Une gouvernance informelle dans la prison de Makala à Kinshasa

For more than thirty years, Makala prison in the city of Kinshasa in Congo has been faced with a contraction of its resources and a virtual absence of state subsidies. The limited presence of state agents and resources is compensated for by an informal organisation—locally known as the "governo...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Sylvie Ayimpam [verfasserIn] Michel Bisa Kibul [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch ; Französisch

Erschienen:	2020

Schlagwörter:	prison Kinshasa informal governance hybrid governance real governance informal regulation

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Socio - Les Éditions de la Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 2017, 14(2020), Seite 87-107
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:14 ; year:2020 ; pages:87-107

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.4000/socio.10591

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ092727093

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author	Sylvie Ayimpam
spellingShingle	Sylvie Ayimpam misc prison misc Kinshasa misc informal governance misc hybrid governance misc real governance misc informal regulation misc Social Sciences misc H Une gouvernance informelle dans la prison de Makala à Kinshasa
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topic_title	Une gouvernance informelle dans la prison de Makala à Kinshasa prison Kinshasa informal governance hybrid governance real governance informal regulation
topic	misc prison misc Kinshasa misc informal governance misc hybrid governance misc real governance misc informal regulation misc Social Sciences misc H
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title	Une gouvernance informelle dans la prison de Makala à Kinshasa
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title_full	Une gouvernance informelle dans la prison de Makala à Kinshasa
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title_sort	gouvernance informelle dans la prison de makala à kinshasa
title_auth	Une gouvernance informelle dans la prison de Makala à Kinshasa
abstract	For more than thirty years, Makala prison in the city of Kinshasa in Congo has been faced with a contraction of its resources and a virtual absence of state subsidies. The limited presence of state agents and resources is compensated for by an informal organisation—locally known as the "governor system" and built around a leader of the prisoners known as the "Governor general"—which organises and regulates the daily life of the prisoners. There is thus a "dual governance" in Makala: one official and the other informal. This article analyses the modalities of the informal governance system, considering it to be the one that enables the prison to be managed on a day-to-day basis. It examines the characteristics of informal governance and its unique relationship with formal governance. It shows that this system of governors, structured by informal norms—often implicit, sometimes explicit—is the relatively stable product of an "arrangement" between the official prison authorities and the prisoner-managers. It highlights the hierarchical and authoritarian structure of the informal organisation and the regulation of the rent-seeking economy set up to finance the day-to-day running of the prison. The singular relationship between these two forms of governance allows the Makala prison to remain a penitentiary belonging to the state, but whose financial and material resources come from external private resources. This way of financing and managing the prison appears to be a kind of informal public-private partnership, a new and highly original form of "hybrid governance".
abstractGer	For more than thirty years, Makala prison in the city of Kinshasa in Congo has been faced with a contraction of its resources and a virtual absence of state subsidies. The limited presence of state agents and resources is compensated for by an informal organisation—locally known as the "governor system" and built around a leader of the prisoners known as the "Governor general"—which organises and regulates the daily life of the prisoners. There is thus a "dual governance" in Makala: one official and the other informal. This article analyses the modalities of the informal governance system, considering it to be the one that enables the prison to be managed on a day-to-day basis. It examines the characteristics of informal governance and its unique relationship with formal governance. It shows that this system of governors, structured by informal norms—often implicit, sometimes explicit—is the relatively stable product of an "arrangement" between the official prison authorities and the prisoner-managers. It highlights the hierarchical and authoritarian structure of the informal organisation and the regulation of the rent-seeking economy set up to finance the day-to-day running of the prison. The singular relationship between these two forms of governance allows the Makala prison to remain a penitentiary belonging to the state, but whose financial and material resources come from external private resources. This way of financing and managing the prison appears to be a kind of informal public-private partnership, a new and highly original form of "hybrid governance".
abstract_unstemmed	For more than thirty years, Makala prison in the city of Kinshasa in Congo has been faced with a contraction of its resources and a virtual absence of state subsidies. The limited presence of state agents and resources is compensated for by an informal organisation—locally known as the "governor system" and built around a leader of the prisoners known as the "Governor general"—which organises and regulates the daily life of the prisoners. There is thus a "dual governance" in Makala: one official and the other informal. This article analyses the modalities of the informal governance system, considering it to be the one that enables the prison to be managed on a day-to-day basis. It examines the characteristics of informal governance and its unique relationship with formal governance. It shows that this system of governors, structured by informal norms—often implicit, sometimes explicit—is the relatively stable product of an "arrangement" between the official prison authorities and the prisoner-managers. It highlights the hierarchical and authoritarian structure of the informal organisation and the regulation of the rent-seeking economy set up to finance the day-to-day running of the prison. The singular relationship between these two forms of governance allows the Makala prison to remain a penitentiary belonging to the state, but whose financial and material resources come from external private resources. This way of financing and managing the prison appears to be a kind of informal public-private partnership, a new and highly original form of "hybrid governance".
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title_short	Une gouvernance informelle dans la prison de Makala à Kinshasa
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