Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor

Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected. Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Lepore L. [verfasserIn] Falconi L. [verfasserIn] Fabrizio V. [verfasserIn] Roberti A. [verfasserIn] Formenton D. [verfasserIn] Iorio M.G. [verfasserIn] Sperandio L. [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2023

Schlagwörter:	fuel defects fission gases leakage gamma spectrometry characterization

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: EPJ Web of Conferences - EDP Sciences, 2010, 288, p 04005(2023)
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:288, p 04005 ; year:2023

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.1051/epjconf/202328804005

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ096363118

Internformat


LEADER	01000naa a22002652 4500
001	DOAJ096363118
003	DE-627
005	20240413150659.0
007	cr uuu---uuuuu
008	240413s2023 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c
024	7		\|a 10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 \|2 doi
035			\|a (DE-627)DOAJ096363118
035			\|a (DE-599)DOAJccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a
040			\|a DE-627 \|b ger \|c DE-627 \|e rakwb
041			\|a eng
050		0	\|a QC1-999
100	0		\|a Lepore L. \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
245	1	0	\|a Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor
264		1	\|c 2023
336			\|a Text \|b txt \|2 rdacontent
337			\|a Computermedien \|b c \|2 rdamedia
338			\|a Online-Ressource \|b cr \|2 rdacarrier
520			\|a Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected.
650		4	\|a fuel defects
650		4	\|a fission gases leakage
650		4	\|a gamma spectrometry characterization
653		0	\|a Physics
700	0		\|a Falconi L. \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Fabrizio V. \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Roberti A. \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Formenton D. \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Iorio M.G. \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	0		\|a Sperandio L. \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
773	0	8	\|i In \|t EPJ Web of Conferences \|d EDP Sciences, 2010 \|g 288, p 04005(2023) \|w (DE-627)647306611 \|w (DE-600)2595425-8 \|x 2100014X \|7 nnns
773	1	8	\|g volume:288, p 04005 \|g year:2023
856	4	0	\|u https://doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u https://doaj.org/article/ccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a \|z kostenfrei
856	4	0	\|u https://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/pdf/2023/14/epjconf_animma2023_04005.pdf \|z kostenfrei
856	4	2	\|u https://doaj.org/toc/2100-014X \|y Journal toc \|z kostenfrei
912			\|a GBV_USEFLAG_A
912			\|a SYSFLAG_A
912			\|a GBV_DOAJ
912			\|a GBV_ILN_20
912			\|a GBV_ILN_22
912			\|a GBV_ILN_23
912			\|a GBV_ILN_24
912			\|a GBV_ILN_31
912			\|a GBV_ILN_39
912			\|a GBV_ILN_40
912			\|a GBV_ILN_60
912			\|a GBV_ILN_62
912			\|a GBV_ILN_63
912			\|a GBV_ILN_65
912			\|a GBV_ILN_69
912			\|a GBV_ILN_70
912			\|a GBV_ILN_73
912			\|a GBV_ILN_95
912			\|a GBV_ILN_105
912			\|a GBV_ILN_110
912			\|a GBV_ILN_151
912			\|a GBV_ILN_161
912			\|a GBV_ILN_170
912			\|a GBV_ILN_206
912			\|a GBV_ILN_213
912			\|a GBV_ILN_230
912			\|a GBV_ILN_285
912			\|a GBV_ILN_293
912			\|a GBV_ILN_370
912			\|a GBV_ILN_602
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2005
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2009
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2011
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2014
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2055
912			\|a GBV_ILN_2111
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4012
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4037
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4112
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4125
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4126
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4249
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4305
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4306
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4307
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4313
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4322
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4323
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4324
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4325
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4335
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4338
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4367
912			\|a GBV_ILN_4700
951			\|a AR
952			\|d 288, p 04005 \|j 2023

