An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System

The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Kai Ou [verfasserIn] Yu Shi [verfasserIn] Wenwen Zhou [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2024

Schlagwörter:	tripartite evolutionary game green technology innovation coal power firms dual-regulatory system

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Energies - MDPI AG, 2008, 17(2024), 3, p 607
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:17 ; year:2024 ; number:3, p 607

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.3390/en17030607

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ094500215

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allfields	10.3390/en17030607 doi (DE-627)DOAJ094500215 (DE-599)DOAJbe3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Kai Ou verfasserin aut An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms’ GTI behavior under China’s dual-regulatory system, this paper introduces environmental impact coefficients and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model (EGM) from the perspective of CER. The influencing factors and interactive relationships among them are analyzed. Additionally, through numerical simulation, the impacts of changes in central and local government S&P (subsidies and penalties) on the evolution of the system are also obtained. The findings indicate the following: (1) Enhancing the initial willingness can accelerate the system’s attainment of an optimal state. The local government exhibits a slower pace of evolution. Coal power firms are more sensitive to changes in the initial willingness of the central government. (2) The local government is more sensitive to changes in the central government’s S&P intensity rather than changes in the central government’s initial willingness. Low levels of central government S&P and high penalties are ineffective, while high subsidies can lead to a sudden decrease in the local government’s willingness. (3) Local government penalties have a positive correlation with their effectiveness in promoting GTI, whereas high subsidies are ineffective. (4) The separate implementation of subsidies or penalties by either the central or the local government is detrimental to achieving the optimal state. Such an approach renders the fluctuant or negative behavior of the local government and coal power firms. tripartite evolutionary game green technology innovation coal power firms dual-regulatory system Technology T Yu Shi verfasserin aut Wenwen Zhou verfasserin aut In Energies MDPI AG, 2008 17(2024), 3, p 607 (DE-627)572083742 (DE-600)2437446-5 19961073 nnns volume:17 year:2024 number:3, p 607 https://doi.org/10.3390/en17030607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/be3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/3/607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1996-1073 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2024 3, p 607
spelling	10.3390/en17030607 doi (DE-627)DOAJ094500215 (DE-599)DOAJbe3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Kai Ou verfasserin aut An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms’ GTI behavior under China’s dual-regulatory system, this paper introduces environmental impact coefficients and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model (EGM) from the perspective of CER. The influencing factors and interactive relationships among them are analyzed. Additionally, through numerical simulation, the impacts of changes in central and local government S&P (subsidies and penalties) on the evolution of the system are also obtained. The findings indicate the following: (1) Enhancing the initial willingness can accelerate the system’s attainment of an optimal state. The local government exhibits a slower pace of evolution. Coal power firms are more sensitive to changes in the initial willingness of the central government. (2) The local government is more sensitive to changes in the central government’s S&P intensity rather than changes in the central government’s initial willingness. Low levels of central government S&P and high penalties are ineffective, while high subsidies can lead to a sudden decrease in the local government’s willingness. (3) Local government penalties have a positive correlation with their effectiveness in promoting GTI, whereas high subsidies are ineffective. (4) The separate implementation of subsidies or penalties by either the central or the local government is detrimental to achieving the optimal state. Such an approach renders the fluctuant or negative behavior of the local government and coal power firms. tripartite evolutionary game green technology innovation coal power firms dual-regulatory system Technology T Yu Shi verfasserin aut Wenwen Zhou verfasserin aut In Energies MDPI AG, 2008 17(2024), 3, p 607 (DE-627)572083742 (DE-600)2437446-5 19961073 nnns volume:17 year:2024 number:3, p 607 https://doi.org/10.3390/en17030607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/be3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/3/607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1996-1073 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2024 3, p 607
