The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse?

Most previous studies fail to investigate the interactive effects of different environmental instruments. Whether adopting more environmental instruments is better or worse for corporate environmental innovation (CEI) remains unclear. In this study, we distinguish between regulatory pressures as pun...
Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Autor*in:	Li, Ruiqian [verfasserIn] Ramanathan, Ramakrishnan [verfasserIn]

Format:	E-Artikel
Sprache:	Englisch

Erschienen:	2024

Schlagwörter:	Environmental penalties Environmental subsidies Corporate environmental innovation Complementary effect Substitutive effect

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Technological forecasting and social change - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1970, 200
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:200

DOI / URN:	10.1016/j.techfore.2023.123193

Katalog-ID:	ELV066731755

Internformat


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245	1	0	\|a The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse?
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publishDate	2024
allfields	10.1016/j.techfore.2023.123193 doi (DE-627)ELV066731755 (ELSEVIER)S0040-1625(23)00878-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 600 VZ 83.31 bkl 71.43 bkl 50.14 bkl Li, Ruiqian verfasserin aut The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse? 2024 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Most previous studies fail to investigate the interactive effects of different environmental instruments. Whether adopting more environmental instruments is better or worse for corporate environmental innovation (CEI) remains unclear. In this study, we distinguish between regulatory pressures as punitive pressures (environmental penalties, EP) and incentive pressures (environmental subsidies, ES) and focus on investigating whether EP and ES act as complements or substitutes on CEI. The results reveal that the interactive effect of EP and ES can act as substitutes rather than complements in promoting CEI. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the substitutive effect of EP and ES on CEI is more pronounced for state-owned firms and for firms operating in regions characterized by higher environmental quality and greater marketization. Our results provide valuable insights for the government on achieving an optimal outcome by mixing environmental instruments to promote CEI. Environmental penalties Environmental subsidies Corporate environmental innovation Complementary effect Substitutive effect Ramanathan, Ramakrishnan verfasserin aut Enthalten in Technological forecasting and social change Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1970 200 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320526011 (DE-600)2015184-6 (DE-576)090955129 0040-1625 nnns volume:200 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 83.31 Wirtschaftswachstum VZ 71.43 Technologische Faktoren Soziologie VZ 50.14 Technik in Beziehung zu anderen Gebieten VZ AR 200
spelling	10.1016/j.techfore.2023.123193 doi (DE-627)ELV066731755 (ELSEVIER)S0040-1625(23)00878-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 600 VZ 83.31 bkl 71.43 bkl 50.14 bkl Li, Ruiqian verfasserin aut The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse? 2024 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Most previous studies fail to investigate the interactive effects of different environmental instruments. Whether adopting more environmental instruments is better or worse for corporate environmental innovation (CEI) remains unclear. In this study, we distinguish between regulatory pressures as punitive pressures (environmental penalties, EP) and incentive pressures (environmental subsidies, ES) and focus on investigating whether EP and ES act as complements or substitutes on CEI. The results reveal that the interactive effect of EP and ES can act as substitutes rather than complements in promoting CEI. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the substitutive effect of EP and ES on CEI is more pronounced for state-owned firms and for firms operating in regions characterized by higher environmental quality and greater marketization. Our results provide valuable insights for the government on achieving an optimal outcome by mixing environmental instruments to promote CEI. Environmental penalties Environmental subsidies Corporate environmental innovation Complementary effect Substitutive effect Ramanathan, Ramakrishnan verfasserin aut Enthalten in Technological forecasting and social change Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1970 200 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320526011 (DE-600)2015184-6 (DE-576)090955129 0040-1625 nnns volume:200 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 83.31 Wirtschaftswachstum VZ 71.43 Technologische Faktoren Soziologie VZ 50.14 Technik in Beziehung zu anderen Gebieten VZ AR 200
allfields_unstemmed	10.1016/j.techfore.2023.123193 doi (DE-627)ELV066731755 (ELSEVIER)S0040-1625(23)00878-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 600 VZ 83.31 bkl 71.43 bkl 50.14 bkl Li, Ruiqian verfasserin aut The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse? 2024 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Most previous studies fail to investigate the interactive effects of different environmental instruments. Whether adopting more environmental instruments is better or worse for corporate environmental innovation (CEI) remains unclear. In this study, we distinguish between regulatory pressures as punitive pressures (environmental penalties, EP) and incentive pressures (environmental subsidies, ES) and focus on investigating whether EP and ES act as complements or substitutes on CEI. The results reveal that the interactive effect of EP and ES can act as substitutes rather than complements in promoting CEI. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the substitutive effect of EP and ES on CEI is more pronounced for state-owned firms and for firms operating in regions characterized by higher environmental quality and greater marketization. Our results provide valuable insights for the government on achieving an optimal outcome by mixing environmental instruments to promote CEI. Environmental penalties Environmental subsidies Corporate environmental innovation Complementary effect Substitutive effect Ramanathan, Ramakrishnan verfasserin aut Enthalten in Technological forecasting and social change Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1970 200 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320526011 (DE-600)2015184-6 (DE-576)090955129 0040-1625 nnns volume:200 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 83.31 Wirtschaftswachstum VZ 71.43 Technologische Faktoren Soziologie VZ 50.14 Technik in Beziehung zu anderen Gebieten VZ AR 200
