Strategic exits in secondary venture capital markets
The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon....
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Andrieu, Guillaume [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2021transfer abstract |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Synthesis of Green fluorescent Nitrogen doped - Rajapandi, Subramani ELSEVIER, 2022, New York, NY |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:36 ; year:2021 ; number:2 ; pages:0 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.105999 |
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ELV053100212 |
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| 520 | |a The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. | ||
| 520 | |a The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. | ||
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10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.105999 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001308.pica (DE-627)ELV053100212 (ELSEVIER)S0883-9026(18)30906-6 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 VZ 35.00 bkl Andrieu, Guillaume verfasserin aut Strategic exits in secondary venture capital markets 2021transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. Peter Groh, Alexander oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Publ Rajapandi, Subramani ELSEVIER Synthesis of Green fluorescent Nitrogen doped 2022 New York, NY (DE-627)ELV009027416 volume:36 year:2021 number:2 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.105999 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA 35.00 Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 36 2021 2 0 |
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10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.105999 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001308.pica (DE-627)ELV053100212 (ELSEVIER)S0883-9026(18)30906-6 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 VZ 35.00 bkl Andrieu, Guillaume verfasserin aut Strategic exits in secondary venture capital markets 2021transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. Peter Groh, Alexander oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Publ Rajapandi, Subramani ELSEVIER Synthesis of Green fluorescent Nitrogen doped 2022 New York, NY (DE-627)ELV009027416 volume:36 year:2021 number:2 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.105999 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA 35.00 Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 36 2021 2 0 |
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10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.105999 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001308.pica (DE-627)ELV053100212 (ELSEVIER)S0883-9026(18)30906-6 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 VZ 35.00 bkl Andrieu, Guillaume verfasserin aut Strategic exits in secondary venture capital markets 2021transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. Peter Groh, Alexander oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science Publ Rajapandi, Subramani ELSEVIER Synthesis of Green fluorescent Nitrogen doped 2022 New York, NY (DE-627)ELV009027416 volume:36 year:2021 number:2 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.105999 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA 35.00 Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 36 2021 2 0 |
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Synthesis of Green fluorescent Nitrogen doped |
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Synthesis of Green fluorescent Nitrogen doped |
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Strategic exits in secondary venture capital markets |
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Strategic exits in secondary venture capital markets |
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Andrieu, Guillaume |
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Synthesis of Green fluorescent Nitrogen doped |
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Andrieu, Guillaume |
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10.1016/j.jbusvent.2019.105999 |
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strategic exits in secondary venture capital markets |
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Strategic exits in secondary venture capital markets |
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The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. |
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The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. |
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The market for secondary venture capital transactions provides a way for investors to obtain liquidity if the investee start-up corporation has not yet reached sufficient maturity for an IPO. It also creates divestment opportunities for badly performing ventures that investors would rather abandon. We analyze the way in which the opportunistic behavior and liquidity constraints of venture capital funds channel deal flow into the secondary venture capital market. Such opportunistic behavior leads to the strategic exit of seed financing venture capitalists. These exits enlarge investors' opportunity set of strategies and therefore affect the deal terms with entrepreneurs. In this paper, we show that two contracts are possible in a world with financially constrained venture capital investors, staged investments, and premature divestment opportunities. Both contracts have their disadvantages. With the first, the venture capitalist will never liquidate a project, even if it is a lemon, but will instead engage in a secondary transaction. With the second contract, although lemons will be systematically abandoned, high-quality ventures may also be liquidated. Entrepreneurs need to consider these effects when aiming to maximize their benefits and must trade off the contract parameters accordingly. Our model provides guidance to entrepreneurs in this respect, helps to explain deal flow into the secondary venture capital market, and offers several empirical predictions. |
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Strategic exits in secondary venture capital markets |
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Peter Groh, Alexander |
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