Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition
In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emission...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Eichner, Thomas [verfasserIn] |
---|
Format: |
E-Artikel |
---|---|
Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2019transfer abstract |
---|
Schlagwörter: |
---|
Umfang: |
27 |
---|
Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field - 2012, JEEM : the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, Amsterdam [u.a.] |
---|---|
Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:94 ; year:2019 ; pages:27-53 ; extent:27 |
Links: |
---|
DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 |
---|
Katalog-ID: |
ELV046247114 |
---|
LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | ELV046247114 | ||
003 | DE-627 | ||
005 | 20230626013334.0 | ||
007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 191021s2019 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
024 | 7 | |a 10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 |2 doi | |
028 | 5 | 2 | |a GBV00000000000565.pica |
035 | |a (DE-627)ELV046247114 | ||
035 | |a (ELSEVIER)S0095-0696(17)30804-5 | ||
040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
041 | |a eng | ||
082 | 0 | 4 | |a 530 |q VZ |
082 | 0 | 4 | |a 580 |q VZ |
084 | |a AFRIKA |q DE-30 |2 fid | ||
084 | |a BIODIV |q DE-30 |2 fid | ||
084 | |a 42.38 |2 bkl | ||
100 | 1 | |a Eichner, Thomas |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition |
264 | 1 | |c 2019transfer abstract | |
300 | |a 27 | ||
336 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b zzz |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b z |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b zu |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | |a In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. | ||
520 | |a In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. | ||
650 | 7 | |a Decentralized policymaking |2 Elsevier | |
650 | 7 | |a Emissions tax |2 Elsevier | |
650 | 7 | |a Pollution |2 Elsevier | |
650 | 7 | |a Capital tax |2 Elsevier | |
650 | 7 | |a Emissions cap |2 Elsevier | |
700 | 1 | |a Pethig, Rüdiger |4 oth | |
773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |n Elsevier |t Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field |d 2012 |d JEEM : the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists |g Amsterdam [u.a.] |w (DE-627)ELV02156082X |
773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:94 |g year:2019 |g pages:27-53 |g extent:27 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 |3 Volltext |
912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_U | ||
912 | |a GBV_ELV | ||
912 | |a SYSFLAG_U | ||
912 | |a FID-AFRIKA | ||
912 | |a FID-BIODIV | ||
912 | |a GBV_ILN_130 | ||
912 | |a GBV_ILN_2002 | ||
936 | b | k | |a 42.38 |j Botanik: Allgemeines |q VZ |
951 | |a AR | ||
952 | |d 94 |j 2019 |h 27-53 |g 27 |
author_variant |
t e te |
---|---|
matchkey_str |
eichnerthomaspethigrdiger:2019----:taeipluinotoadaiat |
hierarchy_sort_str |
2019transfer abstract |
bklnumber |
42.38 |
publishDate |
2019 |
allfields |
10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 doi GBV00000000000565.pica (DE-627)ELV046247114 (ELSEVIER)S0095-0696(17)30804-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 530 VZ 580 VZ AFRIKA DE-30 fid BIODIV DE-30 fid 42.38 bkl Eichner, Thomas verfasserin aut Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition 2019transfer abstract 27 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap Elsevier Pethig, Rüdiger oth Enthalten in Elsevier Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field 2012 JEEM : the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV02156082X volume:94 year:2019 pages:27-53 extent:27 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-AFRIKA FID-BIODIV GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2002 42.38 Botanik: Allgemeines VZ AR 94 2019 27-53 27 |
spelling |
10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 doi GBV00000000000565.pica (DE-627)ELV046247114 (ELSEVIER)S0095-0696(17)30804-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 530 VZ 580 VZ AFRIKA DE-30 fid BIODIV DE-30 fid 42.38 bkl Eichner, Thomas verfasserin aut Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition 2019transfer abstract 27 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap Elsevier Pethig, Rüdiger oth Enthalten in Elsevier Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field 2012 JEEM : the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV02156082X volume:94 year:2019 pages:27-53 extent:27 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-AFRIKA FID-BIODIV GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2002 42.38 Botanik: Allgemeines VZ AR 94 2019 27-53 27 |
allfields_unstemmed |
10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 doi GBV00000000000565.pica (DE-627)ELV046247114 (ELSEVIER)S0095-0696(17)30804-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 530 VZ 580 VZ AFRIKA DE-30 fid BIODIV DE-30 fid 42.38 bkl Eichner, Thomas verfasserin aut Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition 2019transfer abstract 27 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap Elsevier Pethig, Rüdiger oth Enthalten in Elsevier Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field 2012 JEEM : the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV02156082X volume:94 year:2019 pages:27-53 extent:27 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-AFRIKA FID-BIODIV GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2002 42.38 Botanik: Allgemeines VZ AR 94 2019 27-53 27 |
allfieldsGer |
