Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects

Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the pop...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

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Autor*in:	Liu, Tianming [verfasserIn] Xu, Zhengtian [verfasserIn] Vignon, Daniel [verfasserIn] Yin, Yafeng [verfasserIn] Qin, Zhiwei [verfasserIn] Li, Qingyang [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2023

Schlagwörter:	Ride sourcing Driver incentive Supply management Welfare effects

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Transportation research / C - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993, 156
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:156

DOI / URN:	10.1016/j.trc.2023.104323

Katalog-ID:	ELV065106563

Internformat


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245	1	0	\|a Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects
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520			\|a Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the popularity of these incentives, little is known about how drivers respond to them in practice, and currently, there are no means to comprehensively evaluate and optimize their designs. To fill the void, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that formulates ride-sourcing drivers’ working decisions influenced by threshold-based incentives and then calibrate it using real-world data from a ride-sourcing company. Our results provide fresh insights into the market and welfare effects of the threshold-based incentive and its various designs. It is found that the threshold-based incentive could increase welfare significantly for full-time drivers but marginally for part-time drivers. In contrast, involving part-time drivers in the incentive programs generally can yield higher profits for the platform, while incentivizing full-time drivers is mostly unprofitable. On incentive design, the incentive threshold and reward must be closely paired for different driver groups to avoid inferior consequences for the platform and drivers. In addition, switching from threshold-based incentives to direct wage increments may benefit both full-time drivers and the ride-sourcing company.
650		4	\|a Ride sourcing
650		4	\|a Driver incentive
650		4	\|a Supply management
650		4	\|a Welfare effects
700	1		\|a Xu, Zhengtian \|e verfasserin \|0 (orcid)0000-0001-5626-285X \|4 aut
700	1		\|a Vignon, Daniel \|e verfasserin \|0 (orcid)0000-0002-8190-3564 \|4 aut
700	1		\|a Yin, Yafeng \|e verfasserin \|0 (orcid)0000-0003-3117-5463 \|4 aut
700	1		\|a Qin, Zhiwei \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
700	1		\|a Li, Qingyang \|e verfasserin \|4 aut
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bklnumber	55.84
publishDate	2023
allfields	10.1016/j.trc.2023.104323 doi (DE-627)ELV065106563 (ELSEVIER)S0968-090X(23)00312-1 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 380 VZ 55.84 bkl Liu, Tianming verfasserin aut Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the popularity of these incentives, little is known about how drivers respond to them in practice, and currently, there are no means to comprehensively evaluate and optimize their designs. To fill the void, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that formulates ride-sourcing drivers’ working decisions influenced by threshold-based incentives and then calibrate it using real-world data from a ride-sourcing company. Our results provide fresh insights into the market and welfare effects of the threshold-based incentive and its various designs. It is found that the threshold-based incentive could increase welfare significantly for full-time drivers but marginally for part-time drivers. In contrast, involving part-time drivers in the incentive programs generally can yield higher profits for the platform, while incentivizing full-time drivers is mostly unprofitable. On incentive design, the incentive threshold and reward must be closely paired for different driver groups to avoid inferior consequences for the platform and drivers. In addition, switching from threshold-based incentives to direct wage increments may benefit both full-time drivers and the ride-sourcing company. Ride sourcing Driver incentive Supply management Welfare effects Xu, Zhengtian verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-5626-285X aut Vignon, Daniel verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-8190-3564 aut Yin, Yafeng verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-3117-5463 aut Qin, Zhiwei verfasserin aut Li, Qingyang verfasserin aut Enthalten in Transportation research / C Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 156 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320532070 (DE-600)2015891-9 (DE-576)259484962 1879-2359 nnns volume:156 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 55.84 Straßenverkehr VZ AR 156
spelling	10.1016/j.trc.2023.104323 doi (DE-627)ELV065106563 (ELSEVIER)S0968-090X(23)00312-1 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 380 VZ 55.84 bkl Liu, Tianming verfasserin aut Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the popularity of these incentives, little is known about how drivers respond to them in practice, and currently, there are no means to comprehensively evaluate and optimize their designs. To fill the void, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that formulates ride-sourcing drivers’ working decisions influenced by threshold-based incentives and then calibrate it using real-world data from a ride-sourcing company. Our results provide fresh insights into the market and welfare effects of the threshold-based incentive and its various designs. It is found that the threshold-based incentive could increase welfare significantly for full-time drivers but marginally for part-time drivers. In contrast, involving part-time drivers in the incentive programs generally can yield higher profits for the platform, while incentivizing full-time drivers is mostly unprofitable. On incentive design, the incentive threshold and reward must be closely paired for different driver groups to avoid inferior consequences for the platform and drivers. In addition, switching from threshold-based incentives to direct wage increments may benefit both full-time drivers and the ride-sourcing company. Ride sourcing Driver incentive Supply management Welfare effects Xu, Zhengtian verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-5626-285X aut Vignon, Daniel verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-8190-3564 aut Yin, Yafeng verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-3117-5463 aut Qin, Zhiwei verfasserin aut Li, Qingyang verfasserin aut Enthalten in Transportation research / C Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 156 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320532070 (DE-600)2015891-9 (DE-576)259484962 1879-2359 nnns volume:156 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 55.84 Straßenverkehr VZ AR 156
