Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection

Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Chen, Yijuan [verfasserIn] Sivey, Peter [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2021

Schlagwörter:	Gesundheitsökonomik / Gesundheitswesen / Welt
Schlagwörter:	Hospitals Competition Report cards Quality

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Journal of health economics - Amsterdam : North-Holland Publ. Co., 1982, 78
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:78

DOI / URN:	10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102484

Katalog-ID:	ELV006479537

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520			\|a Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low.
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allfields	10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102484 doi (DE-627)ELV006479537 (ELSEVIER)S0167-6296(21)00069-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 44.05 bkl Chen, Yijuan verfasserin aut Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection 2021 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low. 1.1\x Gesundheitsökonomik (DE-2867)11157-5 stw 1.2\x Gesundheitswesen (DE-2867)13371-0 stw 1.3\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Hospitals Competition Report cards Quality Sivey, Peter verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of health economics Amsterdam : North-Holland Publ. Co., 1982 78 Online-Ressource (DE-627)300592922 (DE-600)1482834-0 (DE-576)078993334 1879-1646 nnns volume:78 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 44.05 Gesundheitsökonomie ECS-14001 SKW AR 78
spelling	10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102484 doi (DE-627)ELV006479537 (ELSEVIER)S0167-6296(21)00069-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 44.05 bkl Chen, Yijuan verfasserin aut Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection 2021 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low. 1.1\x Gesundheitsökonomik (DE-2867)11157-5 stw 1.2\x Gesundheitswesen (DE-2867)13371-0 stw 1.3\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Hospitals Competition Report cards Quality Sivey, Peter verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of health economics Amsterdam : North-Holland Publ. Co., 1982 78 Online-Ressource (DE-627)300592922 (DE-600)1482834-0 (DE-576)078993334 1879-1646 nnns volume:78 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 44.05 Gesundheitsökonomie ECS-14001 SKW AR 78
allfields_unstemmed	10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102484 doi (DE-627)ELV006479537 (ELSEVIER)S0167-6296(21)00069-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 44.05 bkl Chen, Yijuan verfasserin aut Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection 2021 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low. 1.1\x Gesundheitsökonomik (DE-2867)11157-5 stw 1.2\x Gesundheitswesen (DE-2867)13371-0 stw 1.3\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Hospitals Competition Report cards Quality Sivey, Peter verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of health economics Amsterdam : North-Holland Publ. Co., 1982 78 Online-Ressource (DE-627)300592922 (DE-600)1482834-0 (DE-576)078993334 1879-1646 nnns volume:78 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 44.05 Gesundheitsökonomie ECS-14001 SKW AR 78
allfieldsGer	10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102484 doi (DE-627)ELV006479537 (ELSEVIER)S0167-6296(21)00069-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 44.05 bkl Chen, Yijuan verfasserin aut Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection 2021 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low. 1.1\x Gesundheitsökonomik (DE-2867)11157-5 stw 1.2\x Gesundheitswesen (DE-2867)13371-0 stw 1.3\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Hospitals Competition Report cards Quality Sivey, Peter verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of health economics Amsterdam : North-Holland Publ. Co., 1982 78 Online-Ressource (DE-627)300592922 (DE-600)1482834-0 (DE-576)078993334 1879-1646 nnns volume:78 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 44.05 Gesundheitsökonomie ECS-14001 SKW AR 78
allfieldsSound	10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102484 doi (DE-627)ELV006479537 (ELSEVIER)S0167-6296(21)00069-2 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 44.05 bkl Chen, Yijuan verfasserin aut Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection 2021 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low. 1.1\x Gesundheitsökonomik (DE-2867)11157-5 stw 1.2\x Gesundheitswesen (DE-2867)13371-0 stw 1.3\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Hospitals Competition Report cards Quality Sivey, Peter verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of health economics Amsterdam : North-Holland Publ. Co., 1982 78 Online-Ressource (DE-627)300592922 (DE-600)1482834-0 (DE-576)078993334 1879-1646 nnns volume:78 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 44.05 Gesundheitsökonomie ECS-14001 SKW AR 78
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author	Chen, Yijuan
spellingShingle	Chen, Yijuan bkl 44.05 stw Gesundheitsökonomik stw Gesundheitswesen stw Welt misc Hospitals misc Competition misc Report cards misc Quality Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection
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topic_title	44.05 bkl Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection 1.1\x Gesundheitsökonomik (DE-2867)11157-5 stw 1.2\x Gesundheitswesen (DE-2867)13371-0 stw 1.3\x Welt (DE-2867)16809-5 stw Hospitals Competition Report cards Quality
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title	Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection
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title_full	Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection
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title_sort	hospital report cards: quality competition and patient selection
title_auth	Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection
abstract	Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low.
abstractGer	Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low.
abstract_unstemmed	Hospital ‘report cards’ policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low.
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title_short	Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection
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doi_str	10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102484
up_date	2024-07-06T21:31:07.528Z
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