Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China
Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spre...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Zhang, Haifeng [verfasserIn] Zhang, Junsen [verfasserIn] Zhang, Yanfeng [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2019 |
|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
Verhaltensökonomik / Wirtschaftswissenschaft / Theorie / Welt |
|---|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of economic behavior & organization - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980, 166, Seite 84-106 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:166 ; pages:84-106 |
| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018 |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
ELV003019195 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | ELV003019195 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20230524165447.0 | ||
| 007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 230430s2019 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
| 024 | 7 | |a 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018 |2 doi | |
| 035 | |a (DE-627)ELV003019195 | ||
| 035 | |a (ELSEVIER)S0167-2681(19)30266-5 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 084 | |a 85.00 |2 bkl | ||
| 084 | |a 83.00 |2 bkl | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Zhang, Haifeng |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China |
| 264 | 1 | |c 2019 | |
| 336 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b zzz |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for. | ||
| 650 | 7 | |8 1.1\x |a Verhaltensökonomik |0 (DE-2867)15861-1 |2 stw | |
| 650 | 7 | |8 1.2\x |a Wirtschaftswissenschaft |0 (DE-2867)10032-2 |2 stw | |
| 650 | 7 | |8 1.3\x |a Theorie |0 (DE-2867)19073-6 |2 stw | |
| 650 | 7 | |8 1.4\x |a Welt |0 (DE-2867)16809-5 |2 stw | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Pay spread | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Incentive | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Tournament | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Faculty performance | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Two-step estimation method | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Zhang, Junsen |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Zhang, Yanfeng |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t Journal of economic behavior & organization |d Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 |g 166, Seite 84-106 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)253781825 |w (DE-600)1460618-5 |w (DE-576)072794445 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:166 |g pages:84-106 |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_U | ||
| 912 | |a SYSFLAG_U | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ELV | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_20 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_22 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_23 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_24 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_31 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_32 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_40 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_60 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_62 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_63 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_65 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_69 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_70 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_73 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_74 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_90 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_95 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_100 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_101 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_105 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_110 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_151 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_224 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_370 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_602 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_702 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2003 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2004 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2005 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2011 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2014 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2015 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2020 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2021 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2025 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2027 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2034 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2038 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2044 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2048 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2049 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2050 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2056 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2059 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2061 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2064 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2065 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2068 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2111 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2112 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2113 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2118 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2122 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2129 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2143 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2147 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2148 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2152 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2153 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2190 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2336 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2507 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_2522 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4035 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4037 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4112 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4125 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4126 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4242 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4251 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4305 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4313 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4323 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4324 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4325 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4326 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4333 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4334 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4335 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4338 | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_ILN_4393 | ||
| 936 | b | k | |a 85.00 |j Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines |
| 936 | b | k | |a 83.00 |j Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines |
| 936 | s | n | |a ECS-02001 |2 SKW |
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 166 |h 84-106 | ||
| author_variant |
h z hz j z jz y z yz |
|---|---|
| matchkey_str |
zhanghaifengzhangjunsenzhangyanfeng:2019----:ooraetnetvsatrncdmceiecfopronlaan |
| hierarchy_sort_str |
2019 |
| bklnumber |
85.00 83.00 |
| publishDate |
2019 |
| allfields |
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018 doi (DE-627)ELV003019195 (ELSEVIER)S0167-2681(19)30266-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 85.00 bkl 83.00 bkl Zhang, Haifeng verfasserin aut Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for. 1.1\x Verhaltensökonomik (DE-2867)15861-1 stw 1.2\x Wirtschaftswissenschaft (DE-2867)10032-2 stw 1.3\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.4\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Pay spread Incentive Tournament Faculty performance Two-step estimation method Zhang, Junsen verfasserin aut Zhang, Yanfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 166, Seite 84-106 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781825 (DE-600)1460618-5 (DE-576)072794445 nnns volume:166 pages:84-106 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines 83.00 Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines ECS-02001 SKW AR 166 84-106 |
| spelling |
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018 doi (DE-627)ELV003019195 (ELSEVIER)S0167-2681(19)30266-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 85.00 bkl 83.00 bkl Zhang, Haifeng verfasserin aut Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for. 1.1\x Verhaltensökonomik (DE-2867)15861-1 stw 1.2\x Wirtschaftswissenschaft (DE-2867)10032-2 stw 1.3\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.4\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Pay spread Incentive Tournament Faculty performance Two-step estimation method Zhang, Junsen verfasserin aut Zhang, Yanfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 166, Seite 84-106 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781825 (DE-600)1460618-5 (DE-576)072794445 nnns volume:166 pages:84-106 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines 83.00 Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines ECS-02001 SKW AR 166 84-106 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018 doi (DE-627)ELV003019195 (ELSEVIER)S0167-2681(19)30266-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 85.00 bkl 83.00 bkl Zhang, Haifeng verfasserin aut Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for. 1.1\x Verhaltensökonomik (DE-2867)15861-1 stw 1.2\x Wirtschaftswissenschaft (DE-2867)10032-2 stw 1.3\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.4\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Pay spread Incentive Tournament Faculty performance Two-step estimation method Zhang, Junsen verfasserin aut Zhang, Yanfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 166, Seite 84-106 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781825 (DE-600)1460618-5 (DE-576)072794445 nnns volume:166 pages:84-106 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines 83.00 Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines ECS-02001 SKW AR 166 84-106 |