allfields_unstemmed	10.1016/j.trc.2023.104323 doi (DE-627)ELV065106563 (ELSEVIER)S0968-090X(23)00312-1 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 380 VZ 55.84 bkl Liu, Tianming verfasserin aut Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the popularity of these incentives, little is known about how drivers respond to them in practice, and currently, there are no means to comprehensively evaluate and optimize their designs. To fill the void, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that formulates ride-sourcing drivers’ working decisions influenced by threshold-based incentives and then calibrate it using real-world data from a ride-sourcing company. Our results provide fresh insights into the market and welfare effects of the threshold-based incentive and its various designs. It is found that the threshold-based incentive could increase welfare significantly for full-time drivers but marginally for part-time drivers. In contrast, involving part-time drivers in the incentive programs generally can yield higher profits for the platform, while incentivizing full-time drivers is mostly unprofitable. On incentive design, the incentive threshold and reward must be closely paired for different driver groups to avoid inferior consequences for the platform and drivers. In addition, switching from threshold-based incentives to direct wage increments may benefit both full-time drivers and the ride-sourcing company. Ride sourcing Driver incentive Supply management Welfare effects Xu, Zhengtian verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-5626-285X aut Vignon, Daniel verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-8190-3564 aut Yin, Yafeng verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-3117-5463 aut Qin, Zhiwei verfasserin aut Li, Qingyang verfasserin aut Enthalten in Transportation research / C Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 156 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320532070 (DE-600)2015891-9 (DE-576)259484962 1879-2359 nnns volume:156 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 55.84 Straßenverkehr VZ AR 156
allfieldsGer	10.1016/j.trc.2023.104323 doi (DE-627)ELV065106563 (ELSEVIER)S0968-090X(23)00312-1 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 380 VZ 55.84 bkl Liu, Tianming verfasserin aut Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the popularity of these incentives, little is known about how drivers respond to them in practice, and currently, there are no means to comprehensively evaluate and optimize their designs. To fill the void, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that formulates ride-sourcing drivers’ working decisions influenced by threshold-based incentives and then calibrate it using real-world data from a ride-sourcing company. Our results provide fresh insights into the market and welfare effects of the threshold-based incentive and its various designs. It is found that the threshold-based incentive could increase welfare significantly for full-time drivers but marginally for part-time drivers. In contrast, involving part-time drivers in the incentive programs generally can yield higher profits for the platform, while incentivizing full-time drivers is mostly unprofitable. On incentive design, the incentive threshold and reward must be closely paired for different driver groups to avoid inferior consequences for the platform and drivers. In addition, switching from threshold-based incentives to direct wage increments may benefit both full-time drivers and the ride-sourcing company. Ride sourcing Driver incentive Supply management Welfare effects Xu, Zhengtian verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-5626-285X aut Vignon, Daniel verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-8190-3564 aut Yin, Yafeng verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-3117-5463 aut Qin, Zhiwei verfasserin aut Li, Qingyang verfasserin aut Enthalten in Transportation research / C Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 156 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320532070 (DE-600)2015891-9 (DE-576)259484962 1879-2359 nnns volume:156 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 55.84 Straßenverkehr VZ AR 156
allfieldsSound	10.1016/j.trc.2023.104323 doi (DE-627)ELV065106563 (ELSEVIER)S0968-090X(23)00312-1 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 380 VZ 55.84 bkl Liu, Tianming verfasserin aut Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the popularity of these incentives, little is known about how drivers respond to them in practice, and currently, there are no means to comprehensively evaluate and optimize their designs. To fill the void, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that formulates ride-sourcing drivers’ working decisions influenced by threshold-based incentives and then calibrate it using real-world data from a ride-sourcing company. Our results provide fresh insights into the market and welfare effects of the threshold-based incentive and its various designs. It is found that the threshold-based incentive could increase welfare significantly for full-time drivers but marginally for part-time drivers. In contrast, involving part-time drivers in the incentive programs generally can yield higher profits for the platform, while incentivizing full-time drivers is mostly unprofitable. On incentive design, the incentive threshold and reward must be closely paired for different driver groups to avoid inferior consequences for the platform and drivers. In addition, switching from threshold-based incentives to direct wage increments may benefit both full-time drivers and the ride-sourcing company. Ride sourcing Driver incentive Supply management Welfare effects Xu, Zhengtian verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-5626-285X aut Vignon, Daniel verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-8190-3564 aut Yin, Yafeng verfasserin (orcid)0000-0003-3117-5463 aut Qin, Zhiwei verfasserin aut Li, Qingyang verfasserin aut Enthalten in Transportation research / C Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 156 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320532070 (DE-600)2015891-9 (DE-576)259484962 1879-2359 nnns volume:156 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_165 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 55.84 Straßenverkehr VZ AR 156
