Constitutions, federalism, and national integration
This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the cen...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Ansolabehere, Stephen [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2022transfer abstract |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Untargeted metabolomic approaches in food authenticity: A review that showcases biomarkers - Mialon, Nicolas ELSEVIER, 2022, EER, Amsterdam |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:148 ; year:2022 ; pages:0 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104225 |
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| 520 | |a This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. | ||
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10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104225 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001890.pica (DE-627)ELV058737308 (ELSEVIER)S0014-2921(22)00131-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 660 VZ 58.34 bkl Ansolabehere, Stephen verfasserin aut Constitutions, federalism, and national integration 2022transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. H70 Elsevier H10 Elsevier D70 Elsevier Puy, M. Socorro oth Enthalten in Elsevier Mialon, Nicolas ELSEVIER Untargeted metabolomic approaches in food authenticity: A review that showcases biomarkers 2022 EER Amsterdam (DE-627)ELV008405123 volume:148 year:2022 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104225 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA 58.34 Lebensmitteltechnologie VZ AR 148 2022 0 |
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10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104225 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001890.pica (DE-627)ELV058737308 (ELSEVIER)S0014-2921(22)00131-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 660 VZ 58.34 bkl Ansolabehere, Stephen verfasserin aut Constitutions, federalism, and national integration 2022transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. H70 Elsevier H10 Elsevier D70 Elsevier Puy, M. Socorro oth Enthalten in Elsevier Mialon, Nicolas ELSEVIER Untargeted metabolomic approaches in food authenticity: A review that showcases biomarkers 2022 EER Amsterdam (DE-627)ELV008405123 volume:148 year:2022 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104225 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA 58.34 Lebensmitteltechnologie VZ AR 148 2022 0 |
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10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104225 doi /cbs_pica/cbs_olc/import_discovery/elsevier/einzuspielen/GBV00000000001890.pica (DE-627)ELV058737308 (ELSEVIER)S0014-2921(22)00131-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 540 660 VZ 58.34 bkl Ansolabehere, Stephen verfasserin aut Constitutions, federalism, and national integration 2022transfer abstract nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. H70 Elsevier H10 Elsevier D70 Elsevier Puy, M. Socorro oth Enthalten in Elsevier Mialon, Nicolas ELSEVIER Untargeted metabolomic approaches in food authenticity: A review that showcases biomarkers 2022 EER Amsterdam (DE-627)ELV008405123 volume:148 year:2022 pages:0 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104225 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OLC-PHA 58.34 Lebensmitteltechnologie VZ AR 148 2022 0 |
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Ansolabehere, Stephen |
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Untargeted metabolomic approaches in food authenticity: A review that showcases biomarkers |
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constitutions, federalism, and national integration |
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Constitutions, federalism, and national integration |
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This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. |
| abstractGer |
This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
This paper offers a model of endogenous constitutional design in a setting where culturally and economically distinct regions establish a national union and bargain over the form of the government. We examine two aspects: the type of legislative decision rule (consensus or majority rule) and the central government’s power over the member regions (centralized or decentralized federalism). We show that (i) more centralized regimes emerge when the regions are culturally similar (e.g., same language or religion) and when the economic benefits derived from the union are high, (ii) if regions choose to govern by consensus rather than majority rule, the resulting legislation will produce higher centralization of power and thus lower regional autonomy, (iii) legislating by consensus, rather than by majority rule, produces more efficient unions but, under some circumstances, majority rule produces a more durable union. Our results carry insights into the historical evolution of nations, such as the inclusion of Scotland in Great Britain, and the current challenges facing the EU and other contemporary unions. |
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Constitutions, federalism, and national integration |
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