allfields_unstemmed	10.3390/en17030607 doi (DE-627)DOAJ094500215 (DE-599)DOAJbe3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Kai Ou verfasserin aut An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms’ GTI behavior under China’s dual-regulatory system, this paper introduces environmental impact coefficients and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model (EGM) from the perspective of CER. The influencing factors and interactive relationships among them are analyzed. Additionally, through numerical simulation, the impacts of changes in central and local government S&P (subsidies and penalties) on the evolution of the system are also obtained. The findings indicate the following: (1) Enhancing the initial willingness can accelerate the system’s attainment of an optimal state. The local government exhibits a slower pace of evolution. Coal power firms are more sensitive to changes in the initial willingness of the central government. (2) The local government is more sensitive to changes in the central government’s S&P intensity rather than changes in the central government’s initial willingness. Low levels of central government S&P and high penalties are ineffective, while high subsidies can lead to a sudden decrease in the local government’s willingness. (3) Local government penalties have a positive correlation with their effectiveness in promoting GTI, whereas high subsidies are ineffective. (4) The separate implementation of subsidies or penalties by either the central or the local government is detrimental to achieving the optimal state. Such an approach renders the fluctuant or negative behavior of the local government and coal power firms. tripartite evolutionary game green technology innovation coal power firms dual-regulatory system Technology T Yu Shi verfasserin aut Wenwen Zhou verfasserin aut In Energies MDPI AG, 2008 17(2024), 3, p 607 (DE-627)572083742 (DE-600)2437446-5 19961073 nnns volume:17 year:2024 number:3, p 607 https://doi.org/10.3390/en17030607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/be3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/3/607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1996-1073 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2024 3, p 607
allfieldsGer	10.3390/en17030607 doi (DE-627)DOAJ094500215 (DE-599)DOAJbe3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Kai Ou verfasserin aut An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms’ GTI behavior under China’s dual-regulatory system, this paper introduces environmental impact coefficients and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model (EGM) from the perspective of CER. The influencing factors and interactive relationships among them are analyzed. Additionally, through numerical simulation, the impacts of changes in central and local government S&P (subsidies and penalties) on the evolution of the system are also obtained. The findings indicate the following: (1) Enhancing the initial willingness can accelerate the system’s attainment of an optimal state. The local government exhibits a slower pace of evolution. Coal power firms are more sensitive to changes in the initial willingness of the central government. (2) The local government is more sensitive to changes in the central government’s S&P intensity rather than changes in the central government’s initial willingness. Low levels of central government S&P and high penalties are ineffective, while high subsidies can lead to a sudden decrease in the local government’s willingness. (3) Local government penalties have a positive correlation with their effectiveness in promoting GTI, whereas high subsidies are ineffective. (4) The separate implementation of subsidies or penalties by either the central or the local government is detrimental to achieving the optimal state. Such an approach renders the fluctuant or negative behavior of the local government and coal power firms. tripartite evolutionary game green technology innovation coal power firms dual-regulatory system Technology T Yu Shi verfasserin aut Wenwen Zhou verfasserin aut In Energies MDPI AG, 2008 17(2024), 3, p 607 (DE-627)572083742 (DE-600)2437446-5 19961073 nnns volume:17 year:2024 number:3, p 607 https://doi.org/10.3390/en17030607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/be3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/3/607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1996-1073 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2024 3, p 607
allfieldsSound	10.3390/en17030607 doi (DE-627)DOAJ094500215 (DE-599)DOAJbe3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Kai Ou verfasserin aut An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms’ GTI behavior under China’s dual-regulatory system, this paper introduces environmental impact coefficients and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model (EGM) from the perspective of CER. The influencing factors and interactive relationships among them are analyzed. Additionally, through numerical simulation, the impacts of changes in central and local government S&P (subsidies and penalties) on the evolution of the system are also obtained. The findings indicate the following: (1) Enhancing the initial willingness can accelerate the system’s attainment of an optimal state. The local government exhibits a slower pace of evolution. Coal power firms are more sensitive to changes in the initial willingness of the central government. (2) The local government is more sensitive to changes in the central government’s S&P intensity rather than changes in the central government’s initial willingness. Low levels of central government S&P and high penalties are ineffective, while high subsidies can lead to a sudden decrease in the local government’s willingness. (3) Local government penalties have a positive correlation with their effectiveness in promoting GTI, whereas high subsidies are ineffective. (4) The separate implementation of subsidies or penalties by either the central or the local government is detrimental to achieving the optimal state. Such an approach renders the fluctuant or negative behavior of the local government and coal power firms. tripartite evolutionary game green technology innovation coal power firms dual-regulatory system Technology T Yu Shi verfasserin aut Wenwen Zhou verfasserin aut In Energies MDPI AG, 2008 17(2024), 3, p 607 (DE-627)572083742 (DE-600)2437446-5 19961073 nnns volume:17 year:2024 number:3, p 607 https://doi.org/10.3390/en17030607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/be3a89b6c5e94169b89db121c53ca527 kostenfrei https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/17/3/607 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1996-1073 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 17 2024 3, p 607
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author	Kai Ou