Indexfelder

author_variant	l l ll f l fl f v fv r a ra f d fd i m im s l sl
matchkey_str	article:2100014X:2023----::eetdulosdniiainnrgratrtexeinethee
hierarchy_sort_str	2023
callnumber-subject-code	QC
publishDate	2023
allfields	10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 doi (DE-627)DOAJ096363118 (DE-599)DOAJccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QC1-999 Lepore L. verfasserin aut Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected. fuel defects fission gases leakage gamma spectrometry characterization Physics Falconi L. verfasserin aut Fabrizio V. verfasserin aut Roberti A. verfasserin aut Formenton D. verfasserin aut Iorio M.G. verfasserin aut Sperandio L. verfasserin aut In EPJ Web of Conferences EDP Sciences, 2010 288, p 04005(2023) (DE-627)647306611 (DE-600)2595425-8 2100014X nnns volume:288, p 04005 year:2023 https://doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/ccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a kostenfrei https://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/pdf/2023/14/epjconf_animma2023_04005.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2100-014X Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 288, p 04005 2023
spelling	10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 doi (DE-627)DOAJ096363118 (DE-599)DOAJccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QC1-999 Lepore L. verfasserin aut Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected. fuel defects fission gases leakage gamma spectrometry characterization Physics Falconi L. verfasserin aut Fabrizio V. verfasserin aut Roberti A. verfasserin aut Formenton D. verfasserin aut Iorio M.G. verfasserin aut Sperandio L. verfasserin aut In EPJ Web of Conferences EDP Sciences, 2010 288, p 04005(2023) (DE-627)647306611 (DE-600)2595425-8 2100014X nnns volume:288, p 04005 year:2023 https://doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/ccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a kostenfrei https://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/pdf/2023/14/epjconf_animma2023_04005.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2100-014X Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 288, p 04005 2023
allfields_unstemmed	10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 doi (DE-627)DOAJ096363118 (DE-599)DOAJccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QC1-999 Lepore L. verfasserin aut Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected. fuel defects fission gases leakage gamma spectrometry characterization Physics Falconi L. verfasserin aut Fabrizio V. verfasserin aut Roberti A. verfasserin aut Formenton D. verfasserin aut Iorio M.G. verfasserin aut Sperandio L. verfasserin aut In EPJ Web of Conferences EDP Sciences, 2010 288, p 04005(2023) (DE-627)647306611 (DE-600)2595425-8 2100014X nnns volume:288, p 04005 year:2023 https://doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/ccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a kostenfrei https://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/pdf/2023/14/epjconf_animma2023_04005.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2100-014X Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 288, p 04005 2023
allfieldsGer	10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 doi (DE-627)DOAJ096363118 (DE-599)DOAJccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QC1-999 Lepore L. verfasserin aut Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected. fuel defects fission gases leakage gamma spectrometry characterization Physics Falconi L. verfasserin aut Fabrizio V. verfasserin aut Roberti A. verfasserin aut Formenton D. verfasserin aut Iorio M.G. verfasserin aut Sperandio L. verfasserin aut In EPJ Web of Conferences EDP Sciences, 2010 288, p 04005(2023) (DE-627)647306611 (DE-600)2595425-8 2100014X nnns volume:288, p 04005 year:2023 https://doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/ccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a kostenfrei https://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/pdf/2023/14/epjconf_animma2023_04005.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2100-014X Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 288, p 04005 2023
allfieldsSound	10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 doi (DE-627)DOAJ096363118 (DE-599)DOAJccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng QC1-999 Lepore L. verfasserin aut Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected. fuel defects fission gases leakage gamma spectrometry characterization Physics Falconi L. verfasserin aut Fabrizio V. verfasserin aut Roberti A. verfasserin aut Formenton D. verfasserin aut Iorio M.G. verfasserin aut Sperandio L. verfasserin aut In EPJ Web of Conferences EDP Sciences, 2010 288, p 04005(2023) (DE-627)647306611 (DE-600)2595425-8 2100014X nnns volume:288, p 04005 year:2023 https://doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/ccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a kostenfrei https://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/pdf/2023/14/epjconf_animma2023_04005.pdf kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/2100-014X Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 288, p 04005 2023
language	English
source	In EPJ Web of Conferences 288, p 04005(2023) volume:288, p 04005 year:2023
sourceStr	In EPJ Web of Conferences 288, p 04005(2023) volume:288, p 04005 year:2023
format_phy_str_mv	Article
institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	fuel defects fission gases leakage gamma spectrometry characterization Physics
isfreeaccess_bool	true
container_title	EPJ Web of Conferences
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Lepore L. @@aut@@ Falconi L. @@aut@@ Fabrizio V. @@aut@@ Roberti A. @@aut@@ Formenton D. @@aut@@ Iorio M.G. @@aut@@ Sperandio L. @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2023-01-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	647306611
