Impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: Based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in China
Promoting equal access to public services and improving people's well-being is a key link in building a modern national governance system in China. However, under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system, local governments face the “dilemma” of economic growth goals and the improvement...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Yamei Wang [verfasserIn] Xiuquan Huang [verfasserIn] Tao Zhang [verfasserIn] Bo Jiang [verfasserIn] Xi Wang [verfasserIn] |
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E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
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2024 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Heliyon - Elsevier, 2016, 10(2024), 4, Seite e26511- |
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volume:10 ; year:2024 ; number:4 ; pages:e26511- |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26511 |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ095612130 |
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520 | |a Promoting equal access to public services and improving people's well-being is a key link in building a modern national governance system in China. However, under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system, local governments face the “dilemma” of economic growth goals and the improvement of people's livelihoods. China's basic public services still have the problems of insufficient supply quantity, unbalanced structure and low efficiency. This paper aims to explore the impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on basic public services, and provide a theoretical and practical basis for deepening the reform of China's fiscal and taxation system, perfecting the transfer payment system, and improving the public service provision at the present stage. Under the premise of theoretical hypothesis, based on the panel data of 178 prefecture-level cities in China from 2008 to 2019, which is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook and the Work report of prefecture-level governments, the fixed effect model and threshold model are used for the empirical test. The results show that: first, the increase of fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on supply of basic public services in prefecture-level cities; second, the local government competition aiming at economic growth will intensify the negative impact, and make the relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic public services show nonlinear characteristics; Third, compared with developed areas, the strengthening regulatory effect of local government competition is more obvious in less-developed areas, such as western and northeastern regions, and third-tier, fourth-tier, and fifth-tier cities. Based on these findings, this paper draws the following policy implications: strengthen the reform of the fiscal and taxation system below the provincial level, promote the construction of a direct transfer payment mechanism, adjust the standards and methods of performance appraisal, and use modern information technology to improve the public service demand and interest expression mechanisms. | ||
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10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26511 doi (DE-627)DOAJ095612130 (DE-599)DOAJ9812f16804814cbc8d22dd5e1d4a774a DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Q1-390 H1-99 Yamei Wang verfasserin aut Impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: Based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in China 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Promoting equal access to public services and improving people's well-being is a key link in building a modern national governance system in China. However, under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system, local governments face the “dilemma” of economic growth goals and the improvement of people's livelihoods. China's basic public services still have the problems of insufficient supply quantity, unbalanced structure and low efficiency. This paper aims to explore the impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on basic public services, and provide a theoretical and practical basis for deepening the reform of China's fiscal and taxation system, perfecting the transfer payment system, and improving the public service provision at the present stage. Under the premise of theoretical hypothesis, based on the panel data of 178 prefecture-level cities in China from 2008 to 2019, which is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook and the Work report of prefecture-level governments, the fixed effect model and threshold model are used for the empirical test. The results show that: first, the increase of fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on supply of basic public services in prefecture-level cities; second, the local government competition aiming at economic growth will intensify the negative impact, and make the relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic public services show nonlinear characteristics; Third, compared with developed areas, the strengthening regulatory effect of local government competition is more obvious in less-developed areas, such as western and northeastern regions, and third-tier, fourth-tier, and fifth-tier cities. Based on these findings, this paper draws the following policy implications: strengthen the reform of the fiscal and taxation system below the provincial level, promote the construction of a direct transfer payment mechanism, adjust the standards and methods of performance appraisal, and use modern information technology to improve the public service demand and interest expression mechanisms. Fiscal decentralization Local government competition Public service supply Science (General) Social sciences (General) Xiuquan Huang verfasserin aut Tao Zhang verfasserin aut Bo Jiang verfasserin aut Xi Wang verfasserin aut In Heliyon Elsevier, 2016 10(2024), 4, Seite e26511- (DE-627)835893197 (DE-600)2835763-2 24058440 nnns volume:10 year:2024 number:4 pages:e26511- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26511 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/9812f16804814cbc8d22dd5e1d4a774a kostenfrei http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844024025428 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2405-8440 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2024 4 e26511- |
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10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26511 doi (DE-627)DOAJ095612130 (DE-599)DOAJ9812f16804814cbc8d22dd5e1d4a774a DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Q1-390 H1-99 Yamei Wang verfasserin aut Impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: Based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in China 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Promoting equal access to public services and improving people's well-being is a key link in building a modern national governance system in China. However, under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system, local governments face the “dilemma” of economic growth goals and the improvement of people's livelihoods. China's basic public services still have the problems of insufficient supply quantity, unbalanced structure and low efficiency. This paper aims to explore the impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on basic public services, and provide a theoretical and practical basis for deepening the reform of China's fiscal and taxation system, perfecting the transfer payment system, and improving the public service provision at the present stage. Under the premise of theoretical hypothesis, based on the panel data of 178 prefecture-level cities in China from 2008 to 2019, which