Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination
Due to the openness of wireless communication, the transmission in ad hoc networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate users. The traditional work generally assumes that both the transmitter and the receiver know the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel, but less cons...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
He, Hongliang [verfasserIn] Li, Xingmei [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Sprache: |
Englisch |
Erschienen: |
2023 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Ad hoc Networks - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 2003, 152 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:152 |
DOI / URN: |
10.1016/j.adhoc.2023.103310 |
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Katalog-ID: |
ELV065827465 |
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245 | 1 | 0 | |a Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination |
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520 | |a Due to the openness of wireless communication, the transmission in ad hoc networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate users. The traditional work generally assumes that both the transmitter and the receiver know the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel, but less consideration is given to the scenario where the receiver does not know the CSI. In order to improve the security performance in this scenario, we propose novel transmission schemes by introducing artificial noise or self-interference across time. The artificial noise scheme can improve security significantly but consumes remarkable power, so we instead fuse multiple signals through a Hadamard matrix to actively introduce self-interference. It turns out that the latter scheme has obvious advantages since it improves security and saves power simultaneously. We analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme, and exhibit simulation results to verify the theoretical analysis. | ||
650 | 4 | |a Physical-layer security | |
650 | 4 | |a Ad hoc network | |
650 | 4 | |a Artificial noise | |
650 | 4 | |a Generator matrix | |
700 | 1 | |a Li, Xingmei |e verfasserin |4 aut | |
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912 | |a GBV_ILN_4306 | ||
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912 | |a GBV_ILN_4322 | ||
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912 | |a GBV_ILN_4393 | ||
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publishDate |
2023 |
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10.1016/j.adhoc.2023.103310 doi (DE-627)ELV065827465 (ELSEVIER)S1570-8705(23)00230-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 004 VZ 54.32 bkl 53.74 bkl He, Hongliang verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-9546-7337 aut Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Due to the openness of wireless communication, the transmission in ad hoc networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate users. The traditional work generally assumes that both the transmitter and the receiver know the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel, but less consideration is given to the scenario where the receiver does not know the CSI. In order to improve the security performance in this scenario, we propose novel transmission schemes by introducing artificial noise or self-interference across time. The artificial noise scheme can improve security significantly but consumes remarkable power, so we instead fuse multiple signals through a Hadamard matrix to actively introduce self-interference. It turns out that the latter scheme has obvious advantages since it improves security and saves power simultaneously. We analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme, and exhibit simulation results to verify the theoretical analysis. Physical-layer security Ad hoc network Artificial noise Generator matrix Li, Xingmei verfasserin aut Enthalten in Ad hoc Networks Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 2003 152 Online-Ressource (DE-627)37127642X (DE-600)2121401-3 (DE-576)255620896 1570-8705 nnns volume:152 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.32 Rechnerkommunikation VZ 53.74 Hochfrequenztechnik Funktechnik VZ AR 152 |
spelling |
10.1016/j.adhoc.2023.103310 doi (DE-627)ELV065827465 (ELSEVIER)S1570-8705(23)00230-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 004 VZ 54.32 bkl 53.74 bkl He, Hongliang verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-9546-7337 aut Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Due to the openness of wireless communication, the transmission in ad hoc networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate users. The traditional work generally assumes that both the transmitter and the receiver know the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel, but less consideration is given to the scenario where the receiver does not know the CSI. In order to improve the security performance in this scenario, we propose novel transmission schemes by introducing artificial noise or self-interference across time. The artificial noise scheme can improve security significantly but consumes remarkable power, so we instead fuse multiple signals through a Hadamard matrix to actively introduce self-interference. It turns out that the latter scheme has obvious advantages since it improves security and saves power simultaneously. We analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme, and exhibit simulation results to verify the theoretical analysis. Physical-layer security Ad hoc network Artificial noise Generator matrix Li, Xingmei verfasserin aut Enthalten in Ad hoc Networks Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 2003 152 Online-Ressource (DE-627)37127642X (DE-600)2121401-3 (DE-576)255620896 1570-8705 nnns volume:152 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.32 Rechnerkommunikation VZ 53.74 Hochfrequenztechnik Funktechnik VZ AR 152 |
allfields_unstemmed |
10.1016/j.adhoc.2023.103310 doi (DE-627)ELV065827465 (ELSEVIER)S1570-8705(23)00230-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 004 VZ 54.32 bkl 53.74 bkl He, Hongliang verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-9546-7337 aut Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Due to the openness of wireless communication, the transmission in ad hoc networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate users. The traditional work generally assumes that both the transmitter and the receiver know the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel, but less consideration is given to the scenario where the receiver does not know the CSI. In order to improve the security performance in this scenario, we propose novel transmission schemes by introducing artificial noise or self-interference across time. The artificial noise scheme can improve security significantly but consumes remarkable power, so we instead fuse multiple signals through a Hadamard matrix to actively introduce self-interference. It turns out that the latter scheme has obvious advantages since it improves security and saves power simultaneously. We analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme, and exhibit simulation results to verify the theoretical analysis. Physical-layer security Ad hoc network Artificial noise Generator matrix Li, Xingmei verfasserin aut Enthalten in Ad hoc Networks Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 2003 152 Online-Ressource (DE-627)37127642X (DE-600)2121401-3 (DE-576)255620896 1570-8705 nnns volume:152 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.32 Rechnerkommunikation VZ 53.74 Hochfrequenztechnik Funktechnik VZ AR 152 |
