Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct
We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Hamilton, Stephen F. [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015transfer abstract |
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| Umfang: |
11 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Mapping invasive - Dorigo, Wouter ELSEVIER, 2012, Amsterdam [u.a.] |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:40 ; year:2015 ; pages:49-59 ; extent:11 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 |
|---|
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ELV018264484 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct |
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| 520 | |a We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. | ||
| 520 | |a We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. | ||
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10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 doi GBVA2015004000025.pica (DE-627)ELV018264484 (ELSEVIER)S0167-7187(15)00023-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 650 DE-600 550 VZ KARTEN DE-1a fid 38.03 bkl 74.48 bkl 74.41 bkl Hamilton, Stephen F. verfasserin aut Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. Bontems, Philippe oth Lepore, Jason oth Enthalten in Elsevier Dorigo, Wouter ELSEVIER Mapping invasive 2012 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV007774605 volume:40 year:2015 pages:49-59 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-KARTEN SSG-OPC-GGO SSG-OPC-AST SSG-OPC-GEO 38.03 Methoden und Techniken der Geowissenschaften VZ 74.48 Geoinformationssysteme VZ 74.41 Luftaufnahmen Photogrammetrie VZ AR 40 2015 49-59 11 045F 650 |
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10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 doi GBVA2015004000025.pica (DE-627)ELV018264484 (ELSEVIER)S0167-7187(15)00023-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 650 DE-600 550 VZ KARTEN DE-1a fid 38.03 bkl 74.48 bkl 74.41 bkl Hamilton, Stephen F. verfasserin aut Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. Bontems, Philippe oth Lepore, Jason oth Enthalten in Elsevier Dorigo, Wouter ELSEVIER Mapping invasive 2012 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV007774605 volume:40 year:2015 pages:49-59 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-KARTEN SSG-OPC-GGO SSG-OPC-AST SSG-OPC-GEO 38.03 Methoden und Techniken der Geowissenschaften VZ 74.48 Geoinformationssysteme VZ 74.41 Luftaufnahmen Photogrammetrie VZ AR 40 2015 49-59 11 045F 650 |
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10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 doi GBVA2015004000025.pica (DE-627)ELV018264484 (ELSEVIER)S0167-7187(15)00023-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 650 DE-600 550 VZ KARTEN DE-1a fid 38.03 bkl 74.48 bkl 74.41 bkl Hamilton, Stephen F. verfasserin aut Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. Bontems, Philippe oth Lepore, Jason oth Enthalten in Elsevier Dorigo, Wouter ELSEVIER Mapping invasive 2012 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV007774605 volume:40 year:2015 pages:49-59 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-KARTEN SSG-OPC-GGO SSG-OPC-AST SSG-OPC-GEO 38.03 Methoden und Techniken der Geowissenschaften VZ 74.48 Geoinformationssysteme VZ 74.41 Luftaufnahmen Photogrammetrie VZ AR 40 2015 49-59 11 045F 650 |
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10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 doi GBVA2015004000025.pica (DE-627)ELV018264484 (ELSEVIER)S0167-7187(15)00023-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 650 DE-600 550 VZ KARTEN DE-1a fid 38.03 bkl 74.48 bkl 74.41 bkl Hamilton, Stephen F. verfasserin aut Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. Bontems, Philippe oth Lepore, Jason oth Enthalten in Elsevier Dorigo, Wouter ELSEVIER Mapping invasive 2012 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV007774605 volume:40 year:2015 pages:49-59 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-KARTEN SSG-OPC-GGO SSG-OPC-AST SSG-OPC-GEO 38.03 Methoden und Techniken der Geowissenschaften VZ 74.48 Geoinformationssysteme VZ 74.41 Luftaufnahmen Photogrammetrie VZ AR 40 2015 49-59 11 045F 650 |
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10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 doi GBVA2015004000025.pica (DE-627)ELV018264484 (ELSEVIER)S0167-7187(15)00023-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 650 DE-600 550 VZ KARTEN DE-1a fid 38.03 bkl 74.48 bkl 74.41 bkl Hamilton, Stephen F. verfasserin aut Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. Bontems, Philippe oth Lepore, Jason oth Enthalten in Elsevier Dorigo, Wouter ELSEVIER Mapping invasive 2012 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV007774605 volume:40 year:2015 pages:49-59 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-KARTEN SSG-OPC-GGO SSG-OPC-AST SSG-OPC-GEO 38.03 Methoden und Techniken der Geowissenschaften VZ 74.48 Geoinformationssysteme VZ 74.41 Luftaufnahmen Photogrammetrie VZ AR 40 2015 49-59 11 045F 650 |
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Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct |
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oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct |
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Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct |
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We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. |
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We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. |
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We consider two firms that compete against each other jointly in upstream and downstream markets under two pricing games: Purchasing to stock (PTS), in which firms select input prices prior to setting consumer prices; and purchasing to order (PTO), in which firms sell forward contracts to consumers prior to selecting input prices. The antitrust implications of the model depend on the relative degree of oligopoly rivalry in the upstream and downstream markets. Firms strategically precommit to setting prices in the less rivalrous market, which serves to soften competition in the more rivalrous market, resulting in anticompetitive effects. Bertrand prices emerge in equilibrium when the markets are equally rivalrous, while Cournot outcomes arise with upstream monopsony or downstream monopoly markets. The slope of firm reaction functions depends on relative rivalry, a feature we use to derive testable hypotheses for antitrust analysis of a wide variety of industry practices. |
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Oligopoly intermediation, relative rivalry and market conduct |
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