is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook and the Work report of prefecture-level governments, the fixed effect model and threshold model are used for the empirical test. The results show that: first, the increase of fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on supply of basic public services in prefecture-level cities; second, the local government competition aiming at economic growth will intensify the negative impact, and make the relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic public services show nonlinear characteristics; Third, compared with developed areas, the strengthening regulatory effect of local government competition is more obvious in less-developed areas, such as western and northeastern regions, and third-tier, fourth-tier, and fifth-tier cities. Based on these findings, this paper draws the following policy implications: strengthen the reform of the fiscal and taxation system below the provincial level, promote the construction of a direct transfer payment mechanism, adjust the standards and methods of performance appraisal, and use modern information technology to improve the public service demand and interest expression mechanisms. Fiscal decentralization Local government competition Public service supply Science (General) Social sciences (General) Xiuquan Huang verfasserin aut Tao Zhang verfasserin aut Bo Jiang verfasserin aut Xi Wang verfasserin aut In Heliyon Elsevier, 2016 10(2024), 4, Seite e26511- (DE-627)835893197 (DE-600)2835763-2 24058440 nnns volume:10 year:2024 number:4 pages:e26511- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26511 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/9812f16804814cbc8d22dd5e1d4a774a kostenfrei http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844024025428 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2405-8440 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2024 4 e26511- |
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10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26511 doi (DE-627)DOAJ095612130 (DE-599)DOAJ9812f16804814cbc8d22dd5e1d4a774a DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Q1-390 H1-99 Yamei Wang verfasserin aut Impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: Based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in China 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Promoting equal access to public services and improving people's well-being is a key link in building a modern national governance system in China. However, under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system, local governments face the “dilemma” of economic growth goals and the improvement of people's livelihoods. China's basic public services still have the problems of insufficient supply quantity, unbalanced structure and low efficiency. This paper aims to explore the impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on basic public services, and provide a theoretical and practical basis for deepening the reform of China's fiscal and taxation system, perfecting the transfer payment system, and improving the public service provision at the present stage. Under the premise of theoretical hypothesis, based on the panel data of 178 prefecture-level cities in China from 2008 to 2019, which is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook and the Work report of prefecture-level governments, the fixed effect model and threshold model are used for the empirical test. The results show that: first, the increase of fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on supply of basic public services in prefecture-level cities; second, the local government competition aiming at economic growth will intensify the negative impact, and make the relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic public services show nonlinear characteristics; Third, compared with developed areas, the strengthening regulatory effect of local government competition is more obvious in less-developed areas, such as western and northeastern regions, and third-tier, fourth-tier, and fifth-tier cities. Based on these findings, this paper draws the following policy implications: strengthen the reform of the fiscal and taxation system below the provincial level, promote the construction of a direct transfer payment mechanism, adjust the standards and methods of performance appraisal, and use modern information technology to improve the public service demand and interest expression mechanisms. Fiscal decentralization Local government competition Public service supply Science (General) Social sciences (General) Xiuquan Huang verfasserin aut Tao Zhang verfasserin aut Bo Jiang verfasserin aut Xi Wang verfasserin aut In Heliyon Elsevier, 2016 10(2024), 4, Seite e26511- (DE-627)835893197 (DE-600)2835763-2 24058440 nnns volume:10 year:2024 number:4 pages:e26511- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26511 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/9812f16804814cbc8d22dd5e1d4a774a kostenfrei http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844024025428 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2405-8440 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2024 4 e26511- |
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10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26511 doi (DE-627)DOAJ095612130 (DE-599)DOAJ9812f16804814cbc8d22dd5e1d4a774a DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Q1-390 H1-99 Yamei Wang verfasserin aut Impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: Based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in China 2024 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Promoting equal access to public services and improving people's well-being is a key link in building a modern national governance system in China. However, under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system, local governments face the “dilemma” of economic growth goals and the improvement of people's livelihoods. China's basic public services still have the problems of insufficient supply quantity, unbalanced structure and low efficiency. This paper aims to explore the impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on basic public services, and provide a theoretical and practical basis for deepening the reform of China's fiscal and taxation system, perfecting the transfer payment system, and improving the public service provision at the present stage. Under the premise of theoretical hypothesis, based on the panel data of 178 prefecture-level cities in China from 2008 to 2019, which is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook and the Work report of prefecture-level governments, the fixed effect model and threshold model are used for the empirical test. The results show that: first, the increase of fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on supply of basic public services in prefecture-level cities; second, the local government competition aiming at economic growth will intensify the negative impact, and make the relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic public services show nonlinear characteristics; Third, compared with developed areas, the strengthening regulatory effect of local government competition is more obvious in less-developed areas, such as western and northeastern regions, and third-tier, fourth-tier, and fifth-tier cities. Based on these findings, this paper draws the following policy implications: strengthen the reform of the fiscal and taxation system below the provincial level, promote the construction of a direct transfer payment mechanism, adjust the standards and methods of performance appraisal, and use modern information technology to improve the public service demand and interest expression mechanisms. Fiscal decentralization Local government competition Public service supply Science (General) Social sciences (General) Xiuquan Huang verfasserin aut Tao Zhang verfasserin aut Bo Jiang verfasserin aut Xi Wang verfasserin aut In Heliyon Elsevier, 2016 10(2024), 4, Seite e26511- (DE-627)835893197 (DE-600)2835763-2 24058440 nnns volume:10 year:2024 number:4 pages:e26511- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e26511 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/9812f16804814cbc8d22dd5e1d4a774a kostenfrei http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2405844024025428 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2405-8440 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 10 2024 4 e26511- |