language	English
source	Enthalten in Transportation research / C 156 volume:156
sourceStr	Enthalten in Transportation research / C 156 volume:156
format_phy_str_mv	Article
bklname	Straßenverkehr
institution	findex.gbv.de
topic_facet	Ride sourcing Driver incentive Supply management Welfare effects
dewey-raw	380
isfreeaccess_bool	false
container_title	Transportation research / C
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Liu, Tianming @@aut@@ Xu, Zhengtian @@aut@@ Vignon, Daniel @@aut@@ Yin, Yafeng @@aut@@ Qin, Zhiwei @@aut@@ Li, Qingyang @@aut@@
publishDateDaySort_date	2023-01-01T00:00:00Z
hierarchy_top_id	320532070
dewey-sort	3380
id	ELV065106563
language_de	englisch
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author	Liu, Tianming
spellingShingle	Liu, Tianming ddc 380 bkl 55.84 misc Ride sourcing misc Driver incentive misc Supply management misc Welfare effects Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects
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topic_title	380 VZ 55.84 bkl Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects Ride sourcing Driver incentive Supply management Welfare effects
topic	ddc 380 bkl 55.84 misc Ride sourcing misc Driver incentive misc Supply management misc Welfare effects
topic_unstemmed	ddc 380 bkl 55.84 misc Ride sourcing misc Driver incentive misc Supply management misc Welfare effects
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title	Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects
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title_full	Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects
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title_sort	threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: implications on supply management and welfare effects
title_auth	Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects
abstract	Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the popularity of these incentives, little is known about how drivers respond to them in practice, and currently, there are no means to comprehensively evaluate and optimize their designs. To fill the void, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that formulates ride-sourcing drivers’ working decisions influenced by threshold-based incentives and then calibrate it using real-world data from a ride-sourcing company. Our results provide fresh insights into the market and welfare effects of the threshold-based incentive and its various designs. It is found that the threshold-based incentive could increase welfare significantly for full-time drivers but marginally for part-time drivers. In contrast, involving part-time drivers in the incentive programs generally can yield higher profits for the platform, while incentivizing full-time drivers is mostly unprofitable. On incentive design, the incentive threshold and reward must be closely paired for different driver groups to avoid inferior consequences for the platform and drivers. In addition, switching from threshold-based incentives to direct wage increments may benefit both full-time drivers and the ride-sourcing company.
abstractGer	Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the popularity of these incentives, little is known about how drivers respond to them in practice, and currently, there are no means to comprehensively evaluate and optimize their designs. To fill the void, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that formulates ride-sourcing drivers’ working decisions influenced by threshold-based incentives and then calibrate it using real-world data from a ride-sourcing company. Our results provide fresh insights into the market and welfare effects of the threshold-based incentive and its various designs. It is found that the threshold-based incentive could increase welfare significantly for full-time drivers but marginally for part-time drivers. In contrast, involving part-time drivers in the incentive programs generally can yield higher profits for the platform, while incentivizing full-time drivers is mostly unprofitable. On incentive design, the incentive threshold and reward must be closely paired for different driver groups to avoid inferior consequences for the platform and drivers. In addition, switching from threshold-based incentives to direct wage increments may benefit both full-time drivers and the ride-sourcing company.
abstract_unstemmed	Ride-sourcing companies have been widely using threshold-based incentive programs to encourage drivers to extend their work hours. In such programs, a driver receives a certain amount of monetary reward if she completes a given supply task within a predetermined time window. However, despite the popularity of these incentives, little is known about how drivers respond to them in practice, and currently, there are no means to comprehensively evaluate and optimize their designs. To fill the void, we develop a dynamic discrete choice model that formulates ride-sourcing drivers’ working decisions influenced by threshold-based incentives and then calibrate it using real-world data from a ride-sourcing company. Our results provide fresh insights into the market and welfare effects of the threshold-based incentive and its various designs. It is found that the threshold-based incentive could increase welfare significantly for full-time drivers but marginally for part-time drivers. In contrast, involving part-time drivers in the incentive programs generally can yield higher profits for the platform, while incentivizing full-time drivers is mostly unprofitable. On incentive design, the incentive threshold and reward must be closely paired for different driver groups to avoid inferior consequences for the platform and drivers. In addition, switching from threshold-based incentives to direct wage increments may benefit both full-time drivers and the ride-sourcing company.
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title_short	Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects
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author2	Xu, Zhengtian Vignon, Daniel Yin, Yafeng Qin, Zhiwei Li, Qingyang
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up_date	2024-07-06T21:51:13.832Z
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Threshold-based incentives for ride-sourcing drivers: Implications on supply management and welfare effects

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