| allfieldsGer |
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018 doi (DE-627)ELV003019195 (ELSEVIER)S0167-2681(19)30266-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 85.00 bkl 83.00 bkl Zhang, Haifeng verfasserin aut Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for. 1.1\x Verhaltensökonomik (DE-2867)15861-1 stw 1.2\x Wirtschaftswissenschaft (DE-2867)10032-2 stw 1.3\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.4\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Pay spread Incentive Tournament Faculty performance Two-step estimation method Zhang, Junsen verfasserin aut Zhang, Yanfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 166, Seite 84-106 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781825 (DE-600)1460618-5 (DE-576)072794445 nnns volume:166 pages:84-106 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines 83.00 Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines ECS-02001 SKW AR 166 84-106 |
| allfieldsSound |
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018 doi (DE-627)ELV003019195 (ELSEVIER)S0167-2681(19)30266-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 85.00 bkl 83.00 bkl Zhang, Haifeng verfasserin aut Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for. 1.1\x Verhaltensökonomik (DE-2867)15861-1 stw 1.2\x Wirtschaftswissenschaft (DE-2867)10032-2 stw 1.3\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.4\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Pay spread Incentive Tournament Faculty performance Two-step estimation method Zhang, Junsen verfasserin aut Zhang, Yanfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980 166, Seite 84-106 Online-Ressource (DE-627)253781825 (DE-600)1460618-5 (DE-576)072794445 nnns volume:166 pages:84-106 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines 83.00 Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines ECS-02001 SKW AR 166 84-106 |
| language |
English |
| source |
Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization 166, Seite 84-106 volume:166 pages:84-106 |
| sourceStr |
Enthalten in Journal of economic behavior & organization 166, Seite 84-106 volume:166 pages:84-106 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| bklname |
Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| topic_facet |
Verhaltensökonomik Wirtschaftswissenschaft Theorie Welt Pay spread Incentive Tournament Faculty performance Two-step estimation method |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
Journal of economic behavior & organization |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Zhang, Haifeng @@aut@@ Zhang, Junsen @@aut@@ Zhang, Yanfeng @@aut@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
2019-01-01T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
253781825 |
| id |
ELV003019195 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ELV003019195</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230524165447.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230430s2019 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)ELV003019195</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ELSEVIER)S0167-2681(19)30266-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">85.00</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">83.00</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zhang, Haifeng</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">1.1\x</subfield><subfield code="a">Verhaltensökonomik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-2867)15861-1</subfield><subfield code="2">stw</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">1.2\x</subfield><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftswissenschaft</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-2867)10032-2</subfield><subfield code="2">stw</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">1.3\x</subfield><subfield code="a">Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-2867)19073-6</subfield><subfield code="2">stw</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">1.4\x</subfield><subfield code="a">Welt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-2867)16809-5</subfield><subfield code="2">stw</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Pay spread</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Incentive</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tournament</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Faculty performance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Two-step estimation method</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zhang, Junsen</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zhang, Yanfeng</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of economic behavior & organization</subfield><subfield code="d">Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980</subfield><subfield code="g">166, Seite 84-106</subfield><subfield code="h">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)253781825</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1460618-5</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)072794445</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:166</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:84-106</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ELV</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_32</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_74</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_90</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_100</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_101</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_224</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_702</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2003</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2004</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2021</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2025</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2034</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2038</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2044</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2048</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2049</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2050</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2056</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2059</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2061</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2064</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2065</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2068</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2113</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2118</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2122</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2129</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2143</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2147</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2148</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2152</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2153</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2190</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2336</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2507</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2522</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4035</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4242</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4251</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4333</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4334</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">85.00</subfield><subfield code="j">Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">83.00</subfield><subfield code="j">Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="s" ind2="n"><subfield code="a">ECS-02001</subfield><subfield code="2">SKW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">166</subfield><subfield code="h">84-106</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| author |
Zhang, Haifeng |
| spellingShingle |
Zhang, Haifeng bkl 85.00 bkl 83.00 stw Verhaltensökonomik stw Wirtschaftswissenschaft stw Theorie stw Welt misc Pay spread misc Incentive misc Tournament misc Faculty performance misc Two-step estimation method Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China |
| authorStr |
Zhang, Haifeng |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)253781825 |
| format |
electronic Article |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| author_role |
aut aut aut |
| collection |
elsevier |
| remote_str |
true |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| topic_title |
85.00 bkl 83.00 bkl Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China 1.1\x Verhaltensökonomik (DE-2867)15861-1 stw 1.2\x Wirtschaftswissenschaft (DE-2867)10032-2 stw 1.3\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.4\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Pay spread Incentive Tournament Faculty performance Two-step estimation method |
| topic |
bkl 85.00 bkl 83.00 stw Verhaltensökonomik stw Wirtschaftswissenschaft stw Theorie stw Welt misc Pay spread misc Incentive misc Tournament misc Faculty performance misc Two-step estimation method |
| topic_unstemmed |
bkl 85.00 bkl 83.00 stw Verhaltensökonomik stw Wirtschaftswissenschaft stw Theorie stw Welt misc Pay spread misc Incentive misc Tournament misc Faculty performance misc Two-step estimation method |
| topic_browse |
bkl 85.00 bkl 83.00 stw Verhaltensökonomik stw Wirtschaftswissenschaft stw Theorie stw Welt misc Pay spread misc Incentive misc Tournament misc Faculty performance misc Two-step estimation method |
| format_facet |
Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
cr |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