spellingShingle	Kai Ou misc tripartite evolutionary game misc green technology innovation misc coal power firms misc dual-regulatory system misc Technology misc T An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System
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topic_title	An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System tripartite evolutionary game green technology innovation coal power firms dual-regulatory system
topic	misc tripartite evolutionary game misc green technology innovation misc coal power firms misc dual-regulatory system misc Technology misc T
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title	An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System
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title_sort	evolutionary game study on green technology innovation of coal power firms under the dual-regulatory system
title_auth	An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System
abstract	The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms’ GTI behavior under China’s dual-regulatory system, this paper introduces environmental impact coefficients and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model (EGM) from the perspective of CER. The influencing factors and interactive relationships among them are analyzed. Additionally, through numerical simulation, the impacts of changes in central and local government S&P (subsidies and penalties) on the evolution of the system are also obtained. The findings indicate the following: (1) Enhancing the initial willingness can accelerate the system’s attainment of an optimal state. The local government exhibits a slower pace of evolution. Coal power firms are more sensitive to changes in the initial willingness of the central government. (2) The local government is more sensitive to changes in the central government’s S&P intensity rather than changes in the central government’s initial willingness. Low levels of central government S&P and high penalties are ineffective, while high subsidies can lead to a sudden decrease in the local government’s willingness. (3) Local government penalties have a positive correlation with their effectiveness in promoting GTI, whereas high subsidies are ineffective. (4) The separate implementation of subsidies or penalties by either the central or the local government is detrimental to achieving the optimal state. Such an approach renders the fluctuant or negative behavior of the local government and coal power firms.
abstractGer	The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms’ GTI behavior under China’s dual-regulatory system, this paper introduces environmental impact coefficients and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model (EGM) from the perspective of CER. The influencing factors and interactive relationships among them are analyzed. Additionally, through numerical simulation, the impacts of changes in central and local government S&P (subsidies and penalties) on the evolution of the system are also obtained. The findings indicate the following: (1) Enhancing the initial willingness can accelerate the system’s attainment of an optimal state. The local government exhibits a slower pace of evolution. Coal power firms are more sensitive to changes in the initial willingness of the central government. (2) The local government is more sensitive to changes in the central government’s S&P intensity rather than changes in the central government’s initial willingness. Low levels of central government S&P and high penalties are ineffective, while high subsidies can lead to a sudden decrease in the local government’s willingness. (3) Local government penalties have a positive correlation with their effectiveness in promoting GTI, whereas high subsidies are ineffective. (4) The separate implementation of subsidies or penalties by either the central or the local government is detrimental to achieving the optimal state. Such an approach renders the fluctuant or negative behavior of the local government and coal power firms.
abstract_unstemmed	The transformation of Chinese coal power firms is crucial for achieving carbon emission reduction (CER) goals, and promoting green technology innovation (GTI) is the key for the achievement. To examine the interactive mechanism of central and local government regulatory behavior and coal power firms’ GTI behavior under China’s dual-regulatory system, this paper introduces environmental impact coefficients and develops a tripartite evolutionary game model (EGM) from the perspective of CER. The influencing factors and interactive relationships among them are analyzed. Additionally, through numerical simulation, the impacts of changes in central and local government S&P (subsidies and penalties) on the evolution of the system are also obtained. The findings indicate the following: (1) Enhancing the initial willingness can accelerate the system’s attainment of an optimal state. The local government exhibits a slower pace of evolution. Coal power firms are more sensitive to changes in the initial willingness of the central government. (2) The local government is more sensitive to changes in the central government’s S&P intensity rather than changes in the central government’s initial willingness. Low levels of central government S&P and high penalties are ineffective, while high subsidies can lead to a sudden decrease in the local government’s willingness. (3) Local government penalties have a positive correlation with their effectiveness in promoting GTI, whereas high subsidies are ineffective. (4) The separate implementation of subsidies or penalties by either the central or the local government is detrimental to achieving the optimal state. Such an approach renders the fluctuant or negative behavior of the local government and coal power firms.
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title_short	An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System
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An Evolutionary Game Study on Green Technology Innovation of Coal power Firms under the Dual-Regulatory System

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