SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network
Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground w...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Guo, Junyan [verfasserIn] Du, Ye [verfasserIn] Sun, Zhichao [verfasserIn] Wu, Runfang [verfasserIn] Wu, Xuesong [verfasserIn] Zhang, Le [verfasserIn] Zheng, Tianshuai [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2023 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Computer communications - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1978, 206, Seite 22-37 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:206 ; pages:22-37 |
DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.comcom.2023.04.011 |
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Katalog-ID: |
ELV009961712 |
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520 | |a Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground wireless link, users are vulnerable to various attacks when accessing SIN and obtaining subscription services, which may pose security threats to user privacy, message integrity and confidentiality. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed to protect the security of access and data transmission, most of them are only applicable to the authentication scenarios in the home domain, without considering the security threats of roaming authentication in foreign domains. Moreover, the existing roaming authentication protocols still have some defects such as security vulnerabilities, long authentication delay, and high communication overhead. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for SIN, namely the SRAKN protocol, which also supports conditional anonymity and batch verification. In the roaming authentication phase, not only fast and low-overhead mutual authentication between the roaming user, satellite node and the foreign terrestrial control station (FTCS) is realized, but also a secure session key is jointly negotiated by the roaming user and FTCS to protect the subscription service transmission. The results of security analysis and performance comparison show that the SRAKN protocol is not only secure and resistant to various known attacks, but also has shorter roaming authentication delay, lower batch authentication overhead and communication overhead, making it more suitable for roaming users to access SIN in foreign domains. | ||
650 | 4 | |a Roaming authentication | |
650 | 4 | |a Key negotiation | |
650 | 4 | |a Conditional anonymity | |
650 | 4 | |a Batch verification | |
650 | 4 | |a Space Information Network | |
700 | 1 | |a Du, Ye |e verfasserin |0 (orcid)0000-0003-1791-8275 |4 aut | |
700 | 1 | |a Sun, Zhichao |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
700 | 1 | |a Wu, Runfang |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
700 | 1 | |a Wu, Xuesong |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
700 | 1 | |a Zhang, Le |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
700 | 1 | |a Zheng, Tianshuai |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
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10.1016/j.comcom.2023.04.011 doi (DE-627)ELV009961712 (ELSEVIER)S0140-3664(23)00130-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 004 VZ 54.00 bkl Guo, Junyan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-2152-0219 aut SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground wireless link, users are vulnerable to various attacks when accessing SIN and obtaining subscription services, which may pose security threats to user privacy, message integrity and confidentiality. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed to protect the security of access and data transmission, most of them are only applicable to the authentication scenarios in the home domain, without considering the security threats of roaming authentication in foreign domains. Moreover, the existing roaming authentication protocols still have some defects such as security vulnerabilities, long authentication delay, and high communication overhead. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for SIN, namely the SRAKN protocol, which also supports conditional anonymity and batch verification. In the roaming authentication phase, not only fast and low-overhead mutual authentication between the roaming user, satellite node and the foreign terrestrial control station (FTCS) is realized, but also a secure session key is jointly negotiated by the roaming user and FTCS to protect the subscription service transmission. The results of security analysis and performance comparison show that the SRAKN protocol is not only secure and resistant to various known attacks, but also has shorter roaming authentication delay, lower batch authentication overhead and communication overhead, making it more suitable for roaming users to access SIN in foreign domains. Roaming authentication Key negotiation Conditional anonymity Batch verification Space Information Network Du, Ye verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-1791-8275 aut Sun, Zhichao verfasserin aut Wu, Runfang verfasserin aut Wu, Xuesong verfasserin aut Zhang, Le verfasserin aut Zheng, Tianshuai verfasserin aut Enthalten in Computer communications Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1978 206, Seite 22-37 Online-Ressource (DE-627)270937900 (DE-600)1478742-8 (DE-576)078316790 0140-3664 nnns volume:206 pages:22-37 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 Informatik: Allgemeines VZ AR 206 22-37 |
