A public recommendation is that policymakers should increase public transparency and ensure public confidence in banking systems to mitigate the risks and uncertainty of bank runs. In sum, the study presents the following: • In a three-player bank run game, communication is less effective than in a two-player scenario. • Policymakers should ensure public confidence and increase public transparency of banking systems.
abstract_unstemmed	This study examines the impact of communication and group size on bank run games, with a strategic focus on three-player games. In the baseline treatment group, communication is not allowed in two-player and three-player games. The main treatment consists of costless communication, cheap communication, and costly communication. The sender's action becomes more predictable with the increasing communication costs due to a lack of incentives to deceive. We find that in the non-cooperative, two-player bank run game, communication fosters cooperative behavior with the learning effect in the repeated interaction. However, coordination is far more difficult to achieve with Nash Pareto dominant equilibrium in three-player games due to its complexity in decision-making in larger groups. The ultimate result presents the limitation of communication as an efficiency-enhancing mechanism. A public recommendation is that policymakers should increase public transparency and ensure public confidence in banking systems to mitigate the risks and uncertainty of bank runs. In sum, the study presents the following: • In a three-player bank run game, communication is less effective than in a two-player scenario. • Policymakers should ensure public confidence and increase public transparency of banking systems.
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title_short	Communication and group size on bank run games
url	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mex.2024.102600 https://doaj.org/article/5b4c35c4b31740fcac4a8530dfdd9c76 http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2215016124000542 https://doaj.org/toc/2215-0161
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