Trust evolution, institutional constraints, and land trusteeship decisions among Chinese farmers

Land trusteeship involves farmers entrusting the farming and managing of their land to trustees, who manage the land on their behalf in exchange for a commission fee. Land trusteeship has been an important approach to bridging the gap between smallholder farmers and modern agriculture in China. Beca...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Qi Li [verfasserIn] Menghui Gao [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2023

Schlagwörter:	households institutional regulation institutional supervision institutional trust land trust relational trust

Übergeordnetes Werk:	In: Agricultural Economics (AGRICECON) - Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, 2016, 69(2023), 12, Seite 485-497
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:69 ; year:2023 ; number:12 ; pages:485-497

Links:	Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Link aufrufen Journal toc Journal toc

DOI / URN:	10.17221/232/2023-AGRICECON

Katalog-ID:	DOAJ099051729

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author	Qi Li
spellingShingle	Qi Li misc households misc institutional regulation misc institutional supervision misc institutional trust misc land trust misc relational trust misc Agriculture misc S Trust evolution, institutional constraints, and land trusteeship decisions among Chinese farmers
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topic_title	Trust evolution, institutional constraints, and land trusteeship decisions among Chinese farmers households institutional regulation institutional supervision institutional trust land trust relational trust
topic	misc households misc institutional regulation misc institutional supervision misc institutional trust misc land trust misc relational trust misc Agriculture misc S
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title	Trust evolution, institutional constraints, and land trusteeship decisions among Chinese farmers
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title_sort	trust evolution, institutional constraints, and land trusteeship decisions among chinese farmers
title_auth	Trust evolution, institutional constraints, and land trusteeship decisions among Chinese farmers
abstract	Land trusteeship involves farmers entrusting the farming and managing of their land to trustees, who manage the land on their behalf in exchange for a commission fee. Land trusteeship has been an important approach to bridging the gap between smallholder farmers and modern agriculture in China. Because of the information asymmetry in land trusteeship, farmers have higher uncertainty and perceived risk, so social trust and institutional constraints are particularly important in promoting farmers' participation in trusteeship. The objective of this study was to examine the impact of trust evolution and institutional constraints on smallholder farmers' decision-making in green prevention and pest control trusteeship. Our research was conducted in Shandong, China, utilising factor analysis and binary regression. The results revealed that trusteeship decision-making combines trust governance and institutional governance, with significant roles played by institutional trust, institutional supervision, institutional regulation, and interpersonal trust. As part-time farming became more prevalent, the importance of institutional trust and institutional supervision increased, indicating a shift in trusteeship governance from social relations to institutional contracts and the maturation of land trusteeship models. In addition, we also tested the interaction effect of social trust and institutional constraints and the heterogeneity effect of different trusteeship contracts. To improve the land trust system, we must enhance farmers' institutional trust and leverage the active role of intermediary supervision organisations such as village collectives.
abstractGer	Land trusteeship involves farmers entrusting the farming and managing of their land to trustees, who manage the land on their behalf in exchange for a commission fee. Land trusteeship has been an important approach to bridging the gap between smallholder farmers and modern agriculture in China. Because of the information asymmetry in land trusteeship, farmers have higher uncertainty and perceived risk, so social trust and institutional constraints are particularly important in promoting farmers' participation in trusteeship. The objective of this study was to examine the impact of trust evolution and institutional constraints on smallholder farmers' decision-making in green prevention and pest control trusteeship. Our research was conducted in Shandong, China, utilising factor analysis and binary regression. The results revealed that trusteeship decision-making combines trust governance and institutional governance, with significant roles played by institutional trust, institutional supervision, institutional regulation, and interpersonal trust. As part-time farming became more prevalent, the importance of institutional trust and institutional supervision increased, indicating a shift in trusteeship governance from social relations to institutional contracts and the maturation of land trusteeship models. In addition, we also tested the interaction effect of social trust and institutional constraints and the heterogeneity effect of different trusteeship contracts. To improve the land trust system, we must enhance farmers' institutional trust and leverage the active role of intermediary supervision organisations such as village collectives.
abstract_unstemmed	Land trusteeship involves farmers entrusting the farming and managing of their land to trustees, who manage the land on their behalf in exchange for a commission fee. Land trusteeship has been an important approach to bridging the gap between smallholder farmers and modern agriculture in China. Because of the information asymmetry in land trusteeship, farmers have higher uncertainty and perceived risk, so social trust and institutional constraints are particularly important in promoting farmers' participation in trusteeship. The objective of this study was to examine the impact of trust evolution and institutional constraints on smallholder farmers' decision-making in green prevention and pest control trusteeship. Our research was conducted in Shandong, China, utilising factor analysis and binary regression. The results revealed that trusteeship decision-making combines trust governance and institutional governance, with significant roles played by institutional trust, institutional supervision, institutional regulation, and interpersonal trust. As part-time farming became more prevalent, the importance of institutional trust and institutional supervision increased, indicating a shift in trusteeship governance from social relations to institutional contracts and the maturation of land trusteeship models. In addition, we also tested the interaction effect of social trust and institutional constraints and the heterogeneity effect of different trusteeship contracts. To improve the land trust system, we must enhance farmers' institutional trust and leverage the active role of intermediary supervision organisations such as village collectives.
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title_short	Trust evolution, institutional constraints, and land trusteeship decisions among Chinese farmers
url	https://doi.org/10.17221/232/2023-AGRICECON https://doaj.org/article/aa7333d8c90f4e36a1c764cfe5ef1883 https://agricecon.agriculturejournals.cz/artkey/age-202312-0003_trust-evolution-institutional-constraints-and-land-trusteeship-decisions-among-chinese-farmers.php https://doaj.org/toc/0139-570X https://doaj.org/toc/1805-9295
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Trust evolution, institutional constraints, and land trusteeship decisions among Chinese farmers

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