allfieldsGer	10.1016/j.techfore.2023.123193 doi (DE-627)ELV066731755 (ELSEVIER)S0040-1625(23)00878-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 600 VZ 83.31 bkl 71.43 bkl 50.14 bkl Li, Ruiqian verfasserin aut The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse? 2024 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Most previous studies fail to investigate the interactive effects of different environmental instruments. Whether adopting more environmental instruments is better or worse for corporate environmental innovation (CEI) remains unclear. In this study, we distinguish between regulatory pressures as punitive pressures (environmental penalties, EP) and incentive pressures (environmental subsidies, ES) and focus on investigating whether EP and ES act as complements or substitutes on CEI. The results reveal that the interactive effect of EP and ES can act as substitutes rather than complements in promoting CEI. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the substitutive effect of EP and ES on CEI is more pronounced for state-owned firms and for firms operating in regions characterized by higher environmental quality and greater marketization. Our results provide valuable insights for the government on achieving an optimal outcome by mixing environmental instruments to promote CEI. Environmental penalties Environmental subsidies Corporate environmental innovation Complementary effect Substitutive effect Ramanathan, Ramakrishnan verfasserin aut Enthalten in Technological forecasting and social change Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1970 200 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320526011 (DE-600)2015184-6 (DE-576)090955129 0040-1625 nnns volume:200 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 83.31 Wirtschaftswachstum VZ 71.43 Technologische Faktoren Soziologie VZ 50.14 Technik in Beziehung zu anderen Gebieten VZ AR 200
allfieldsSound	10.1016/j.techfore.2023.123193 doi (DE-627)ELV066731755 (ELSEVIER)S0040-1625(23)00878-8 DE-627 ger DE-627 rda eng 300 600 VZ 83.31 bkl 71.43 bkl 50.14 bkl Li, Ruiqian verfasserin aut The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse? 2024 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier Most previous studies fail to investigate the interactive effects of different environmental instruments. Whether adopting more environmental instruments is better or worse for corporate environmental innovation (CEI) remains unclear. In this study, we distinguish between regulatory pressures as punitive pressures (environmental penalties, EP) and incentive pressures (environmental subsidies, ES) and focus on investigating whether EP and ES act as complements or substitutes on CEI. The results reveal that the interactive effect of EP and ES can act as substitutes rather than complements in promoting CEI. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the substitutive effect of EP and ES on CEI is more pronounced for state-owned firms and for firms operating in regions characterized by higher environmental quality and greater marketization. Our results provide valuable insights for the government on achieving an optimal outcome by mixing environmental instruments to promote CEI. Environmental penalties Environmental subsidies Corporate environmental innovation Complementary effect Substitutive effect Ramanathan, Ramakrishnan verfasserin aut Enthalten in Technological forecasting and social change Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier Science, 1970 200 Online-Ressource (DE-627)320526011 (DE-600)2015184-6 (DE-576)090955129 0040-1625 nnns volume:200 GBV_USEFLAG_U GBV_ELV SYSFLAG_U GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2049 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2470 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 83.31 Wirtschaftswachstum VZ 71.43 Technologische Faktoren Soziologie VZ 50.14 Technik in Beziehung zu anderen Gebieten VZ AR 200
language	English
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title_full	The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse?
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title_sort	the interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: is more better or worse?
title_auth	The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse?
abstract	Most previous studies fail to investigate the interactive effects of different environmental instruments. Whether adopting more environmental instruments is better or worse for corporate environmental innovation (CEI) remains unclear. In this study, we distinguish between regulatory pressures as punitive pressures (environmental penalties, EP) and incentive pressures (environmental subsidies, ES) and focus on investigating whether EP and ES act as complements or substitutes on CEI. The results reveal that the interactive effect of EP and ES can act as substitutes rather than complements in promoting CEI. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the substitutive effect of EP and ES on CEI is more pronounced for state-owned firms and for firms operating in regions characterized by higher environmental quality and greater marketization. Our results provide valuable insights for the government on achieving an optimal outcome by mixing environmental instruments to promote CEI.
abstractGer	Most previous studies fail to investigate the interactive effects of different environmental instruments. Whether adopting more environmental instruments is better or worse for corporate environmental innovation (CEI) remains unclear. In this study, we distinguish between regulatory pressures as punitive pressures (environmental penalties, EP) and incentive pressures (environmental subsidies, ES) and focus on investigating whether EP and ES act as complements or substitutes on CEI. The results reveal that the interactive effect of EP and ES can act as substitutes rather than complements in promoting CEI. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the substitutive effect of EP and ES on CEI is more pronounced for state-owned firms and for firms operating in regions characterized by higher environmental quality and greater marketization. Our results provide valuable insights for the government on achieving an optimal outcome by mixing environmental instruments to promote CEI.
abstract_unstemmed	Most previous studies fail to investigate the interactive effects of different environmental instruments. Whether adopting more environmental instruments is better or worse for corporate environmental innovation (CEI) remains unclear. In this study, we distinguish between regulatory pressures as punitive pressures (environmental penalties, EP) and incentive pressures (environmental subsidies, ES) and focus on investigating whether EP and ES act as complements or substitutes on CEI. The results reveal that the interactive effect of EP and ES can act as substitutes rather than complements in promoting CEI. The results remain unchanged after a series of robustness tests. Further heterogeneity analysis reveals that the substitutive effect of EP and ES on CEI is more pronounced for state-owned firms and for firms operating in regions characterized by higher environmental quality and greater marketization. Our results provide valuable insights for the government on achieving an optimal outcome by mixing environmental instruments to promote CEI.
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title_short	The interactive effect of environmental penalties and environmental subsidies on corporate environmental innovation: Is more better or worse?
remote_bool	true
author2	Ramanathan, Ramakrishnan
author2Str	Ramanathan, Ramakrishnan
ppnlink	320526011
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isOA_txt	false
hochschulschrift_bool	false
doi_str	10.1016/j.techfore.2023.123193
up_date	2024-07-06T18:47:54.257Z
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