Land supply, pricing and local governments' land hoarding in China
China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examin...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Du, Jinfeng [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2014transfer abstract |
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| Umfang: |
10 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: A new method to predict high and low-temperature ignition delays under transient thermodynamic conditions and its experimental validation using a Rapid Compression-Expansion Machine - Desantes, José M. ELSEVIER, 2016, [Amsterdam] |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:48 ; year:2014 ; pages:180-189 ; extent:10 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 |
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| 520 | |a China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. | ||
| 520 | |a China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Peiser, Richard B. |4 oth | |
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10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 doi GBVA2014005000019.pica (DE-627)ELV033739730 (ELSEVIER)S0166-0462(14)00071-4 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 620 VZ 540 VZ 35.00 bkl Du, Jinfeng verfasserin aut Land supply, pricing and local governments' land hoarding in China 2014transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. Peiser, Richard B. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Desantes, José M. ELSEVIER A new method to predict high and low-temperature ignition delays under transient thermodynamic conditions and its experimental validation using a Rapid Compression-Expansion Machine 2016 [Amsterdam] (DE-627)ELV019226683 volume:48 year:2014 pages:180-189 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_60 35.00 Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 48 2014 180-189 10 045F 330 |
| spelling |
10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 doi GBVA2014005000019.pica (DE-627)ELV033739730 (ELSEVIER)S0166-0462(14)00071-4 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 620 VZ 540 VZ 35.00 bkl Du, Jinfeng verfasserin aut Land supply, pricing and local governments' land hoarding in China 2014transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. Peiser, Richard B. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Desantes, José M. ELSEVIER A new method to predict high and low-temperature ignition delays under transient thermodynamic conditions and its experimental validation using a Rapid Compression-Expansion Machine 2016 [Amsterdam] (DE-627)ELV019226683 volume:48 year:2014 pages:180-189 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_60 35.00 Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 48 2014 180-189 10 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 doi GBVA2014005000019.pica (DE-627)ELV033739730 (ELSEVIER)S0166-0462(14)00071-4 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 620 VZ 540 VZ 35.00 bkl Du, Jinfeng verfasserin aut Land supply, pricing and local governments' land hoarding in China 2014transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. Peiser, Richard B. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Desantes, José M. ELSEVIER A new method to predict high and low-temperature ignition delays under transient thermodynamic conditions and its experimental validation using a Rapid Compression-Expansion Machine 2016 [Amsterdam] (DE-627)ELV019226683 volume:48 year:2014 pages:180-189 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_60 35.00 Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 48 2014 180-189 10 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 doi GBVA2014005000019.pica (DE-627)ELV033739730 (ELSEVIER)S0166-0462(14)00071-4 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 620 VZ 540 VZ 35.00 bkl Du, Jinfeng verfasserin aut Land supply, pricing and local governments' land hoarding in China 2014transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. Peiser, Richard B. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Desantes, José M. ELSEVIER A new method to predict high and low-temperature ignition delays under transient thermodynamic conditions and its experimental validation using a Rapid Compression-Expansion Machine 2016 [Amsterdam] (DE-627)ELV019226683 volume:48 year:2014 pages:180-189 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_60 35.00 Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 48 2014 180-189 10 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 doi GBVA2014005000019.pica (DE-627)ELV033739730 (ELSEVIER)S0166-0462(14)00071-4 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 620 VZ 540 VZ 35.00 bkl Du, Jinfeng verfasserin aut Land supply, pricing and local governments' land hoarding in China 2014transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. Peiser, Richard B. oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Desantes, José M. ELSEVIER A new method to predict high and low-temperature ignition delays under transient thermodynamic conditions and its experimental validation using a Rapid Compression-Expansion Machine 2016 [Amsterdam] (DE-627)ELV019226683 volume:48 year:2014 pages:180-189 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.07.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_60 35.00 Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 48 2014 180-189 10 045F 330 |
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However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. 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A new method to predict high and low-temperature ignition delays under transient thermodynamic conditions and its experimental validation using a Rapid Compression-Expansion Machine |
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A new method to predict high and low-temperature ignition delays under transient thermodynamic conditions and its experimental validation using a Rapid Compression-Expansion Machine |
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land supply, pricing and local governments' land hoarding in china |
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Land supply, pricing and local governments' land hoarding in China |
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China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. |
| abstractGer |
China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
China's land reform has successfully taken advantage of land sales to generate revenue. However, with land prices soaring, land has become a secure and profitable asset, which in turn has triggered land speculation. The ensuing bubble is detrimental to sustainable development. This paper examines the impact of China's land pricing system on land hoarding by local governments, who acquire and hold land as one form of China's land speculation. We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. According to IV estimation, one yuan per square meter increase of land price could trigger local governments to hoard 40.8ha more land annually and 163.1ha more land cumulatively over the period 1995 to 2010; while according to non-IV estimation, the magnitude is 0.3 and 3.8ha, respectively. |
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We first review the mechanism of land speculation; next, we analyze the institutional root of land hoarding by local governments in China; last, we investigate empirically the relationship between the magnitude of local governments' land hoarding and the land pricing system based on provincial level data from 1995 to 2010. The results indicate that land price is positive and significantly correlated with the magnitude of land hoarding by local governments. Their land hoarding behaviors have adapted to the progress of land reform and to changes in land market conditions. The instrumental variables (IV) estimation accounting for the possible endogeneity of land price generates more significant and pronounced effects than non-IV estimation. 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