spelling |
10.1016/j.comcom.2023.04.011 doi (DE-627)ELV009961712 (ELSEVIER)S0140-3664(23)00130-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 004 VZ 54.00 bkl Guo, Junyan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-2152-0219 aut SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground wireless link, users are vulnerable to various attacks when accessing SIN and obtaining subscription services, which may pose security threats to user privacy, message integrity and confidentiality. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed to protect the security of access and data transmission, most of them are only applicable to the authentication scenarios in the home domain, without considering the security threats of roaming authentication in foreign domains. Moreover, the existing roaming authentication protocols still have some defects such as security vulnerabilities, long authentication delay, and high communication overhead. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for SIN, namely the SRAKN protocol, which also supports conditional anonymity and batch verification. In the roaming authentication phase, not only fast and low-overhead mutual authentication between the roaming user, satellite node and the foreign terrestrial control station (FTCS) is realized, but also a secure session key is jointly negotiated by the roaming user and FTCS to protect the subscription service transmission. The results of security analysis and performance comparison show that the SRAKN protocol is not only secure and resistant to various known attacks, but also has shorter roaming authentication delay, lower batch authentication overhead and communication overhead, making it more suitable for roaming users to access SIN in foreign domains. Roaming authentication Key negotiation Conditional anonymity Batch verification Space Information Network Du, Ye verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-1791-8275 aut Sun, Zhichao verfasserin aut Wu, Runfang verfasserin aut Wu, Xuesong verfasserin aut Zhang, Le verfasserin aut Zheng, Tianshuai verfasserin aut Enthalten in Computer communications Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1978 206, Seite 22-37 Online-Ressource (DE-627)270937900 (DE-600)1478742-8 (DE-576)078316790 0140-3664 nnns volume:206 pages:22-37 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 Informatik: Allgemeines VZ AR 206 22-37 |
allfields_unstemmed |
10.1016/j.comcom.2023.04.011 doi (DE-627)ELV009961712 (ELSEVIER)S0140-3664(23)00130-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 004 VZ 54.00 bkl Guo, Junyan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-2152-0219 aut SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground wireless link, users are vulnerable to various attacks when accessing SIN and obtaining subscription services, which may pose security threats to user privacy, message integrity and confidentiality. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed to protect the security of access and data transmission, most of them are only applicable to the authentication scenarios in the home domain, without considering the security threats of roaming authentication in foreign domains. Moreover, the existing roaming authentication protocols still have some defects such as security vulnerabilities, long authentication delay, and high communication overhead. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for SIN, namely the SRAKN protocol, which also supports conditional anonymity and batch verification. In the roaming authentication phase, not only fast and low-overhead mutual authentication between the roaming user, satellite node and the foreign terrestrial control station (FTCS) is realized, but also a secure session key is jointly negotiated by the roaming user and FTCS to protect the subscription service transmission. The results of security analysis and performance comparison show that the SRAKN protocol is not only secure and resistant to various known attacks, but also has shorter roaming authentication delay, lower batch authentication overhead and communication overhead, making it more suitable for roaming users to access SIN in foreign domains. Roaming authentication Key negotiation Conditional anonymity Batch verification Space Information Network Du, Ye verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-1791-8275 aut Sun, Zhichao verfasserin aut Wu, Runfang verfasserin aut Wu, Xuesong verfasserin aut Zhang, Le verfasserin aut Zheng, Tianshuai verfasserin aut Enthalten in Computer communications Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1978 206, Seite 22-37 Online-Ressource (DE-627)270937900 (DE-600)1478742-8 (DE-576)078316790 0140-3664 nnns volume:206 pages:22-37 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 Informatik: Allgemeines VZ AR 206 22-37 |