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Q1-390 H1-99 Impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: Based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in China Fiscal decentralization Local government competition Public service supply |
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Impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: Based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in China |
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impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in china |
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Impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: Based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in China |
abstract |
Promoting equal access to public services and improving people's well-being is a key link in building a modern national governance system in China. However, under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system, local governments face the “dilemma” of economic growth goals and the improvement of people's livelihoods. China's basic public services still have the problems of insufficient supply quantity, unbalanced structure and low efficiency. This paper aims to explore the impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on basic public services, and provide a theoretical and practical basis for deepening the reform of China's fiscal and taxation system, perfecting the transfer payment system, and improving the public service provision at the present stage. Under the premise of theoretical hypothesis, based on the panel data of 178 prefecture-level cities in China from 2008 to 2019, which is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook and the Work report of prefecture-level governments, the fixed effect model and threshold model are used for the empirical test. The results show that: first, the increase of fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on supply of basic public services in prefecture-level cities; second, the local government competition aiming at economic growth will intensify the negative impact, and make the relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic public services show nonlinear characteristics; Third, compared with developed areas, the strengthening regulatory effect of local government competition is more obvious in less-developed areas, such as western and northeastern regions, and third-tier, fourth-tier, and fifth-tier cities. Based on these findings, this paper draws the following policy implications: strengthen the reform of the fiscal and taxation system below the provincial level, promote the construction of a direct transfer payment mechanism, adjust the standards and methods of performance appraisal, and use modern information technology to improve the public service demand and interest expression mechanisms. |
abstractGer |
Promoting equal access to public services and improving people's well-being is a key link in building a modern national governance system in China. However, under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system, local governments face the “dilemma” of economic growth goals and the improvement of people's livelihoods. China's basic public services still have the problems of insufficient supply quantity, unbalanced structure and low efficiency. This paper aims to explore the impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on basic public services, and provide a theoretical and practical basis for deepening the reform of China's fiscal and taxation system, perfecting the transfer payment system, and improving the public service provision at the present stage. Under the premise of theoretical hypothesis, based on the panel data of 178 prefecture-level cities in China from 2008 to 2019, which is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook and the Work report of prefecture-level governments, the fixed effect model and threshold model are used for the empirical test. The results show that: first, the increase of fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on supply of basic public services in prefecture-level cities; second, the local government competition aiming at economic growth will intensify the negative impact, and make the relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic public services show nonlinear characteristics; Third, compared with developed areas, the strengthening regulatory effect of local government competition is more obvious in less-developed areas, such as western and northeastern regions, and third-tier, fourth-tier, and fifth-tier cities. Based on these findings, this paper draws the following policy implications: strengthen the reform of the fiscal and taxation system below the provincial level, promote the construction of a direct transfer payment mechanism, adjust the standards and methods of performance appraisal, and use modern information technology to improve the public service demand and interest expression mechanisms. |
abstract_unstemmed |
Promoting equal access to public services and improving people's well-being is a key link in building a modern national governance system in China. However, under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system, local governments face the “dilemma” of economic growth goals and the improvement of people's livelihoods. China's basic public services still have the problems of insufficient supply quantity, unbalanced structure and low efficiency. This paper aims to explore the impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on basic public services, and provide a theoretical and practical basis for deepening the reform of China's fiscal and taxation system, perfecting the transfer payment system, and improving the public service provision at the present stage. Under the premise of theoretical hypothesis, based on the panel data of 178 prefecture-level cities in China from 2008 to 2019, which is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook and the Work report of prefecture-level governments, the fixed effect model and threshold model are used for the empirical test. The results show that: first, the increase of fiscal decentralization has a negative impact on supply of basic public services in prefecture-level cities; second, the local government competition aiming at economic growth will intensify the negative impact, and make the relationship between fiscal decentralization and basic public services show nonlinear characteristics; Third, compared with developed areas, the strengthening regulatory effect of local government competition is more obvious in less-developed areas, such as western and northeastern regions, and third-tier, fourth-tier, and fifth-tier cities. Based on these findings, this paper draws the following policy implications: strengthen the reform of the fiscal and taxation system below the provincial level, promote the construction of a direct transfer payment mechanism, adjust the standards and methods of performance appraisal, and use modern information technology to improve the public service demand and interest expression mechanisms. |
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Impact of fiscal decentralization and local government competition on the supply of basic public services: Based on the empirical evidence of prefecture-level cities in China |
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