Information advantages, excessive risk-taking, and capital regulation for BigTechs in financial intermediation
This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Li, Mei [verfasserIn] Qiu, Junfeng [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2023 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: China economic review - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1989, 80 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:80 |
DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101989 |
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Katalog-ID: |
ELV060641738 |
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520 | |a This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare. | ||
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10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101989 doi (DE-627)ELV060641738 (ELSEVIER)S1043-951X(23)00074-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 330 360 VZ Li, Mei verfasserin aut Information advantages, excessive risk-taking, and capital regulation for BigTechs in financial intermediation 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare. BigTechs Excessive risk-taking Capital regulation Qiu, Junfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in China economic review Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1989 80 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320596656 (DE-600)2019641-6 (DE-576)094085749 1043-951X nnns volume:80 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 80 |
spelling |
10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101989 doi (DE-627)ELV060641738 (ELSEVIER)S1043-951X(23)00074-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 330 360 VZ Li, Mei verfasserin aut Information advantages, excessive risk-taking, and capital regulation for BigTechs in financial intermediation 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare. BigTechs Excessive risk-taking Capital regulation Qiu, Junfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in China economic review Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1989 80 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320596656 (DE-600)2019641-6 (DE-576)094085749 1043-951X nnns volume:80 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 80 |
allfields_unstemmed |
10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101989 doi (DE-627)ELV060641738 (ELSEVIER)S1043-951X(23)00074-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 330 360 VZ Li, Mei verfasserin aut Information advantages, excessive risk-taking, and capital regulation for BigTechs in financial intermediation 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare. BigTechs Excessive risk-taking Capital regulation Qiu, Junfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in China economic review Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1989 80 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320596656 (DE-600)2019641-6 (DE-576)094085749 1043-951X nnns volume:80 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 80 |
allfieldsGer |
10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101989 doi (DE-627)ELV060641738 (ELSEVIER)S1043-951X(23)00074-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 330 360 VZ Li, Mei verfasserin aut Information advantages, excessive risk-taking, and capital regulation for BigTechs in financial intermediation 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare. BigTechs Excessive risk-taking Capital regulation Qiu, Junfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in China economic review Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1989 80 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320596656 (DE-600)2019641-6 (DE-576)094085749 1043-951X nnns volume:80 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 80 |
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10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101989 doi (DE-627)ELV060641738 (ELSEVIER)S1043-951X(23)00074-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 330 360 VZ Li, Mei verfasserin aut Information advantages, excessive risk-taking, and capital regulation for BigTechs in financial intermediation 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare. BigTechs Excessive risk-taking Capital regulation Qiu, Junfeng verfasserin aut Enthalten in China economic review Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1989 80 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320596656 (DE-600)2019641-6 (DE-576)094085749 1043-951X nnns volume:80 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 AR 80 |
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Information advantages, excessive risk-taking, and capital regulation for BigTechs in financial intermediation |
abstract |
This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare. |
abstractGer |
This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare. |
abstract_unstemmed |
This paper establishes theoretical models to study capital regulation of BigTech firms (BigTechs hereafter) providing financial intermediation services. In our models, BigTechs borrow debts to invest between socially efficient prudent assets and socially inefficient risky assets. Limited liabilities imply that with a higher capital adequacy ratio, BigTechs are more risk averse and favor the prudent asset more. Then we examine how better information of BigTechs will affect BigTechs' incentive for excessive risk-taking, welfare, and capital regulation. The major results produced by our models are as follows: (1) Better information of BigTechs does not eliminate and could in some circumstances exacerbate their excessive risk-taking behavior. (2) Better information of BigTechs does not necessarily improve welfare. BigTechs could employ better information to more precisely identify the socially inefficient risky asset to invest in, causing more severe resource misallocation. (3) Capital regulation is an effective tool to curb BigTechs' excessive risk-taking and to ensure that better information of BigTechs will improve welfare. |
collection_details |
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title_short |
Information advantages, excessive risk-taking, and capital regulation for BigTechs in financial intermediation |
remote_bool |
true |
author2 |
Qiu, Junfeng |
author2Str |
Qiu, Junfeng |
ppnlink |
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mediatype_str_mv |
c |
isOA_txt |
false |
hochschulschrift_bool |
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doi_str |
10.1016/j.chieco.2023.101989 |
up_date |
2024-07-06T16:39:31.766Z |
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1803848485979553792 |
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