The effect of economic freedom on board diversity
Drawing on institutional theory and homophily network theory, we argue theoretically and support empirically that higher economic freedom reduces the board of director diversity. Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher ec...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Lee, Sang Mook [verfasserIn] Bazel-Shoham, Ofra [verfasserIn] Tarba, Shlomo Y. [verfasserIn] Shoham, Amir [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2022 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of business research - New York, NY : Elsevier, 1973, 149, Seite 833-849 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:149 ; pages:833-849 |
DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.05.076 |
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10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.05.076 doi (DE-627)ELV008113106 (ELSEVIER)S0148-2963(22)00520-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 650 VZ 85.00 bkl Lee, Sang Mook verfasserin aut The effect of economic freedom on board diversity 2022 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Drawing on institutional theory and homophily network theory, we argue theoretically and support empirically that higher economic freedom reduces the board of director diversity. Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher economic freedom are less likely to foster gender or ethnic diversity on their boards. The results are robust to a battery of variables that capture differences in economic freedom, gender, and ethnic diversity. The results are also robust to various empirical tests, including endogeneity analyses, such as propensity score matching and the instrumental variable approach. Economic freedom Board gender diversity Board ethnic diversity Homophily Bazel-Shoham, Ofra verfasserin aut Tarba, Shlomo Y. verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-1919-084X aut Shoham, Amir verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of business research New York, NY : Elsevier, 1973 149, Seite 833-849 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320511251 (DE-600)2013438-1 (DE-576)090954998 0148-2963 nnns volume:149 pages:833-849 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines VZ AR 149 833-849 |
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10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.05.076 doi (DE-627)ELV008113106 (ELSEVIER)S0148-2963(22)00520-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 650 VZ 85.00 bkl Lee, Sang Mook verfasserin aut The effect of economic freedom on board diversity 2022 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Drawing on institutional theory and homophily network theory, we argue theoretically and support empirically that higher economic freedom reduces the board of director diversity. Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher economic freedom are less likely to foster gender or ethnic diversity on their boards. The results are robust to a battery of variables that capture differences in economic freedom, gender, and ethnic diversity. The results are also robust to various empirical tests, including endogeneity analyses, such as propensity score matching and the instrumental variable approach. Economic freedom Board gender diversity Board ethnic diversity Homophily Bazel-Shoham, Ofra verfasserin aut Tarba, Shlomo Y. verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-1919-084X aut Shoham, Amir verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of business research New York, NY : Elsevier, 1973 149, Seite 833-849 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320511251 (DE-600)2013438-1 (DE-576)090954998 0148-2963 nnns volume:149 pages:833-849 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines VZ AR 149 833-849 |
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10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.05.076 doi (DE-627)ELV008113106 (ELSEVIER)S0148-2963(22)00520-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 650 VZ 85.00 bkl Lee, Sang Mook verfasserin aut The effect of economic freedom on board diversity 2022 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Drawing on institutional theory and homophily network theory, we argue theoretically and support empirically that higher economic freedom reduces the board of director diversity. Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher economic freedom are less likely to foster gender or ethnic diversity on their boards. The results are robust to a battery of variables that capture differences in economic freedom, gender, and ethnic diversity. The results are also robust to various empirical tests, including endogeneity analyses, such as propensity score matching and the instrumental variable approach. Economic freedom Board gender diversity Board ethnic diversity Homophily Bazel-Shoham, Ofra verfasserin aut Tarba, Shlomo Y. verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-1919-084X aut Shoham, Amir verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of business research New York, NY : Elsevier, 1973 149, Seite 833-849 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320511251 (DE-600)2013438-1 (DE-576)090954998 0148-2963 nnns volume:149 pages:833-849 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines VZ AR 149 833-849 |
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10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.05.076 doi (DE-627)ELV008113106 (ELSEVIER)S0148-2963(22)00520-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 650 VZ 85.00 bkl Lee, Sang Mook verfasserin aut The effect of economic freedom on board diversity 2022 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Drawing on institutional theory and homophily network theory, we argue theoretically and support empirically that higher economic freedom reduces the board of director diversity. Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher economic freedom are less likely to foster gender or ethnic diversity on their boards. The results are robust to a battery of variables that capture differences in economic freedom, gender, and ethnic diversity. The results are also robust to various empirical tests, including endogeneity analyses, such as propensity score matching and the instrumental variable approach. Economic freedom Board gender diversity Board ethnic diversity Homophily Bazel-Shoham, Ofra verfasserin aut Tarba, Shlomo Y. verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-1919-084X aut Shoham, Amir verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of business research New York, NY : Elsevier, 1973 149, Seite 833-849 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320511251 (DE-600)2013438-1 (DE-576)090954998 0148-2963 nnns volume:149 pages:833-849 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines VZ AR 149 833-849 |
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10.1016/j.jbusres.2022.05.076 doi (DE-627)ELV008113106 (ELSEVIER)S0148-2963(22)00520-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 650 VZ 85.00 bkl Lee, Sang Mook verfasserin aut The effect of economic freedom on board diversity 2022 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Drawing on institutional theory and homophily network theory, we argue theoretically and support empirically that higher economic freedom reduces the board of director diversity. Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher economic freedom are less likely to foster gender or ethnic diversity on their boards. The results are robust to a battery of variables that capture differences in economic freedom, gender, and ethnic diversity. The results are also robust to various empirical tests, including endogeneity analyses, such as propensity score matching and the instrumental variable approach. Economic freedom Board gender diversity Board ethnic diversity Homophily Bazel-Shoham, Ofra verfasserin aut Tarba, Shlomo Y. verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-1919-084X aut Shoham, Amir verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of business research New York, NY : Elsevier, 1973 149, Seite 833-849 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320511251 (DE-600)2013438-1 (DE-576)090954998 0148-2963 nnns volume:149 pages:833-849 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 85.00 Betriebswirtschaft: Allgemeines VZ AR 149 833-849 |
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abstract |
Drawing on institutional theory and homophily network theory, we argue theoretically and support empirically that higher economic freedom reduces the board of director diversity. Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher economic freedom are less likely to foster gender or ethnic diversity on their boards. The results are robust to a battery of variables that capture differences in economic freedom, gender, and ethnic diversity. The results are also robust to various empirical tests, including endogeneity analyses, such as propensity score matching and the instrumental variable approach. |
abstractGer |
Drawing on institutional theory and homophily network theory, we argue theoretically and support empirically that higher economic freedom reduces the board of director diversity. Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher economic freedom are less likely to foster gender or ethnic diversity on their boards. The results are robust to a battery of variables that capture differences in economic freedom, gender, and ethnic diversity. The results are also robust to various empirical tests, including endogeneity analyses, such as propensity score matching and the instrumental variable approach. |
abstract_unstemmed |
Drawing on institutional theory and homophily network theory, we argue theoretically and support empirically that higher economic freedom reduces the board of director diversity. Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher economic freedom are less likely to foster gender or ethnic diversity on their boards. The results are robust to a battery of variables that capture differences in economic freedom, gender, and ethnic diversity. The results are also robust to various empirical tests, including endogeneity analyses, such as propensity score matching and the instrumental variable approach. |
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Using alarge U.S. sample of 26,142 firm-year pairs for 1996–2015, we find that firms located in the states with higher economic freedom are less likely to foster gender or ethnic diversity on their boards. The results are robust to a battery of variables that capture differences in economic freedom, gender, and ethnic diversity. 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