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10.1016/j.comcom.2023.04.011 doi (DE-627)ELV009961712 (ELSEVIER)S0140-3664(23)00130-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 004 VZ 54.00 bkl Guo, Junyan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-2152-0219 aut SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground wireless link, users are vulnerable to various attacks when accessing SIN and obtaining subscription services, which may pose security threats to user privacy, message integrity and confidentiality. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed to protect the security of access and data transmission, most of them are only applicable to the authentication scenarios in the home domain, without considering the security threats of roaming authentication in foreign domains. Moreover, the existing roaming authentication protocols still have some defects such as security vulnerabilities, long authentication delay, and high communication overhead. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for SIN, namely the SRAKN protocol, which also supports conditional anonymity and batch verification. In the roaming authentication phase, not only fast and low-overhead mutual authentication between the roaming user, satellite node and the foreign terrestrial control station (FTCS) is realized, but also a secure session key is jointly negotiated by the roaming user and FTCS to protect the subscription service transmission. The results of security analysis and performance comparison show that the SRAKN protocol is not only secure and resistant to various known attacks, but also has shorter roaming authentication delay, lower batch authentication overhead and communication overhead, making it more suitable for roaming users to access SIN in foreign domains. Roaming authentication Key negotiation Conditional anonymity Batch verification Space Information Network Du, Ye verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-1791-8275 aut Sun, Zhichao verfasserin aut Wu, Runfang verfasserin aut Wu, Xuesong verfasserin aut Zhang, Le verfasserin aut Zheng, Tianshuai verfasserin aut Enthalten in Computer communications Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1978 206, Seite 22-37 Online-Ressource (DE-627)270937900 (DE-600)1478742-8 (DE-576)078316790 0140-3664 nnns volume:206 pages:22-37 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 Informatik: Allgemeines VZ AR 206 22-37 |
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10.1016/j.comcom.2023.04.011 doi (DE-627)ELV009961712 (ELSEVIER)S0140-3664(23)00130-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 004 VZ 54.00 bkl Guo, Junyan verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-2152-0219 aut SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground wireless link, users are vulnerable to various attacks when accessing SIN and obtaining subscription services, which may pose security threats to user privacy, message integrity and confidentiality. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed to protect the security of access and data transmission, most of them are only applicable to the authentication scenarios in the home domain, without considering the security threats of roaming authentication in foreign domains. Moreover, the existing roaming authentication protocols still have some defects such as security vulnerabilities, long authentication delay, and high communication overhead. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for SIN, namely the SRAKN protocol, which also supports conditional anonymity and batch verification. In the roaming authentication phase, not only fast and low-overhead mutual authentication between the roaming user, satellite node and the foreign terrestrial control station (FTCS) is realized, but also a secure session key is jointly negotiated by the roaming user and FTCS to protect the subscription service transmission. The results of security analysis and performance comparison show that the SRAKN protocol is not only secure and resistant to various known attacks, but also has shorter roaming authentication delay, lower batch authentication overhead and communication overhead, making it more suitable for roaming users to access SIN in foreign domains. Roaming authentication Key negotiation Conditional anonymity Batch verification Space Information Network Du, Ye verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-1791-8275 aut Sun, Zhichao verfasserin aut Wu, Runfang verfasserin aut Wu, Xuesong verfasserin aut Zhang, Le verfasserin aut Zheng, Tianshuai verfasserin aut Enthalten in Computer communications Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1978 206, Seite 22-37 Online-Ressource (DE-627)270937900 (DE-600)1478742-8 (DE-576)078316790 0140-3664 nnns volume:206 pages:22-37 GBV_USEFLAG_U SYSFLAG_U GBV_ELV GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.00 Informatik: Allgemeines VZ AR 206 22-37 |
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Guo, Junyan @@aut@@ Du, Ye @@aut@@ Sun, Zhichao @@aut@@ Wu, Runfang @@aut@@ Wu, Xuesong @@aut@@ Zhang, Le @@aut@@ Zheng, Tianshuai @@aut@@ |
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Guo, Junyan ddc 004 bkl 54.00 misc Roaming authentication misc Key negotiation misc Conditional anonymity misc Batch verification misc Space Information Network SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network |
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004 VZ 54.00 bkl SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network Roaming authentication Key negotiation Conditional anonymity Batch verification Space Information Network |
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srakn: secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol for space information network |