10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 doi GBV00000000000565.pica (DE-627)ELV046247114 (ELSEVIER)S0095-0696(17)30804-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 530 VZ 580 VZ AFRIKA DE-30 fid BIODIV DE-30 fid 42.38 bkl Eichner, Thomas verfasserin aut Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition 2019transfer abstract 27 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap Elsevier Pethig, Rüdiger oth Enthalten in Elsevier Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field 2012 JEEM : the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV02156082X volume:94 year:2019 pages:27-53 extent:27 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-AFRIKA FID-BIODIV GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2002 42.38 Botanik: Allgemeines VZ AR 94 2019 27-53 27 |
allfieldsSound |
10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 doi GBV00000000000565.pica (DE-627)ELV046247114 (ELSEVIER)S0095-0696(17)30804-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 530 VZ 580 VZ AFRIKA DE-30 fid BIODIV DE-30 fid 42.38 bkl Eichner, Thomas verfasserin aut Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition 2019transfer abstract 27 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap Elsevier Pethig, Rüdiger oth Enthalten in Elsevier Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field 2012 JEEM : the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV02156082X volume:94 year:2019 pages:27-53 extent:27 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-AFRIKA FID-BIODIV GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2002 42.38 Botanik: Allgemeines VZ AR 94 2019 27-53 27 |
language |
English |
source |
Enthalten in Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field Amsterdam [u.a.] volume:94 year:2019 pages:27-53 extent:27 |
sourceStr |
Enthalten in Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field Amsterdam [u.a.] volume:94 year:2019 pages:27-53 extent:27 |
format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
bklname |
Botanik: Allgemeines |
institution |
findex.gbv.de |
topic_facet |
Decentralized policymaking Emissions tax Pollution Capital tax Emissions cap |
dewey-raw |
530 |
isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
container_title |
Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field |
authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Eichner, Thomas @@aut@@ Pethig, Rüdiger @@oth@@ |
publishDateDaySort_date |
2019-01-01T00:00:00Z |
hierarchy_top_id |
ELV02156082X |
dewey-sort |
3530 |
id |
ELV046247114 |
language_de |
englisch |
fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ELV046247114</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230626013334.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">191021s2019 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="028" ind1="5" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">GBV00000000000565.pica</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)ELV046247114</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ELSEVIER)S0095-0696(17)30804-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">530</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">580</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AFRIKA</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-30</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">BIODIV</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-30</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">42.38</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Eichner, Thomas</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2019transfer abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">27</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Decentralized policymaking</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Emissions tax</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Pollution</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Capital tax</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Emissions cap</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Pethig, Rüdiger</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="n">Elsevier</subfield><subfield code="t">Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field</subfield><subfield code="d">2012</subfield><subfield code="d">JEEM : the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists</subfield><subfield code="g">Amsterdam [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)ELV02156082X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:94</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2019</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:27-53</subfield><subfield code="g">extent:27</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ELV</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-AFRIKA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-BIODIV</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_130</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">42.38</subfield><subfield code="j">Botanik: Allgemeines</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">94</subfield><subfield code="j">2019</subfield><subfield code="h">27-53</subfield><subfield code="g">27</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
author |
Eichner, Thomas |
spellingShingle |
Eichner, Thomas ddc 530 ddc 580 fid AFRIKA fid BIODIV bkl 42.38 Elsevier Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition |
authorStr |
Eichner, Thomas |
ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)ELV02156082X |
format |
electronic Article |
dewey-ones |
530 - Physics 580 - Plants (Botany) |
delete_txt_mv |
keep |
author_role |
aut |
collection |
elsevier |
remote_str |
true |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
topic_title |
530 VZ 580 VZ AFRIKA DE-30 fid BIODIV DE-30 fid 42.38 bkl Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap Elsevier |
