On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry

This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest i...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Lambertini, Luca [verfasserIn] Tampieri, Alessandro [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2023

Schlagwörter:	Environmental CSR Multiproduct monopolist Time-consistent emission tax Emission abatement Horizontal differentiation R&D spillovers

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Journal of cleaner production - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993, 426
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:426

DOI / URN:	10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139036

Katalog-ID:	ELV065145828

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allfields	10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139036 doi (DE-627)ELV065145828 (ELSEVIER)S0959-6526(23)03194-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 690 330 VZ 43.35 bkl 85.35 bkl Lambertini, Luca verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-6353-4753 aut On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest in R&D activities to reduce polluting emissions, while emission-reducing innovation may spillover from one product to the other. We show that the monopolist has no incentive to engage in ECSR, unless a regulatory measure is introduced. By contrast, a time consistent tax induces the adoption of a ECSR statute. Under admissible parameter conditions, profits are concave and single-peaked in the ECSR intensity. Finally, ECSR monotonically increases social welfare, by raising consumer surplus and curbing environmental damage. Environmental CSR Multiproduct monopolist Time-consistent emission tax Emission abatement Horizontal differentiation R&D spillovers Tampieri, Alessandro verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of cleaner production Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 426 Online-Ressource (DE-627)324655878 (DE-600)2029338-0 (DE-576)252613988 0959-6526 nnns volume:426 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.35 Umweltrichtlinien Umweltnormen VZ 85.35 Fertigung VZ AR 426
spelling	10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139036 doi (DE-627)ELV065145828 (ELSEVIER)S0959-6526(23)03194-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 690 330 VZ 43.35 bkl 85.35 bkl Lambertini, Luca verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-6353-4753 aut On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest in R&D activities to reduce polluting emissions, while emission-reducing innovation may spillover from one product to the other. We show that the monopolist has no incentive to engage in ECSR, unless a regulatory measure is introduced. By contrast, a time consistent tax induces the adoption of a ECSR statute. Under admissible parameter conditions, profits are concave and single-peaked in the ECSR intensity. Finally, ECSR monotonically increases social welfare, by raising consumer surplus and curbing environmental damage. Environmental CSR Multiproduct monopolist Time-consistent emission tax Emission abatement Horizontal differentiation R&D spillovers Tampieri, Alessandro verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of cleaner production Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 426 Online-Ressource (DE-627)324655878 (DE-600)2029338-0 (DE-576)252613988 0959-6526 nnns volume:426 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.35 Umweltrichtlinien Umweltnormen VZ 85.35 Fertigung VZ AR 426
allfields_unstemmed	10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139036 doi (DE-627)ELV065145828 (ELSEVIER)S0959-6526(23)03194-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 690 330 VZ 43.35 bkl 85.35 bkl Lambertini, Luca verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-6353-4753 aut On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest in R&D activities to reduce polluting emissions, while emission-reducing innovation may spillover from one product to the other. We show that the monopolist has no incentive to engage in ECSR, unless a regulatory measure is introduced. By contrast, a time consistent tax induces the adoption of a ECSR statute. Under admissible parameter conditions, profits are concave and single-peaked in the ECSR intensity. Finally, ECSR monotonically increases social welfare, by raising consumer surplus and curbing environmental damage. Environmental CSR Multiproduct monopolist Time-consistent emission tax Emission abatement Horizontal differentiation R&D spillovers Tampieri, Alessandro verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of cleaner production Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 426 Online-Ressource (DE-627)324655878 (DE-600)2029338-0 (DE-576)252613988 0959-6526 nnns volume:426 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.35 Umweltrichtlinien Umweltnormen VZ 85.35 Fertigung VZ AR 426
allfieldsGer	10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139036 doi (DE-627)ELV065145828 (ELSEVIER)S0959-6526(23)03194-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 690 330 VZ 43.35 bkl 85.35 bkl Lambertini, Luca verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-6353-4753 aut On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest in R&D activities to reduce polluting emissions, while emission-reducing innovation may spillover from one product to the other. We show that the monopolist has no incentive to engage in ECSR, unless a regulatory measure is introduced. By contrast, a time consistent tax induces the adoption of a ECSR statute. Under admissible parameter conditions, profits are concave and single-peaked in the ECSR intensity. Finally, ECSR monotonically increases social welfare, by raising consumer surplus and curbing environmental damage. Environmental CSR Multiproduct monopolist Time-consistent emission tax Emission abatement Horizontal differentiation R&D spillovers Tampieri, Alessandro verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of cleaner production Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 426 Online-Ressource (DE-627)324655878 (DE-600)2029338-0 (DE-576)252613988 0959-6526 nnns volume:426 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.35 Umweltrichtlinien Umweltnormen VZ 85.35 Fertigung VZ AR 426
