Manufacturers׳ channel structures when selling asymmetric competing products
Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products...
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Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Yang, Shilei [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015transfer abstract |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Umfang: |
11 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation - 2013, Amsterdam [u.a.] |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:170 ; year:2015 ; pages:641-651 ; extent:11 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
ELV029090679 |
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| 520 | |a Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. | ||
| 520 | |a Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Cournot competition |2 Elsevier | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Channel structure |2 Elsevier | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Bertrand–Cournot competition |2 Elsevier | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Substitutability |2 Elsevier | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Bertrand competition |2 Elsevier | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Brand equity |2 Elsevier | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Shi, Victor |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Jackson, Jonathan E. |4 oth | |
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10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 doi GBVA2015014000029.pica (DE-627)ELV029090679 (ELSEVIER)S0925-5273(15)00118-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DE-600 540 VZ 540 VZ 35.10 bkl Yang, Shilei verfasserin aut Manufacturers׳ channel structures when selling asymmetric competing products 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Cournot competition Elsevier Channel structure Elsevier Bertrand–Cournot competition Elsevier Substitutability Elsevier Bertrand competition Elsevier Brand equity Elsevier Shi, Victor oth Jackson, Jonathan E. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation 2013 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV016982673 volume:170 year:2015 pages:641-651 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_70 35.10 Physikalische Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 170 2015 641-651 11 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 doi GBVA2015014000029.pica (DE-627)ELV029090679 (ELSEVIER)S0925-5273(15)00118-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DE-600 540 VZ 540 VZ 35.10 bkl Yang, Shilei verfasserin aut Manufacturers׳ channel structures when selling asymmetric competing products 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Cournot competition Elsevier Channel structure Elsevier Bertrand–Cournot competition Elsevier Substitutability Elsevier Bertrand competition Elsevier Brand equity Elsevier Shi, Victor oth Jackson, Jonathan E. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation 2013 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV016982673 volume:170 year:2015 pages:641-651 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_70 35.10 Physikalische Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 170 2015 641-651 11 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 doi GBVA2015014000029.pica (DE-627)ELV029090679 (ELSEVIER)S0925-5273(15)00118-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DE-600 540 VZ 540 VZ 35.10 bkl Yang, Shilei verfasserin aut Manufacturers׳ channel structures when selling asymmetric competing products 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Cournot competition Elsevier Channel structure Elsevier Bertrand–Cournot competition Elsevier Substitutability Elsevier Bertrand competition Elsevier Brand equity Elsevier Shi, Victor oth Jackson, Jonathan E. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation 2013 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV016982673 volume:170 year:2015 pages:641-651 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_70 35.10 Physikalische Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 170 2015 641-651 11 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 doi GBVA2015014000029.pica (DE-627)ELV029090679 (ELSEVIER)S0925-5273(15)00118-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DE-600 540 VZ 540 VZ 35.10 bkl Yang, Shilei verfasserin aut Manufacturers׳ channel structures when selling asymmetric competing products 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Cournot competition Elsevier Channel structure Elsevier Bertrand–Cournot competition Elsevier Substitutability Elsevier Bertrand competition Elsevier Brand equity Elsevier Shi, Victor oth Jackson, Jonathan E. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation 2013 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV016982673 volume:170 year:2015 pages:641-651 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_70 35.10 Physikalische Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 170 2015 641-651 11 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 doi GBVA2015014000029.pica (DE-627)ELV029090679 (ELSEVIER)S0925-5273(15)00118-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DE-600 540 VZ 540 VZ 35.10 bkl Yang, Shilei verfasserin aut Manufacturers׳ channel structures when selling asymmetric competing products 2015transfer abstract 11 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. Cournot competition Elsevier Channel structure Elsevier Bertrand–Cournot competition Elsevier Substitutability Elsevier Bertrand competition Elsevier Brand equity Elsevier Shi, Victor oth Jackson, Jonathan E. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation 2013 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV016982673 volume:170 year:2015 pages:641-651 extent:11 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.04.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_70 35.10 Physikalische Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 170 2015 641-651 11 045F 330 |
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TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation |
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To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. 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Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. |
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Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. |
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Manufacturers often face the fundamental channel structure decision, namely, whether to sell their products directly to consumers or indirectly through an intermediary. To address this issue, extensive research has analyzed equilibrium channel structures for competing, equally substitutable products. However, in reality, many competing products are asymmetric in both substitutability and brand equity. In this paper, we study how these two asymmetric characteristics affect the equilibrium channel structures of manufacturers selling competing products. Following some recent studies, we adopt a refined consumer demand model derived from the representative consumer utility function. Based on this model, we examine three possible types of competition between the two supply chains: Cournot (quantity) competition, Bertrand (price)competition, and Bertrand–Cournot competition. We find that brand equity, substitutability, as well as the type of competition all play important roles in determining the equilibrium channel structures. Specifically, in equilibrium a manufacturer always sells directly when its rival competes on quantity. Moreover, when there is sufficient asymmetry in either brand equity or substitutability, manufacturers tend to sell directly. Our results demonstrate that the benefits of selling indirectly shown in previous studies depend critically on the assumptions of equally substitutable products and Bertrand competition. |
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