Journal of economic behavior & organization |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
253781825 |
| hierarchy_top_title |
Journal of economic behavior & organization |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)253781825 (DE-600)1460618-5 (DE-576)072794445 |
| title |
Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)ELV003019195 (ELSEVIER)S0167-2681(19)30266-5 |
| title_full |
Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China |
| author_sort |
Zhang, Haifeng |
| journal |
Journal of economic behavior & organization |
| journalStr |
Journal of economic behavior & organization |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
2019 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
zzz |
| container_start_page |
84 |
| class_local_iln |
SKW:ECS-02001 |
| author_browse |
Zhang, Haifeng Zhang, Junsen Zhang, Yanfeng |
| container_volume |
166 |
| class |
85.00 bkl 83.00 bkl |
| format_se |
Elektronische Aufsätze |
| author-letter |
Zhang, Haifeng |
| doi_str_mv |
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018 |
| normlink |
(DE-2867)15861-1 (DE-2867)10032-2 (DE-2867)19073-6 (DE-2867)16809-5 |
| normlink_prefix_str_mv |
(DE-2867)15861-1 (DE-2867)10032-2 (DE-2867)19073-6 (DE-2867)16809-5 |
| author2-role |
verfasserin |
| title_sort |
do tournament incentives matter in academics? evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in china |
| title_auth |
Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China |
| abstract |
Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for. |
| abstractGer |
Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for. |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 |
| title_short |
Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China |
| remote_bool |
true |
| author2 |
Zhang, Junsen Zhang, Yanfeng |
| author2Str |
Zhang, Junsen Zhang, Yanfeng |
| ppnlink |
253781825 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
c |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| doi_str |
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018 |
| up_date |
2024-07-06T18:13:24.415Z |
| _version_ |
1803854392241160192 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ELV003019195</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230524165447.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">230430s2019 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1016/j.jebo.2019.08.018</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)ELV003019195</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ELSEVIER)S0167-2681(19)30266-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">85.00</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">83.00</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zhang, Haifeng</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Do tournament incentives matter in academics? Evidence from personnel data in a top-tier university in China</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2019</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Using unique personnel data collected from a Chinese top-tier university, this paper investigates the net effects of a tournament-type incentive scheme on faculty performance as measured by average student ratings and research output. Two-step estimation results show that an increase in the pay spread between adjacent position levels improves faculty performance in teaching and research. Several robustness checks suggest that this net incentive effect remains sizeable even if a potential selectivity effect is controlled for.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">1.1\x</subfield><subfield code="a">Verhaltensökonomik</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-2867)15861-1</subfield><subfield code="2">stw</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">1.2\x</subfield><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftswissenschaft</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-2867)10032-2</subfield><subfield code="2">stw</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">1.3\x</subfield><subfield code="a">Theorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-2867)19073-6</subfield><subfield code="2">stw</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">1.4\x</subfield><subfield code="a">Welt</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-2867)16809-5</subfield><subfield code="2">stw</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Pay spread</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Incentive</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Tournament</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Faculty performance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Two-step estimation method</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zhang, Junsen</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zhang, Yanfeng</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of economic behavior & organization</subfield><subfield code="d">Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, 1980</subfield><subfield code="g">166, Seite 84-106</subfield><subfield code="h">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)253781825</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1460618-5</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-576)072794445</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:166</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:84-106</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ELV</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_20</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_23</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_24</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_31</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_32</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_40</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_60</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_62</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_63</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_65</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_69</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_70</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_73</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_74</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_90</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_95</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_100</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_101</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_105</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_110</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_151</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_224</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_602</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_702</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2003</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2004</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2005</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2014</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2015</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2020</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2021</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2025</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2027</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2034</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2038</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2044</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2048</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2049</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2050</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2056</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2059</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2061</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2064</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2065</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2068</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2111</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2113</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2118</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2122</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2129</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2143</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2147</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2148</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2152</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2153</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2190</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2336</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2507</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2522</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4035</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4037</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4112</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4125</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4242</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4251</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4305</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4313</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4323</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4324</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4325</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4326</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4333</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4334</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4335</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4338</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_4393</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">85.00</subfield><subfield code="j">Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">83.00</subfield><subfield code="j">Volkswirtschaft: Allgemeines</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="s" ind2="n"><subfield code="a">ECS-02001</subfield><subfield code="2">SKW</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">166</subfield><subfield code="h">84-106</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.398015 |