Accounting fraud, auditing, and the role of government sanctions in China
We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Lisic, Ling Lei [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015transfer abstract |
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| Umfang: |
10 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: RETRACTED: Shuffling pathway of anti-twinning in body-centered-cubic metals - Xie, Hongxian ELSEVIER, 2022, JBR, New York, NY |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:68 ; year:2015 ; number:6 ; pages:1186-1195 ; extent:10 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 |
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ELV02868799X |
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| 520 | |a We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. | ||
| 520 | |a We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. | ||
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| 700 | 1 | |a Song, Yanheng |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Wang, Kun |4 oth | |
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10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 doi GBVA2015004000007.pica (DE-627)ELV02868799X (ELSEVIER)S0148-2963(14)00356-7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 650 DE-600 670 VZ 51.00 bkl Lisic, Ling Lei verfasserin aut Accounting fraud, auditing, and the role of government sanctions in China 2015transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. Silveri, Sabatino Dino oth Song, Yanheng oth Wang, Kun oth Enthalten in Elsevier Xie, Hongxian ELSEVIER RETRACTED: Shuffling pathway of anti-twinning in body-centered-cubic metals 2022 JBR New York, NY (DE-627)ELV008600120 volume:68 year:2015 number:6 pages:1186-1195 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 51.00 Werkstoffkunde: Allgemeines VZ AR 68 2015 6 1186-1195 10 045F 650 |
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10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 doi GBVA2015004000007.pica (DE-627)ELV02868799X (ELSEVIER)S0148-2963(14)00356-7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 650 DE-600 670 VZ 51.00 bkl Lisic, Ling Lei verfasserin aut Accounting fraud, auditing, and the role of government sanctions in China 2015transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. Silveri, Sabatino Dino oth Song, Yanheng oth Wang, Kun oth Enthalten in Elsevier Xie, Hongxian ELSEVIER RETRACTED: Shuffling pathway of anti-twinning in body-centered-cubic metals 2022 JBR New York, NY (DE-627)ELV008600120 volume:68 year:2015 number:6 pages:1186-1195 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 51.00 Werkstoffkunde: Allgemeines VZ AR 68 2015 6 1186-1195 10 045F 650 |
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10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 doi GBVA2015004000007.pica (DE-627)ELV02868799X (ELSEVIER)S0148-2963(14)00356-7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 650 DE-600 670 VZ 51.00 bkl Lisic, Ling Lei verfasserin aut Accounting fraud, auditing, and the role of government sanctions in China 2015transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. Silveri, Sabatino Dino oth Song, Yanheng oth Wang, Kun oth Enthalten in Elsevier Xie, Hongxian ELSEVIER RETRACTED: Shuffling pathway of anti-twinning in body-centered-cubic metals 2022 JBR New York, NY (DE-627)ELV008600120 volume:68 year:2015 number:6 pages:1186-1195 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 51.00 Werkstoffkunde: Allgemeines VZ AR 68 2015 6 1186-1195 10 045F 650 |
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10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 doi GBVA2015004000007.pica (DE-627)ELV02868799X (ELSEVIER)S0148-2963(14)00356-7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 650 650 DE-600 670 VZ 51.00 bkl Lisic, Ling Lei verfasserin aut Accounting fraud, auditing, and the role of government sanctions in China 2015transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. Silveri, Sabatino Dino oth Song, Yanheng oth Wang, Kun oth Enthalten in Elsevier Xie, Hongxian ELSEVIER RETRACTED: Shuffling pathway of anti-twinning in body-centered-cubic metals 2022 JBR New York, NY (DE-627)ELV008600120 volume:68 year:2015 number:6 pages:1186-1195 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 51.00 Werkstoffkunde: Allgemeines VZ AR 68 2015 6 1186-1195 10 045F 650 |
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Lisic, Ling Lei |
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Lisic, Ling Lei |
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accounting fraud, auditing, and the role of government sanctions in china |
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Accounting fraud, auditing, and the role of government sanctions in China |
| abstract |
We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. |
| abstractGer |
We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
We use the unique economic, legal, and political landscape of China to examine the impact of auditors on the incidence of accounting fraud. In particular, we examine whether large audit firms reduce the incidence of financial statement fraud in China, an emerging market in which auditors face strong government sanctions but low litigation risk associated with audit failures. We find that companies audited by large audit firms are less likely to commit financial statement fraud. This effect is stronger for regulated industries and for revenue-related frauds. Our results are robust to considering the severity of fraud, excluding firms cross-listing in other jurisdictions, using alternative measures of fraud, accounting for the self-selection of auditors, and controlling for other corporate governance mechanisms. Our results highlight the role of government sanctions in assuring audit quality and have important practical implications to help international audit firms – and businesses more generally – successfully compete in China. |
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Accounting fraud, auditing, and the role of government sanctions in China |
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.11.013 |
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Silveri, Sabatino Dino Song, Yanheng Wang, Kun |
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Silveri, Sabatino Dino Song, Yanheng Wang, Kun |
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2024-07-06T19:28:23.556Z |
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