id	DOAJ096363118
language_de	englisch
fullrecord	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000naa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ096363118</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240413150659.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">240413s2023 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1051/epjconf/202328804005</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ096363118</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">QC1-999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lepore L.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">fuel defects</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">fission gases leakage</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">gamma spectrometry characterization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Physics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Falconi L.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fabrizio V.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Roberti A.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Formenton D.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Iorio M.G.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sperandio L.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">EPJ Web of Conferences</subfield><subfield code="d">EDP Sciences, 2010</subfield><subfield code="g">288, p 04005(2023)</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)647306611</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2595425-8</subfield><subfield code="x">2100014X</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:288, p 04005</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/202328804005</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/ccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/pdf/2023/14/epjconf_animma2023_04005.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/2100-014X</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_170</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">288, p 04005</subfield><subfield code="j">2023</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
callnumber-first	Q - Science
author	Lepore L.
spellingShingle	Lepore L. misc QC1-999 misc fuel defects misc fission gases leakage misc gamma spectrometry characterization misc Physics Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor
authorStr	Lepore L.
ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv	@@773@@(DE-627)647306611
format	electronic Article
delete_txt_mv	keep
author_role	aut aut aut aut aut aut aut
collection	DOAJ
remote_str	true
callnumber-label	QC1-999
illustrated	Not Illustrated
issn	2100014X
topic_title	QC1-999 Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor fuel defects fission gases leakage gamma spectrometry characterization
topic	misc QC1-999 misc fuel defects misc fission gases leakage misc gamma spectrometry characterization misc Physics
topic_unstemmed	misc QC1-999 misc fuel defects misc fission gases leakage misc gamma spectrometry characterization misc Physics
topic_browse	misc QC1-999 misc fuel defects misc fission gases leakage misc gamma spectrometry characterization misc Physics
format_facet	Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource
format_main_str_mv	Text Zeitschrift/Artikel
carriertype_str_mv	cr
hierarchy_parent_title	EPJ Web of Conferences
hierarchy_parent_id	647306611
hierarchy_top_title	EPJ Web of Conferences
isfreeaccess_txt	true
familylinks_str_mv	(DE-627)647306611 (DE-600)2595425-8
title	Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor
ctrlnum	(DE-627)DOAJ096363118 (DE-599)DOAJccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a
title_full	Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor
author_sort	Lepore L.
journal	EPJ Web of Conferences
journalStr	EPJ Web of Conferences
callnumber-first-code	Q
lang_code	eng
isOA_bool	true
recordtype	marc
publishDateSort	2023
contenttype_str_mv	txt
author_browse	Lepore L. Falconi L. Fabrizio V. Roberti A. Formenton D. Iorio M.G. Sperandio L.
container_volume	288, p 04005
class	QC1-999
format_se	Elektronische Aufsätze
author-letter	Lepore L.
doi_str_mv	10.1051/epjconf/202328804005
author2-role	verfasserin
title_sort	defected fuel rods identification in triga reactors: the experience at the enea casaccia triga rc-1 reactor
callnumber	QC1-999
title_auth	Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor
abstract	Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected.
abstractGer	Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected.
abstract_unstemmed	Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected.
collection_details	GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4700
title_short	Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor
url	https://doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/202328804005 https://doaj.org/article/ccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a https://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/pdf/2023/14/epjconf_animma2023_04005.pdf https://doaj.org/toc/2100-014X
remote_bool	true
author2	Falconi L. Fabrizio V. Roberti A. Formenton D. Iorio M.G. Sperandio L.
author2Str	Falconi L. Fabrizio V. Roberti A. Formenton D. Iorio M.G. Sperandio L.
ppnlink	647306611
callnumber-subject	QC - Physics
mediatype_str_mv	c
isOA_txt	true
hochschulschrift_bool	false
doi_str	10.1051/epjconf/202328804005
callnumber-a	QC1-999
up_date	2024-07-03T19:44:50.348Z
_version_	1803588353762787330
