SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY
Despite being urged and called upon by the United States to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017, South Korea showed signs of reluctance until the end of 2020, only officially announcing its strategy in 2022. This article aimed to clarify the reasons for South Korea’s ambiguity from 2017 to 2...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Yen Pham Thi [verfasserIn] |
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E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
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2023 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Journal of Liberty and International Affairs - Institute for Research and European Studies, 2015, 9(2023), 3 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:9 ; year:2023 ; number:3 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.47305/JLIA2393577t |
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Katalog-ID: |
DOAJ097950920 |
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10.47305/JLIA2393577t doi (DE-627)DOAJ097950920 (DE-599)DOAJ4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JC11-607 Yen Pham Thi verfasserin aut SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Despite being urged and called upon by the United States to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017, South Korea showed signs of reluctance until the end of 2020, only officially announcing its strategy in 2022. This article aimed to clarify the reasons for South Korea’s ambiguity from 2017 to 2020 and the factors behind its transformation in the subsequent period. Utilizing the comparative analysis method and autonomous strategic theory, the article argued that South Korea shifted from a “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic autonomy” to reduce dependence on China and the United States, asserting its position as a middle power. The results showed that before 2020, challenges from North Korea and economic relations with China made South Korea cautious about participating in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, staying on the sidelines risked isolating it within the US alliance network. Meanwhile, concessions created opportunities for China to extend its influence over South Korea, even in cultural and social domains. Based on this, the article concluded that South Korea’s shift in approach to the Indo-Pacific region was necessary to affirm its middle power status. Indo-Pacific Strategy South Korea US-Korea Relations Strategic Ambiguity Strategic Autonomy Political theory In Journal of Liberty and International Affairs Institute for Research and European Studies, 2015 9(2023), 3 (DE-627)823701751 (DE-600)2819111-0 18579760 nnns volume:9 year:2023 number:3 https://doi.org/10.47305/JLIA2393577t kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 kostenfrei https://www.e-jlia.com/index.php/jlia/article/view/1215 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1857-9760 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2040 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_2953 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 AR 9 2023 3 |
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10.47305/JLIA2393577t doi (DE-627)DOAJ097950920 (DE-599)DOAJ4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JC11-607 Yen Pham Thi verfasserin aut SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Despite being urged and called upon by the United States to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017, South Korea showed signs of reluctance until the end of 2020, only officially announcing its strategy in 2022. This article aimed to clarify the reasons for South Korea’s ambiguity from 2017 to 2020 and the factors behind its transformation in the subsequent period. Utilizing the comparative analysis method and autonomous strategic theory, the article argued that South Korea shifted from a “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic autonomy” to reduce dependence on China and the United States, asserting its position as a middle power. The results showed that before 2020, challenges from North Korea and economic relations with China made South Korea cautious about participating in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, staying on the sidelines risked isolating it within the US alliance network. Meanwhile, concessions created opportunities for China to extend its influence over South Korea, even in cultural and social domains. Based on this, the article concluded that South Korea’s shift in approach to the Indo-Pacific region was necessary to affirm its middle power status. Indo-Pacific Strategy South Korea US-Korea Relations Strategic Ambiguity Strategic Autonomy Political theory In Journal of Liberty and International Affairs Institute for Research and European Studies, 2015 9(2023), 3 (DE-627)823701751 (DE-600)2819111-0 18579760 nnns volume:9 year:2023 number:3 https://doi.org/10.47305/JLIA2393577t kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 kostenfrei https://www.e-jlia.com/index.php/jlia/article/view/1215 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1857-9760 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2040 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_2953 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 AR 9 2023 3 |
