Executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: Evidence from the Chinese food industry
This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score match...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Zhang, Zhihong [verfasserIn] Wang, Pin [verfasserIn] Xu, Huichao [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2019 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
Wirtschaftsmodell / Makroökonomisches Modell / Modellierung / Theorie / Welt |
|---|---|
| Schlagwörter: |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Economic modelling - Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984, 90, Seite 374-385 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:90 ; pages:374-385 |
| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.econmod.2019.11.026 |
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| 520 | |a This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality. | ||
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10.1016/j.econmod.2019.11.026 doi (DE-627)ELV004251954 (ELSEVIER)S0264-9993(19)31205-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zhang, Zhihong verfasserin aut Executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: Evidence from the Chinese food industry 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality. 1.1\x Wirtschaftsmodell (DE-2867)10065-1 stw 1.2\x Makroökonomisches Modell (DE-2867)29938-1 stw 1.3\x Modellierung (DE-2867)15381-1 stw 1.4\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.5\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Integrity preference Product quality Power Internal control Wang, Pin verfasserin aut Xu, Huichao verfasserin aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 90, Seite 374-385 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:90 pages:374-385 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 ECS-01001 SKW AR 90 374-385 |
| spelling |
10.1016/j.econmod.2019.11.026 doi (DE-627)ELV004251954 (ELSEVIER)S0264-9993(19)31205-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zhang, Zhihong verfasserin aut Executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: Evidence from the Chinese food industry 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality. 1.1\x Wirtschaftsmodell (DE-2867)10065-1 stw 1.2\x Makroökonomisches Modell (DE-2867)29938-1 stw 1.3\x Modellierung (DE-2867)15381-1 stw 1.4\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.5\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Integrity preference Product quality Power Internal control Wang, Pin verfasserin aut Xu, Huichao verfasserin aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 90, Seite 374-385 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:90 pages:374-385 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 ECS-01001 SKW AR 90 374-385 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
10.1016/j.econmod.2019.11.026 doi (DE-627)ELV004251954 (ELSEVIER)S0264-9993(19)31205-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zhang, Zhihong verfasserin aut Executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: Evidence from the Chinese food industry 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality. 1.1\x Wirtschaftsmodell (DE-2867)10065-1 stw 1.2\x Makroökonomisches Modell (DE-2867)29938-1 stw 1.3\x Modellierung (DE-2867)15381-1 stw 1.4\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.5\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Integrity preference Product quality Power Internal control Wang, Pin verfasserin aut Xu, Huichao verfasserin aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 90, Seite 374-385 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:90 pages:374-385 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 ECS-01001 SKW AR 90 374-385 |
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10.1016/j.econmod.2019.11.026 doi (DE-627)ELV004251954 (ELSEVIER)S0264-9993(19)31205-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zhang, Zhihong verfasserin aut Executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: Evidence from the Chinese food industry 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality. 1.1\x Wirtschaftsmodell (DE-2867)10065-1 stw 1.2\x Makroökonomisches Modell (DE-2867)29938-1 stw 1.3\x Modellierung (DE-2867)15381-1 stw 1.4\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.5\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Integrity preference Product quality Power Internal control Wang, Pin verfasserin aut Xu, Huichao verfasserin aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 90, Seite 374-385 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:90 pages:374-385 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 ECS-01001 SKW AR 90 374-385 |
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10.1016/j.econmod.2019.11.026 doi (DE-627)ELV004251954 (ELSEVIER)S0264-9993(19)31205-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng Zhang, Zhihong verfasserin aut Executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: Evidence from the Chinese food industry 2019 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality. 1.1\x Wirtschaftsmodell (DE-2867)10065-1 stw 1.2\x Makroökonomisches Modell (DE-2867)29938-1 stw 1.3\x Modellierung (DE-2867)15381-1 stw 1.4\x Theorie (DE-2867)19073-6 stw 1.5\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Integrity preference Product quality Power Internal control Wang, Pin verfasserin aut Xu, Huichao verfasserin aut Enthalten in Economic modelling Amsterdam : Elsevier [u.a.], 1984 90, Seite 374-385 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320507459 (DE-600)2013002-8 (DE-576)094056749 0264-9993 nnns volume:90 pages:374-385 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 ECS-01001 SKW AR 90 374-385 |
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executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: evidence from the chinese food industry |
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Executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: Evidence from the Chinese food industry |
| abstract |
This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality. |
| abstractGer |
This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
This study tests whether and how top executives’ preference for integrity affects product quality, using manually collected data for executive birthplace and media coverage related to food quality. We find, using ordered logistic regressions and ordinary least squares based on propensity score matching, that a preference for integrity among food industry executives has a positive effect on food quality. Further, executive power significantly regulates this effect. Valuing integrity helps top executives to overcome the temptation to misuse power. Thus, a concentration of power among executives in the Chinese food companies plays a positive role in propagating integrity within the firms they lead, further strengthening the inhibitory effect on quality failure and the positive effect on quality and safety. Finally, we find that internal control is a channel through which the top executives’ preference for integrity can positively influence product quality. |
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Executives’ preference for integrity and product quality: Evidence from the Chinese food industry |
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