Strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain
With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and eva...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Shi, Dan [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2021transfer abstract |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation - 2013, Amsterdam [u.a.] |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:242 ; year:2021 ; pages:0 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108300 |
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ELV055674364 |
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| 520 | |a With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. | ||
| 520 | |a With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. | ||
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| 700 | 1 | |a Li, Xiang |4 oth | |
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10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108300 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001561.pica (DE-627)ELV055674364 (ELSEVIER)S0925-5273(21)00276-0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 VZ 540 VZ 35.10 bkl Shi, Dan verfasserin aut Strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain 2021transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. Online marketplace Elsevier Multi-channel management Elsevier Platform supply chain Elsevier Game theory Elsevier Wang, Meiqi oth Li, Xiang oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation 2013 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV016982673 volume:242 year:2021 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108300 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_70 35.10 Physikalische Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 242 2021 0 |
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10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108300 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001561.pica (DE-627)ELV055674364 (ELSEVIER)S0925-5273(21)00276-0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 VZ 540 VZ 35.10 bkl Shi, Dan verfasserin aut Strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain 2021transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. Online marketplace Elsevier Multi-channel management Elsevier Platform supply chain Elsevier Game theory Elsevier Wang, Meiqi oth Li, Xiang oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation 2013 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV016982673 volume:242 year:2021 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108300 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_70 35.10 Physikalische Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 242 2021 0 |
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10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108300 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001561.pica (DE-627)ELV055674364 (ELSEVIER)S0925-5273(21)00276-0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 VZ 540 VZ 35.10 bkl Shi, Dan verfasserin aut Strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain 2021transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. Online marketplace Elsevier Multi-channel management Elsevier Platform supply chain Elsevier Game theory Elsevier Wang, Meiqi oth Li, Xiang oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation 2013 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV016982673 volume:242 year:2021 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108300 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_70 35.10 Physikalische Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 242 2021 0 |
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10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108300 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001561.pica (DE-627)ELV055674364 (ELSEVIER)S0925-5273(21)00276-0 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 VZ 540 VZ 35.10 bkl Shi, Dan verfasserin aut Strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain 2021transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. Online marketplace Elsevier Multi-channel management Elsevier Platform supply chain Elsevier Game theory Elsevier Wang, Meiqi oth Li, Xiang oth Enthalten in Elsevier Science TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation 2013 Amsterdam [u.a.] (DE-627)ELV016982673 volume:242 year:2021 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108300 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_70 35.10 Physikalische Chemie: Allgemeines VZ AR 242 2021 0 |
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TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation |
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TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation |
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Strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain |
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Strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain |
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Shi, Dan |
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TiO2 nanoparticle assisted solid phase photocatalytic degradation of polythene film: A mechanistic investigation |
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strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain |
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Strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain |
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With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. |
| abstractGer |
With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
With the increasing popularity of platform economics, supply chain members are facing strategic decisions regarding whether to introduce online marketplace platforms in addition to their existing brick-and-mortar sales channels. Our study investigates this problem by quantitatively modelling and evaluating four different channel structures defined by whether the manufacturer, the retailer, neither or both choose to adopt the platform to enhance their sales. It is shown that the introduction of a marketplace platform is beneficial for supply chain members only if the degree of competition among different channels is low. Moreover, modes MR, MN and NN are shown as possible equilibrium channel structures depending on the degree of channel competition and the platform fee rate, and it is found that the Nash and Stackelberg equilibriums coincide, indicating that there is no first-mover advantage in platform introduction. Some extended cases are explored by incorporating the endogenous platform fee rate, platform spillover effect, and asymmetric market base, and the robustness of the results is analysed. |
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Strategic introduction of marketplace platform and its impacts on supply chain |
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