topic |
ddc 530 ddc 580 fid AFRIKA fid BIODIV bkl 42.38 Elsevier Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap |
topic_unstemmed |
ddc 530 ddc 580 fid AFRIKA fid BIODIV bkl 42.38 Elsevier Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap |
topic_browse |
ddc 530 ddc 580 fid AFRIKA fid BIODIV bkl 42.38 Elsevier Decentralized policymaking Elsevier Emissions tax Elsevier Pollution Elsevier Capital tax Elsevier Emissions cap |
format_facet |
Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource |
format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
carriertype_str_mv |
zu |
author2_variant |
r p rp |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field |
hierarchy_parent_id |
ELV02156082X |
dewey-tens |
530 - Physics 580 - Plants (Botany) |
hierarchy_top_title |
Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field |
isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)ELV02156082X |
title |
Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition |
ctrlnum |
(DE-627)ELV046247114 (ELSEVIER)S0095-0696(17)30804-5 |
title_full |
Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition |
author_sort |
Eichner, Thomas |
journal |
Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field |
journalStr |
Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field |
lang_code |
eng |
isOA_bool |
false |
dewey-hundreds |
500 - Science |
recordtype |
marc |
publishDateSort |
2019 |
contenttype_str_mv |
zzz |
container_start_page |
27 |
author_browse |
Eichner, Thomas |
container_volume |
94 |
physical |
27 |
class |
530 VZ 580 VZ AFRIKA DE-30 fid BIODIV DE-30 fid 42.38 bkl |
format_se |
Elektronische Aufsätze |
author-letter |
Eichner, Thomas |
doi_str_mv |
10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 |
dewey-full |
530 580 |
title_sort |
strategic pollution control and capital tax competition |
title_auth |
Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition |
abstract |
In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. |
abstractGer |
In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. |
abstract_unstemmed |
In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition. |
collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U FID-AFRIKA FID-BIODIV GBV_ILN_130 GBV_ILN_2002 |
title_short |
Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 |
remote_bool |
true |
author2 |
Pethig, Rüdiger |
author2Str |
Pethig, Rüdiger |
ppnlink |
ELV02156082X |
mediatype_str_mv |
z |
isOA_txt |
false |
hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
author2_role |
oth |
doi_str |
10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002 |
up_date |
2024-07-06T19:43:27.388Z |
_version_ |
1803860057666879488 |
fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ELV046247114</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20230626013334.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">191021s2019 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="028" ind1="5" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">GBV00000000000565.pica</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)ELV046247114</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ELSEVIER)S0095-0696(17)30804-5</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">530</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">580</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AFRIKA</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-30</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">BIODIV</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-30</subfield><subfield code="2">fid</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">42.38</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Eichner, Thomas</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2019transfer abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">27</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Decentralized policymaking</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Emissions tax</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Pollution</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Capital tax</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Emissions cap</subfield><subfield code="2">Elsevier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Pethig, Rüdiger</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Enthalten in</subfield><subfield code="n">Elsevier</subfield><subfield code="t">Electromagnetically induced grating in an atomic system with a static magnetic field</subfield><subfield code="d">2012</subfield><subfield code="d">JEEM : the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists</subfield><subfield code="g">Amsterdam [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)ELV02156082X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:94</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2019</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:27-53</subfield><subfield code="g">extent:27</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2019.01.002</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ELV</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SYSFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-AFRIKA</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">FID-BIODIV</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_130</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_ILN_2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="936" ind1="b" ind2="k"><subfield code="a">42.38</subfield><subfield code="j">Botanik: Allgemeines</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">94</subfield><subfield code="j">2019</subfield><subfield code="h">27-53</subfield><subfield code="g">27</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
score |
7.399331 |