Identifying agent's information sets: An application to a lifecycle model of schooling, consumption and labor supply
We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of we...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Navarro, Salvador [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2017transfer abstract |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Umfang: |
35 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Mo1463 Endoscopic Ultrasound Guided Fine Needle Aspiration Cytology (EUS FNA) - Evaluation of the Diagnostic Yield Pre and Post Rapid Onsite Evaluation (ROSE) - Patel, Chintan ELSEVIER, 2015, the official journal of the Society for Economic Dynamics, Amsterdam [u.a.] |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:25 ; year:2017 ; pages:58-92 ; extent:35 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 |
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| 520 | |a We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. | ||
| 520 | |a We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. | ||
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10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 doi GBVA2017018000010.pica (DE-627)ELV036067121 (ELSEVIER)S1094-2025(17)30029-7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 610 VZ 600 670 VZ 51.00 bkl Navarro, Salvador verfasserin aut Identifying agent's information sets: An application to a lifecycle model of schooling, consumption and labor supply 2017transfer abstract 35 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. I24 Elsevier J22 Elsevier D81 Elsevier Zhou, Jin oth Enthalten in ScienceDirect Patel, Chintan ELSEVIER Mo1463 Endoscopic Ultrasound Guided Fine Needle Aspiration Cytology (EUS FNA) - Evaluation of the Diagnostic Yield Pre and Post Rapid Onsite Evaluation (ROSE) 2015 the official journal of the Society for Economic Dynamics Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV013466119 volume:25 year:2017 pages:58-92 extent:35 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 51.00 Werkstoffkunde: Allgemeines VZ AR 25 2017 58-92 35 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 doi GBVA2017018000010.pica (DE-627)ELV036067121 (ELSEVIER)S1094-2025(17)30029-7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 610 VZ 600 670 VZ 51.00 bkl Navarro, Salvador verfasserin aut Identifying agent's information sets: An application to a lifecycle model of schooling, consumption and labor supply 2017transfer abstract 35 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. I24 Elsevier J22 Elsevier D81 Elsevier Zhou, Jin oth Enthalten in ScienceDirect Patel, Chintan ELSEVIER Mo1463 Endoscopic Ultrasound Guided Fine Needle Aspiration Cytology (EUS FNA) - Evaluation of the Diagnostic Yield Pre and Post Rapid Onsite Evaluation (ROSE) 2015 the official journal of the Society for Economic Dynamics Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV013466119 volume:25 year:2017 pages:58-92 extent:35 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 51.00 Werkstoffkunde: Allgemeines VZ AR 25 2017 58-92 35 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 doi GBVA2017018000010.pica (DE-627)ELV036067121 (ELSEVIER)S1094-2025(17)30029-7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 610 VZ 600 670 VZ 51.00 bkl Navarro, Salvador verfasserin aut Identifying agent's information sets: An application to a lifecycle model of schooling, consumption and labor supply 2017transfer abstract 35 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. I24 Elsevier J22 Elsevier D81 Elsevier Zhou, Jin oth Enthalten in ScienceDirect Patel, Chintan ELSEVIER Mo1463 Endoscopic Ultrasound Guided Fine Needle Aspiration Cytology (EUS FNA) - Evaluation of the Diagnostic Yield Pre and Post Rapid Onsite Evaluation (ROSE) 2015 the official journal of the Society for Economic Dynamics Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV013466119 volume:25 year:2017 pages:58-92 extent:35 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 51.00 Werkstoffkunde: Allgemeines VZ AR 25 2017 58-92 35 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 doi GBVA2017018000010.pica (DE-627)ELV036067121 (ELSEVIER)S1094-2025(17)30029-7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 610 VZ 600 670 VZ 51.00 bkl Navarro, Salvador verfasserin aut Identifying agent's information sets: An application to a lifecycle model of schooling, consumption and labor supply 2017transfer abstract 35 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. I24 Elsevier J22 Elsevier D81 Elsevier Zhou, Jin oth Enthalten in ScienceDirect Patel, Chintan ELSEVIER Mo1463 Endoscopic Ultrasound Guided Fine Needle Aspiration Cytology (EUS FNA) - Evaluation of the Diagnostic Yield Pre and Post Rapid Onsite Evaluation (ROSE) 2015 the official journal of the Society for Economic Dynamics Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV013466119 volume:25 year:2017 pages:58-92 extent:35 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 51.00 Werkstoffkunde: Allgemeines VZ AR 25 2017 58-92 35 045F 330 |
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10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 doi GBVA2017018000010.pica (DE-627)ELV036067121 (ELSEVIER)S1094-2025(17)30029-7 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 330 330 DNB 610 VZ 600 670 VZ 51.00 bkl Navarro, Salvador verfasserin aut Identifying agent's information sets: An application to a lifecycle model of schooling, consumption and labor supply 2017transfer abstract 35 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. I24 Elsevier J22 Elsevier D81 Elsevier Zhou, Jin oth Enthalten in ScienceDirect Patel, Chintan ELSEVIER Mo1463 Endoscopic Ultrasound Guided Fine Needle Aspiration Cytology (EUS FNA) - Evaluation of the Diagnostic Yield Pre and Post Rapid Onsite Evaluation (ROSE) 2015 the official journal of the Society for Economic Dynamics Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV013466119 volume:25 year:2017 pages:58-92 extent:35 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2017.01.011 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 51.00 Werkstoffkunde: Allgemeines VZ AR 25 2017 58-92 35 045F 330 |
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Enthalten in Mo1463 Endoscopic Ultrasound Guided Fine Needle Aspiration Cytology (EUS FNA) - Evaluation of the Diagnostic Yield Pre and Post Rapid Onsite Evaluation (ROSE) Amsterdam [u.a.] volume:25 year:2017 pages:58-92 extent:35 |
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Identifying agent's information sets: An application to a lifecycle model of schooling, consumption and labor supply |
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We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. |
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We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. |
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We adapt the insight of to develop a methodology that distinguishes information unknown to the econometrician but forecastable by the agent from information unknown to both, at each point in an agent's lifecycle. Predictable variability and uncertainty have different implications in terms of welfare, especially when markets are incomplete. We apply our procedure in the context of an incomplete markets lifecycle model of consumption, labor supply, and schooling decisions, when borrowing limits arise from repayment constraints. Using microdata on earnings, hours worked, schooling choices, and consumption of white males in the US, we infer the agent's information set. We then estimate the model using the identified agent's information set. We find that 52% and 56% of the variance of college and high school log wages respectively are predictable by the agent at the time schooling choices are made. When we complete the market, college attendance increases from 48% to 59%, about half of this increase is due to uncertainty, and the other half because of the borrowing limits. To illustrate the importance of assumptions about what is forecastable by the agent, we simulate a minimum wage insurance policy under different assumptions about the information available to the agents in the model. When we allow for asymmetric information between the insurance institution and the individual, adverse selection turns profits negative. Consumer welfare, however, increases by about 28% when we give individuals access to their estimated information set regardless of asymmetries. |
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