allfieldsSound	10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139036 doi (DE-627)ELV065145828 (ELSEVIER)S0959-6526(23)03194-3 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 690 330 VZ 43.35 bkl 85.35 bkl Lambertini, Luca verfasserin (orcid)0000-0001-6353-4753 aut On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest in R&D activities to reduce polluting emissions, while emission-reducing innovation may spillover from one product to the other. We show that the monopolist has no incentive to engage in ECSR, unless a regulatory measure is introduced. By contrast, a time consistent tax induces the adoption of a ECSR statute. Under admissible parameter conditions, profits are concave and single-peaked in the ECSR intensity. Finally, ECSR monotonically increases social welfare, by raising consumer surplus and curbing environmental damage. Environmental CSR Multiproduct monopolist Time-consistent emission tax Emission abatement Horizontal differentiation R&D spillovers Tampieri, Alessandro verfasserin aut Enthalten in Journal of cleaner production Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1993 426 Online-Ressource (DE-627)324655878 (DE-600)2029338-0 (DE-576)252613988 0959-6526 nnns volume:426 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U SSG-OPC-GGO GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 43.35 Umweltrichtlinien Umweltnormen VZ 85.35 Fertigung VZ AR 426
language	English
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author	Lambertini, Luca
spellingShingle	Lambertini, Luca ddc 690 bkl 43.35 bkl 85.35 misc Environmental CSR misc Multiproduct monopolist misc Time-consistent emission tax misc Emission abatement misc Horizontal differentiation misc R&D spillovers On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry
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topic_title	690 330 VZ 43.35 bkl 85.35 bkl On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry Environmental CSR Multiproduct monopolist Time-consistent emission tax Emission abatement Horizontal differentiation R&D spillovers
topic	ddc 690 bkl 43.35 bkl 85.35 misc Environmental CSR misc Multiproduct monopolist misc Time-consistent emission tax misc Emission abatement misc Horizontal differentiation misc R&D spillovers
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title	On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry
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title_full	On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry
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title_sort	on the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry
title_auth	On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry
abstract	This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest in R&D activities to reduce polluting emissions, while emission-reducing innovation may spillover from one product to the other. We show that the monopolist has no incentive to engage in ECSR, unless a regulatory measure is introduced. By contrast, a time consistent tax induces the adoption of a ECSR statute. Under admissible parameter conditions, profits are concave and single-peaked in the ECSR intensity. Finally, ECSR monotonically increases social welfare, by raising consumer surplus and curbing environmental damage.
abstractGer	This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest in R&D activities to reduce polluting emissions, while emission-reducing innovation may spillover from one product to the other. We show that the monopolist has no incentive to engage in ECSR, unless a regulatory measure is introduced. By contrast, a time consistent tax induces the adoption of a ECSR statute. Under admissible parameter conditions, profits are concave and single-peaked in the ECSR intensity. Finally, ECSR monotonically increases social welfare, by raising consumer surplus and curbing environmental damage.
abstract_unstemmed	This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest in R&D activities to reduce polluting emissions, while emission-reducing innovation may spillover from one product to the other. We show that the monopolist has no incentive to engage in ECSR, unless a regulatory measure is introduced. By contrast, a time consistent tax induces the adoption of a ECSR statute. Under admissible parameter conditions, profits are concave and single-peaked in the ECSR intensity. Finally, ECSR monotonically increases social welfare, by raising consumer surplus and curbing environmental damage.
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title_short	On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry
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up_date	2024-07-06T21:59:50.884Z
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fullrecord_marcxml	<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">ELV065145828</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20231210093147.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">231015s2023 xx \|\|\|\|\|o 00\| \|\|eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.139036</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)ELV065145828</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(ELSEVIER)S0959-6526(23)03194-3</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rda</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">690</subfield><subfield code="a">330</subfield><subfield code="q">VZ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">43.35</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">85.35</subfield><subfield code="2">bkl</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lambertini, Luca</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="0">(orcid)0000-0001-6353-4753</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">2023</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Computermedien</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper studies the incentives to adopt Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility (ECSR) in a multiproduct monopoly. In our framework, products are horizontally differentiated, production is polluting and a time-consistent government levies a tax on emissions. The ECSR monopolist may invest in R&D activities to reduce polluting emissions, while emission-reducing innovation may spillover from one product to the other. We show that the monopolist has no incentive to engage in ECSR, unless a regulatory measure is introduced. By contrast, a time consistent tax induces the adoption of a ECSR statute. Under admissible parameter conditions, profits are concave and single-peaked in the ECSR intensity. 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On the private and social incentives to adopt environmentally and socially responsible practices in a monopoly industry

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