Supporting secure spectrum sensing data transmission against SSDH attack in cognitive radio ad hoc networks
Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identif...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Feng, Jingyu [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2016transfer abstract |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Umfang: |
10 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Claude C. Roy, MD, October 21, 1928–July 2, 2015 - Alvarez, Fernando ELSEVIER, 2015, London |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:72 ; year:2016 ; pages:140-149 ; extent:10 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 |
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ELV035496479 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Supporting secure spectrum sensing data transmission against SSDH attack in cognitive radio ad hoc networks |
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| 520 | |a Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. | ||
| 520 | |a Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. | ||
| 650 | 7 | |a Ad hoc |2 Elsevier | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Cooperative spectrum sensing |2 Elsevier | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Hijack |2 Elsevier | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Cognitive radio |2 Elsevier | |
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| 700 | 1 | |a Lu, Guangyue |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Wang, Honggang |4 oth | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Wang, Xuanhong |4 oth | |
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10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 doi GBVA2016019000003.pica (DE-627)ELV035496479 (ELSEVIER)S1084-8045(16)30126-6 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 004 DE-600 610 VZ 570 VZ BIODIV DE-30 fid 35.70 bkl 42.12 bkl 42.15 bkl Feng, Jingyu verfasserin aut Supporting secure spectrum sensing data transmission against SSDH attack in cognitive radio ad hoc networks 2016transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Ad hoc Elsevier Cooperative spectrum sensing Elsevier Hijack Elsevier Cognitive radio Elsevier Trust Elsevier Lu, Guangyue oth Wang, Honggang oth Wang, Xuanhong oth Enthalten in Academic Press Alvarez, Fernando ELSEVIER Claude C. Roy, MD, October 21, 1928–July 2, 2015 2015 London (DE-627)ELV013451553 volume:72 year:2016 pages:140-149 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-BIODIV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_40 35.70 Biochemie: Allgemeines VZ 42.12 Biophysik VZ 42.15 Zellbiologie VZ AR 72 2016 140-149 10 045F 004 |
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10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 doi GBVA2016019000003.pica (DE-627)ELV035496479 (ELSEVIER)S1084-8045(16)30126-6 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 004 DE-600 610 VZ 570 VZ BIODIV DE-30 fid 35.70 bkl 42.12 bkl 42.15 bkl Feng, Jingyu verfasserin aut Supporting secure spectrum sensing data transmission against SSDH attack in cognitive radio ad hoc networks 2016transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Ad hoc Elsevier Cooperative spectrum sensing Elsevier Hijack Elsevier Cognitive radio Elsevier Trust Elsevier Lu, Guangyue oth Wang, Honggang oth Wang, Xuanhong oth Enthalten in Academic Press Alvarez, Fernando ELSEVIER Claude C. Roy, MD, October 21, 1928–July 2, 2015 2015 London (DE-627)ELV013451553 volume:72 year:2016 pages:140-149 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-BIODIV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_40 35.70 Biochemie: Allgemeines VZ 42.12 Biophysik VZ 42.15 Zellbiologie VZ AR 72 2016 140-149 10 045F 004 |
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10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 doi GBVA2016019000003.pica (DE-627)ELV035496479 (ELSEVIER)S1084-8045(16)30126-6 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 004 DE-600 610 VZ 570 VZ BIODIV DE-30 fid 35.70 bkl 42.12 bkl 42.15 bkl Feng, Jingyu verfasserin aut Supporting secure spectrum sensing data transmission against SSDH attack in cognitive radio ad hoc networks 2016transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Ad hoc Elsevier Cooperative spectrum sensing Elsevier Hijack Elsevier Cognitive radio Elsevier Trust Elsevier Lu, Guangyue oth Wang, Honggang oth Wang, Xuanhong oth Enthalten in Academic Press Alvarez, Fernando ELSEVIER Claude C. Roy, MD, October 21, 1928–July 2, 2015 2015 London (DE-627)ELV013451553 volume:72 year:2016 pages:140-149 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-BIODIV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_40 35.70 Biochemie: Allgemeines VZ 42.12 Biophysik VZ 42.15 Zellbiologie VZ AR 72 2016 140-149 10 045F 004 |
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10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 doi GBVA2016019000003.pica (DE-627)ELV035496479 (ELSEVIER)S1084-8045(16)30126-6 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 004 DE-600 610 VZ 570 VZ BIODIV DE-30 fid 35.70 bkl 42.12 bkl 42.15 bkl Feng, Jingyu verfasserin aut Supporting secure spectrum sensing data transmission against SSDH attack in cognitive radio ad hoc networks 2016transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Ad hoc Elsevier Cooperative spectrum sensing Elsevier Hijack Elsevier Cognitive radio Elsevier Trust Elsevier Lu, Guangyue oth Wang, Honggang oth Wang, Xuanhong oth Enthalten in Academic Press Alvarez, Fernando ELSEVIER Claude C. Roy, MD, October 21, 1928–July 2, 2015 2015 London (DE-627)ELV013451553 volume:72 year:2016 pages:140-149 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-BIODIV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_40 35.70 Biochemie: Allgemeines VZ 42.12 Biophysik VZ 42.15 Zellbiologie VZ AR 72 2016 140-149 10 045F 004 |
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10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 doi GBVA2016019000003.pica (DE-627)ELV035496479 (ELSEVIER)S1084-8045(16)30126-6 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 004 004 DE-600 610 VZ 570 VZ BIODIV DE-30 fid 35.70 bkl 42.12 bkl 42.15 bkl Feng, Jingyu verfasserin aut Supporting secure spectrum sensing data transmission against SSDH attack in cognitive radio ad hoc networks 2016transfer abstract 10 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. Ad hoc Elsevier Cooperative spectrum sensing Elsevier Hijack Elsevier Cognitive radio Elsevier Trust Elsevier Lu, Guangyue oth Wang, Honggang oth Wang, Xuanhong oth Enthalten in Academic Press Alvarez, Fernando ELSEVIER Claude C. Roy, MD, October 21, 1928–July 2, 2015 2015 London (DE-627)ELV013451553 volume:72 year:2016 pages:140-149 extent:10 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jnca.2016.06.007 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-BIODIV SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_40 35.70 Biochemie: Allgemeines VZ 42.12 Biophysik VZ 42.15 Zellbiologie VZ AR 72 2016 140-149 10 045F 004 |
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Supporting secure spectrum sensing data transmission against SSDH attack in cognitive radio ad hoc networks |
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Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. |
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Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Cognitive radio ad hoc networks are commonly perceived as ideal ad hoc environments where cognitive radio technology enables secondary users (SUs) to utilize scarce spectrum resources in a dynamic manner. Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) is the key function of cognitive radio technology to identify the available spectrum. However, the nature of aggregating data makes CSS offer opportunities for malicious SUs. Recently, a lot of efforts have been paid to combating spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) threat, but little attention to the multi-hop architecture of cognitive radio ad hoc networks. In this paper, we report the discovery of a novel attack called spectrum sensing data hijack (SSDH), in which attackers disguise as routers to hijack and tamper with spectrum sensing data during the transmission. Our simulations show that this new attack needs much less cost to manipulate CSS and has a much higher success rate compared with SSDF attack. We conduct an in-depth investigation on SSDH and propose a two-level defense scheme from the design ideas of IBC signature-verification and neighbor monitor. We also perform simulations to validate our approach. The results show that our defense scheme can significantly reduce the SSDH attack success ratio. |
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