fullrecord_marcxml	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000naa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">DOAJ096363118</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20240413150659.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">240413s2023 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1051/epjconf/202328804005</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)DOAJ096363118</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)DOAJccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">QC1-999</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lepore L.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Experience in running TRIGA reactors all around the world has shown that fuel cladding failures can occur. Fission products, especially in gaseous physical form, can exit the defected fuel rods being dispersed within the water primary coolant. Suspects of a cladding failure event can be confirmed by detection of short-lived fission products, i.e., Krypton, Xenon, and even Iodine isotopes in primary water, or within the ionic-exchange resins tank installed for the purification of the primary coolant loop. The magnitude of the release of those ‘key-indicators’ from the defected fuel element(s) is the driving method by which the defected rod(s) can be identified. ‘Significant’ releases can be detected with a direct online sampling of the water from the top of the suspected fuel rod with reactor at power, leading this water to an online high-resolution gamma spectrometry analysis system. By considering delays due to the water velocity in tubes and decay time of radionuclides identified within the gamma spectrum, it is possible to calculate the concentration of those radionuclides just emerging from the inspected fuel rod. Releases lower than the minimum detection capabilities of the previous online experimental configuration push to modify the detection method with an indirect identification of the release. This is the case when the ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water, when reactor is on power, is the dominant component in the gamma spectrum of the sampled water, and fission gases (even produced) are not identified promptly, i.e. a relationship to a specific fuel rod by the sampling circuit before could not be identified. The paper describes the experience carried out at the Italian ENEA TRIGA RC-1 reactor, deepening the technical aspects and solutions applied to solve the issue. In particular, a ‘significant’ release has been found in the instrumented fuel rod within ring B, i.e. the inner fuel ring, exposed to the maximum neutron flux of the reactor. The leaking element was found within a week, in two days of operation, being the sampling system designed on detection of minutes-shortlived fission gases (no need to ‘cool’ down the primary loop by waiting decay of hours-lived radionuclides). After the removal of the instrumented fuel rod in ring B, further days in searching other ‘significant’ release with the sampling circuit before have reported nothing detected. But in samples of water taken after reactor shutdown, some iodine emerged after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive background of the activated water. This was sufficient evidence of another defected fuel rod in the pool. Identification of the latter defected fuel element is still ongoing, being based on: 1) selective removal of rod(s) from the reactor core, 2) run power of the reactor, 3) take samples of water after shutdown and measure iodine after decaying of ‘normal’ radioactive-background of the activated water, 4) identify the rod responsible of the remaining leakage when no further iodine is detected.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">fuel defects</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">fission gases leakage</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">gamma spectrometry characterization</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Physics</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Falconi L.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fabrizio V.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Roberti A.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Formenton D.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Iorio M.G.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sperandio L.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">EPJ Web of Conferences</subfield><subfield code="d">EDP Sciences, 2010</subfield><subfield code="g">288, p 04005(2023)</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)647306611</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2595425-8</subfield><subfield code="x">2100014X</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:288, p 04005</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1051/epjconf/202328804005</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/article/ccd37184155c491484ce260e8489347a</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://www.epj-conferences.org/articles/epjconf/pdf/2023/14/epjconf_animma2023_04005.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="u">https://doaj.org/toc/2100-014X</subfield><subfield code="y">Journal toc</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_A</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_DOAJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_161</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_170</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_206</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_213</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_230</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4249</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4307</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4322</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4367</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4700</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">288, p 04005</subfield><subfield code="j">2023</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
score	7.401143

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Schreiben Sie uns!

Defected fuel rods identification in TRIGA Reactors: The experience at the ENEA Casaccia TRIGA RC-1 reactor

Nicht das Richtige dabei?

Zugang & Verfügbarkeit

Vorhandene Bände

Nicht das Richtige dabei?