Are interim CEOs just caretakers?
Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
He, Xiaoxiao [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2020transfer abstract |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Cardiac Troponin by Point-of-Care Testing - Collinson, Paul ELSEVIER, 2020, [Amsterdam] |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:61 ; year:2020 ; pages:0 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.003 |
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| 520 | |a Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. | ||
| 520 | |a Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. | ||
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10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.003 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001238.pica (DE-627)ELV049785427 (ELSEVIER)S0929-1199(18)30172-X DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 610 VZ 44.85 bkl He, Xiaoxiao verfasserin aut Are interim CEOs just caretakers? 2020transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. Zhu, Margaret Rui oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Collinson, Paul ELSEVIER Cardiac Troponin by Point-of-Care Testing 2020 [Amsterdam] (DE-627)ELV003777138 volume:61 year:2020 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 44.85 Kardiologie Angiologie VZ AR 61 2020 0 |
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10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.003 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001238.pica (DE-627)ELV049785427 (ELSEVIER)S0929-1199(18)30172-X DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 610 VZ 44.85 bkl He, Xiaoxiao verfasserin aut Are interim CEOs just caretakers? 2020transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. Zhu, Margaret Rui oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Collinson, Paul ELSEVIER Cardiac Troponin by Point-of-Care Testing 2020 [Amsterdam] (DE-627)ELV003777138 volume:61 year:2020 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 44.85 Kardiologie Angiologie VZ AR 61 2020 0 |
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10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.003 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001238.pica (DE-627)ELV049785427 (ELSEVIER)S0929-1199(18)30172-X DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 610 VZ 44.85 bkl He, Xiaoxiao verfasserin aut Are interim CEOs just caretakers? 2020transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. Zhu, Margaret Rui oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Collinson, Paul ELSEVIER Cardiac Troponin by Point-of-Care Testing 2020 [Amsterdam] (DE-627)ELV003777138 volume:61 year:2020 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.003 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U 44.85 Kardiologie Angiologie VZ AR 61 2020 0 |
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Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. |
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Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
Interim CEOs are often viewed as caretakers during CEO transition periods. However, the caretaker function does not fully explain the increasing trend in the use of interim CEO appointments. Recent studies suggest that firms also use the interim position to test potential CEO candidates. This paper empirically examines this argument using a hand-collected dataset of 1936 CEO successions between 1994 and 2014. We find evidence that firms consider interim positions as a testing ground for CEO candidates. Specifically, we find that candidates with uncertain managerial abilities are more likely to be initially named as interim CEOs rather than permanent CEOs. We also find that interim CEOs are more likely to be promoted to the permanent CEO position when they have better interim-period performance attributable to managerial skills. Consistent with the testing-ground option hypothesis, we find interim CEOs promoted to the permanent position result in superior long-run performance, suggesting better CEO-firm matches. |
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Are interim CEOs just caretakers? |
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Zhu, Margaret Rui |
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10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2018.11.003 |
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