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SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network |
abstract |
Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground wireless link, users are vulnerable to various attacks when accessing SIN and obtaining subscription services, which may pose security threats to user privacy, message integrity and confidentiality. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed to protect the security of access and data transmission, most of them are only applicable to the authentication scenarios in the home domain, without considering the security threats of roaming authentication in foreign domains. Moreover, the existing roaming authentication protocols still have some defects such as security vulnerabilities, long authentication delay, and high communication overhead. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for SIN, namely the SRAKN protocol, which also supports conditional anonymity and batch verification. In the roaming authentication phase, not only fast and low-overhead mutual authentication between the roaming user, satellite node and the foreign terrestrial control station (FTCS) is realized, but also a secure session key is jointly negotiated by the roaming user and FTCS to protect the subscription service transmission. The results of security analysis and performance comparison show that the SRAKN protocol is not only secure and resistant to various known attacks, but also has shorter roaming authentication delay, lower batch authentication overhead and communication overhead, making it more suitable for roaming users to access SIN in foreign domains. |
abstractGer |
Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground wireless link, users are vulnerable to various attacks when accessing SIN and obtaining subscription services, which may pose security threats to user privacy, message integrity and confidentiality. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed to protect the security of access and data transmission, most of them are only applicable to the authentication scenarios in the home domain, without considering the security threats of roaming authentication in foreign domains. Moreover, the existing roaming authentication protocols still have some defects such as security vulnerabilities, long authentication delay, and high communication overhead. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for SIN, namely the SRAKN protocol, which also supports conditional anonymity and batch verification. In the roaming authentication phase, not only fast and low-overhead mutual authentication between the roaming user, satellite node and the foreign terrestrial control station (FTCS) is realized, but also a secure session key is jointly negotiated by the roaming user and FTCS to protect the subscription service transmission. The results of security analysis and performance comparison show that the SRAKN protocol is not only secure and resistant to various known attacks, but also has shorter roaming authentication delay, lower batch authentication overhead and communication overhead, making it more suitable for roaming users to access SIN in foreign domains. |
abstract_unstemmed |
Nowadays, the Space Information Network (SIN) with global signal coverage, large capacity, bandwidth-on-demand flexibility, and multiple services has attracted more and more users to enjoy real-time services without geographical restrictions. However, due to the openness of the satellite-to-ground wireless link, users are vulnerable to various attacks when accessing SIN and obtaining subscription services, which may pose security threats to user privacy, message integrity and confidentiality. Although many authentication protocols have been proposed to protect the security of access and data transmission, most of them are only applicable to the authentication scenarios in the home domain, without considering the security threats of roaming authentication in foreign domains. Moreover, the existing roaming authentication protocols still have some defects such as security vulnerabilities, long authentication delay, and high communication overhead. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new secure roaming authentication and key negotiation protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) for SIN, namely the SRAKN protocol, which also supports conditional anonymity and batch verification. In the roaming authentication phase, not only fast and low-overhead mutual authentication between the roaming user, satellite node and the foreign terrestrial control station (FTCS) is realized, but also a secure session key is jointly negotiated by the roaming user and FTCS to protect the subscription service transmission. The results of security analysis and performance comparison show that the SRAKN protocol is not only secure and resistant to various known attacks, but also has shorter roaming authentication delay, lower batch authentication overhead and communication overhead, making it more suitable for roaming users to access SIN in foreign domains. |
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SRAKN: Secure Roaming Authentication and Key Negotiation protocol for Space Information Network |
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