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10.47305/JLIA2393577t doi (DE-627)DOAJ097950920 (DE-599)DOAJ4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JC11-607 Yen Pham Thi verfasserin aut SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Despite being urged and called upon by the United States to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017, South Korea showed signs of reluctance until the end of 2020, only officially announcing its strategy in 2022. This article aimed to clarify the reasons for South Korea’s ambiguity from 2017 to 2020 and the factors behind its transformation in the subsequent period. Utilizing the comparative analysis method and autonomous strategic theory, the article argued that South Korea shifted from a “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic autonomy” to reduce dependence on China and the United States, asserting its position as a middle power. The results showed that before 2020, challenges from North Korea and economic relations with China made South Korea cautious about participating in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, staying on the sidelines risked isolating it within the US alliance network. Meanwhile, concessions created opportunities for China to extend its influence over South Korea, even in cultural and social domains. Based on this, the article concluded that South Korea’s shift in approach to the Indo-Pacific region was necessary to affirm its middle power status. Indo-Pacific Strategy South Korea US-Korea Relations Strategic Ambiguity Strategic Autonomy Political theory In Journal of Liberty and International Affairs Institute for Research and European Studies, 2015 9(2023), 3 (DE-627)823701751 (DE-600)2819111-0 18579760 nnns volume:9 year:2023 number:3 https://doi.org/10.47305/JLIA2393577t kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 kostenfrei https://www.e-jlia.com/index.php/jlia/article/view/1215 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1857-9760 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2040 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_2953 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 AR 9 2023 3 |
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10.47305/JLIA2393577t doi (DE-627)DOAJ097950920 (DE-599)DOAJ4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JC11-607 Yen Pham Thi verfasserin aut SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Despite being urged and called upon by the United States to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017, South Korea showed signs of reluctance until the end of 2020, only officially announcing its strategy in 2022. This article aimed to clarify the reasons for South Korea’s ambiguity from 2017 to 2020 and the factors behind its transformation in the subsequent period. Utilizing the comparative analysis method and autonomous strategic theory, the article argued that South Korea shifted from a “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic autonomy” to reduce dependence on China and the United States, asserting its position as a middle power. The results showed that before 2020, challenges from North Korea and economic relations with China made South Korea cautious about participating in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, staying on the sidelines risked isolating it within the US alliance network. Meanwhile, concessions created opportunities for China to extend its influence over South Korea, even in cultural and social domains. Based on this, the article concluded that South Korea’s shift in approach to the Indo-Pacific region was necessary to affirm its middle power status. Indo-Pacific Strategy South Korea US-Korea Relations Strategic Ambiguity Strategic Autonomy Political theory In Journal of Liberty and International Affairs Institute for Research and European Studies, 2015 9(2023), 3 (DE-627)823701751 (DE-600)2819111-0 18579760 nnns volume:9 year:2023 number:3 https://doi.org/10.47305/JLIA2393577t kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 kostenfrei https://www.e-jlia.com/index.php/jlia/article/view/1215 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1857-9760 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2040 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_2953 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 AR 9 2023 3 |
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10.47305/JLIA2393577t doi (DE-627)DOAJ097950920 (DE-599)DOAJ4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng JC11-607 Yen Pham Thi verfasserin aut SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY 2023 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Despite being urged and called upon by the United States to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017, South Korea showed signs of reluctance until the end of 2020, only officially announcing its strategy in 2022. This article aimed to clarify the reasons for South Korea’s ambiguity from 2017 to 2020 and the factors behind its transformation in the subsequent period. Utilizing the comparative analysis method and autonomous strategic theory, the article argued that South Korea shifted from a “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic autonomy” to reduce dependence on China and the United States, asserting its position as a middle power. The results showed that before 2020, challenges from North Korea and economic relations with China made South Korea cautious about participating in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, staying on the sidelines risked isolating it within the US alliance network. Meanwhile, concessions created opportunities for China to extend its influence over South Korea, even in cultural and social domains. Based on this, the article concluded that South Korea’s shift in approach to the Indo-Pacific region was necessary to affirm its middle power status. Indo-Pacific Strategy South