allfieldsGer |
10.1016/j.adhoc.2023.103310 doi (DE-627)ELV065827465 (ELSEVIER)S1570-8705(23)00230-5 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 004 VZ 54.32 bkl 53.74 bkl He, Hongliang verfasserin (orcid)0000-0002-9546-7337 aut Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination 2023 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Due to the openness of wireless communication, the transmission in ad hoc networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate users. The traditional work generally assumes that both the transmitter and the receiver know the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel, but less consideration is given to the scenario where the receiver does not know the CSI. In order to improve the security performance in this scenario, we propose novel transmission schemes by introducing artificial noise or self-interference across time. The artificial noise scheme can improve security significantly but consumes remarkable power, so we instead fuse multiple signals through a Hadamard matrix to actively introduce self-interference. It turns out that the latter scheme has obvious advantages since it improves security and saves power simultaneously. We analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme, and exhibit simulation results to verify the theoretical analysis. Physical-layer security Ad hoc network Artificial noise Generator matrix Li, Xingmei verfasserin aut Enthalten in Ad hoc Networks Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 2003 152 Online-Ressource (DE-627)37127642X (DE-600)2121401-3 (DE-576)255620896 1570-8705 nnns volume:152 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_171 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2088 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 54.32 Rechnerkommunikation VZ 53.74 Hochfrequenztechnik Funktechnik VZ AR 152 |
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Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination |
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(DE-627)ELV065827465 (ELSEVIER)S1570-8705(23)00230-5 |
title_full |
Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination |
author_sort |
He, Hongliang |
journal |
Ad hoc Networks |
journalStr |
Ad hoc Networks |
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eng |
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000 - Computer science, information & general works |
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2023 |
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zzz |
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He, Hongliang Li, Xingmei |
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Elektronische Aufsätze |
author-letter |
He, Hongliang |
doi_str_mv |
10.1016/j.adhoc.2023.103310 |
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(ORCID)0000-0002-9546-7337 |
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004 |
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title_sort |
secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without csi at the destination |
title_auth |
Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination |
abstract |
Due to the openness of wireless communication, the transmission in ad hoc networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate users. The traditional work generally assumes that both the transmitter and the receiver know the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel, but less consideration is given to the scenario where the receiver does not know the CSI. In order to improve the security performance in this scenario, we propose novel transmission schemes by introducing artificial noise or self-interference across time. The artificial noise scheme can improve security significantly but consumes remarkable power, so we instead fuse multiple signals through a Hadamard matrix to actively introduce self-interference. It turns out that the latter scheme has obvious advantages since it improves security and saves power simultaneously. We analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme, and exhibit simulation results to verify the theoretical analysis. |
abstractGer |
Due to the openness of wireless communication, the transmission in ad hoc networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate users. The traditional work generally assumes that both the transmitter and the receiver know the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel, but less consideration is given to the scenario where the receiver does not know the CSI. In order to improve the security performance in this scenario, we propose novel transmission schemes by introducing artificial noise or self-interference across time. The artificial noise scheme can improve security significantly but consumes remarkable power, so we instead fuse multiple signals through a Hadamard matrix to actively introduce self-interference. It turns out that the latter scheme has obvious advantages since it improves security and saves power simultaneously. We analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme, and exhibit simulation results to verify the theoretical analysis. |
abstract_unstemmed |
Due to the openness of wireless communication, the transmission in ad hoc networks is vulnerable to eavesdropping by illegitimate users. The traditional work generally assumes that both the transmitter and the receiver know the channel state information (CSI) of the legitimate channel, but less consideration is given to the scenario where the receiver does not know the CSI. In order to improve the security performance in this scenario, we propose novel transmission schemes by introducing artificial noise or self-interference across time. The artificial noise scheme can improve security significantly but consumes remarkable power, so we instead fuse multiple signals through a Hadamard matrix to actively introduce self-interference. It turns out that the latter scheme has obvious advantages since it improves security and saves power simultaneously. We analyze the achievable secrecy rate of the proposed scheme, and exhibit simulation results to verify the theoretical analysis. |
collection_details |
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title_short |
Secure transmission in wireless ad-hoc networks without CSI at the destination |
remote_bool |
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author2 |
Li, Xingmei |
author2Str |
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doi_str |
10.1016/j.adhoc.2023.103310 |
up_date |
2024-07-07T00:23:18.767Z |
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