Korea US-Korea Relations Strategic Ambiguity Strategic Autonomy Political theory In Journal of Liberty and International Affairs Institute for Research and European Studies, 2015 9(2023), 3 (DE-627)823701751 (DE-600)2819111-0 18579760 nnns volume:9 year:2023 number:3 https://doi.org/10.47305/JLIA2393577t kostenfrei https://doaj.org/article/4a872537d25b435d86f3ed66085c0380 kostenfrei https://www.e-jlia.com/index.php/jlia/article/view/1215 kostenfrei https://doaj.org/toc/1857-9760 Journal toc kostenfrei GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_DOAJ GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_206 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_636 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2040 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2863 GBV_ILN_2953 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4277 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 AR 9 2023 3 |
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Yen Pham Thi misc JC11-607 misc Indo-Pacific Strategy misc South Korea misc US-Korea Relations misc Strategic Ambiguity misc Strategic Autonomy misc Political theory SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY |
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JC11-607 SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY Indo-Pacific Strategy South Korea US-Korea Relations Strategic Ambiguity Strategic Autonomy |
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south korea and the indo-pacific strategy: from strategic ambiguity to strategic autonomy |
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SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY |
abstract |
Despite being urged and called upon by the United States to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017, South Korea showed signs of reluctance until the end of 2020, only officially announcing its strategy in 2022. This article aimed to clarify the reasons for South Korea’s ambiguity from 2017 to 2020 and the factors behind its transformation in the subsequent period. Utilizing the comparative analysis method and autonomous strategic theory, the article argued that South Korea shifted from a “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic autonomy” to reduce dependence on China and the United States, asserting its position as a middle power. The results showed that before 2020, challenges from North Korea and economic relations with China made South Korea cautious about participating in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, staying on the sidelines risked isolating it within the US alliance network. Meanwhile, concessions created opportunities for China to extend its influence over South Korea, even in cultural and social domains. Based on this, the article concluded that South Korea’s shift in approach to the Indo-Pacific region was necessary to affirm its middle power status. |
abstractGer |
Despite being urged and called upon by the United States to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017, South Korea showed signs of reluctance until the end of 2020, only officially announcing its strategy in 2022. This article aimed to clarify the reasons for South Korea’s ambiguity from 2017 to 2020 and the factors behind its transformation in the subsequent period. Utilizing the comparative analysis method and autonomous strategic theory, the article argued that South Korea shifted from a “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic autonomy” to reduce dependence on China and the United States, asserting its position as a middle power. The results showed that before 2020, challenges from North Korea and economic relations with China made South Korea cautious about participating in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, staying on the sidelines risked isolating it within the US alliance network. Meanwhile, concessions created opportunities for China to extend its influence over South Korea, even in cultural and social domains. Based on this, the article concluded that South Korea’s shift in approach to the Indo-Pacific region was necessary to affirm its middle power status. |
abstract_unstemmed |
Despite being urged and called upon by the United States to develop an Indo-Pacific strategy since 2017, South Korea showed signs of reluctance until the end of 2020, only officially announcing its strategy in 2022. This article aimed to clarify the reasons for South Korea’s ambiguity from 2017 to 2020 and the factors behind its transformation in the subsequent period. Utilizing the comparative analysis method and autonomous strategic theory, the article argued that South Korea shifted from a “strategic ambiguity” to a “strategic autonomy” to reduce dependence on China and the United States, asserting its position as a middle power. The results showed that before 2020, challenges from North Korea and economic relations with China made South Korea cautious about participating in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, staying on the sidelines risked isolating it within the US alliance network. Meanwhile, concessions created opportunities for China to extend its influence over South Korea, even in cultural and social domains. Based on this, the article concluded that South Korea’s shift in approach to the Indo-Pacific region was necessary to affirm its middle power status. |
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SOUTH KOREA AND THE INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: FROM STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY TO STRATEGIC AUTONOMY |
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|
score |
7.4007034 |