A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator

Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game the...
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Autor*in:	Crettez, Bertrand [verfasserIn] Deloche, Régis

Format:	E-Artikel

Erschienen:	2019

Anmerkung:	© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

Übergeordnetes Werk:	Enthalten in: Review of law and economics - De Gruyter, 2005, 15(2019), 2 vom: 06. März
Übergeordnetes Werk:	volume:15 ; year:2019 ; number:2 ; day:06 ; month:03

Links:	Volltext

DOI / URN:	10.1515/rle-2016-0001

Katalog-ID:	GRUY00664192X

Internformat


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matchkey_str	article:15555879:2019----::lwneooisesetvocssaigue
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allfields	10.1515/rle-2016-0001 doi (DE-627)GRUY00664192X (DE-B1597)rle-2016-0001-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb 340 330 VZ 2 ssgn INTRECHT DE-1a fid 86.00 bkl 83.13 bkl Crettez, Bertrand verfasserin aut A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules. Deloche, Régis aut Enthalten in Review of law and economics De Gruyter, 2005 15(2019), 2 vom: 06. März Online-Ressource (DE-627)490222692 (DE-600)2191851-X (DE-576)266225713 1555-5879 nnns volume:15 year:2019 number:2 day:06 month:03 https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0001 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_GRUY FID-INTRECHT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_77 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2158 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2861 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 86.00 Recht: Allgemeines VZ 83.13 Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik Wohlfahrtstheorie VZ AR 15 2019 2 06 03
spelling	10.1515/rle-2016-0001 doi (DE-627)GRUY00664192X (DE-B1597)rle-2016-0001-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb 340 330 VZ 2 ssgn INTRECHT DE-1a fid 86.00 bkl 83.13 bkl Crettez, Bertrand verfasserin aut A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules. Deloche, Régis aut Enthalten in Review of law and economics De Gruyter, 2005 15(2019), 2 vom: 06. März Online-Ressource (DE-627)490222692 (DE-600)2191851-X (DE-576)266225713 1555-5879 nnns volume:15 year:2019 number:2 day:06 month:03 https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0001 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_GRUY FID-INTRECHT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_77 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2158 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2861 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 86.00 Recht: Allgemeines VZ 83.13 Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik Wohlfahrtstheorie VZ AR 15 2019 2 06 03
allfields_unstemmed	10.1515/rle-2016-0001 doi (DE-627)GRUY00664192X (DE-B1597)rle-2016-0001-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb 340 330 VZ 2 ssgn INTRECHT DE-1a fid 86.00 bkl 83.13 bkl Crettez, Bertrand verfasserin aut A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules. Deloche, Régis aut Enthalten in Review of law and economics De Gruyter, 2005 15(2019), 2 vom: 06. März Online-Ressource (DE-627)490222692 (DE-600)2191851-X (DE-576)266225713 1555-5879 nnns volume:15 year:2019 number:2 day:06 month:03 https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0001 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_GRUY FID-INTRECHT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_77 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2158 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2861 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 86.00 Recht: Allgemeines VZ 83.13 Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik Wohlfahrtstheorie VZ AR 15 2019 2 06 03
allfieldsGer	10.1515/rle-2016-0001 doi (DE-627)GRUY00664192X (DE-B1597)rle-2016-0001-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb 340 330 VZ 2 ssgn INTRECHT DE-1a fid 86.00 bkl 83.13 bkl Crettez, Bertrand verfasserin aut A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules. Deloche, Régis aut Enthalten in Review of law and economics De Gruyter, 2005 15(2019), 2 vom: 06. März Online-Ressource (DE-627)490222692 (DE-600)2191851-X (DE-576)266225713 1555-5879 nnns volume:15 year:2019 number:2 day:06 month:03 https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0001 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_GRUY FID-INTRECHT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_77 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2158 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2861 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 86.00 Recht: Allgemeines VZ 83.13 Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik Wohlfahrtstheorie VZ AR 15 2019 2 06 03
allfieldsSound	10.1515/rle-2016-0001 doi (DE-627)GRUY00664192X (DE-B1597)rle-2016-0001-e DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb 340 330 VZ 2 ssgn INTRECHT DE-1a fid 86.00 bkl 83.13 bkl Crettez, Bertrand verfasserin aut A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator 2019 Text txt rdacontent Computermedien c rdamedia Online-Ressource cr rdacarrier © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules. Deloche, Régis aut Enthalten in Review of law and economics De Gruyter, 2005 15(2019), 2 vom: 06. März Online-Ressource (DE-627)490222692 (DE-600)2191851-X (DE-576)266225713 1555-5879 nnns volume:15 year:2019 number:2 day:06 month:03 https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0001 lizenzpflichtig Volltext SYSFLAG_0 GBV_GRUY FID-INTRECHT SSG-OLC-WIW GBV_ILN_11 GBV_ILN_20 GBV_ILN_22 GBV_ILN_23 GBV_ILN_24 GBV_ILN_26 GBV_ILN_31 GBV_ILN_32 GBV_ILN_39 GBV_ILN_40 GBV_ILN_60 GBV_ILN_62 GBV_ILN_63 GBV_ILN_65 GBV_ILN_69 GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_73 GBV_ILN_74 GBV_ILN_77 GBV_ILN_90 GBV_ILN_95 GBV_ILN_100 GBV_ILN_101 GBV_ILN_105 GBV_ILN_110 GBV_ILN_120 GBV_ILN_121 GBV_ILN_138 GBV_ILN_150 GBV_ILN_151 GBV_ILN_152 GBV_ILN_161 GBV_ILN_170 GBV_ILN_184 GBV_ILN_187 GBV_ILN_213 GBV_ILN_224 GBV_ILN_230 GBV_ILN_250 GBV_ILN_281 GBV_ILN_285 GBV_ILN_293 GBV_ILN_370 GBV_ILN_374 GBV_ILN_602 GBV_ILN_647 GBV_ILN_702 GBV_ILN_2001 GBV_ILN_2003 GBV_ILN_2004 GBV_ILN_2005 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_2007 GBV_ILN_2008 GBV_ILN_2009 GBV_ILN_2010 GBV_ILN_2011 GBV_ILN_2014 GBV_ILN_2015 GBV_ILN_2018 GBV_ILN_2020 GBV_ILN_2021 GBV_ILN_2025 GBV_ILN_2026 GBV_ILN_2027 GBV_ILN_2031 GBV_ILN_2034 GBV_ILN_2037 GBV_ILN_2038 GBV_ILN_2043 GBV_ILN_2044 GBV_ILN_2048 GBV_ILN_2050 GBV_ILN_2055 GBV_ILN_2056 GBV_ILN_2057 GBV_ILN_2059 GBV_ILN_2061 GBV_ILN_2064 GBV_ILN_2065 GBV_ILN_2068 GBV_ILN_2093 GBV_ILN_2106 GBV_ILN_2108 GBV_ILN_2110 GBV_ILN_2111 GBV_ILN_2112 GBV_ILN_2113 GBV_ILN_2116 GBV_ILN_2118 GBV_ILN_2119 GBV_ILN_2122 GBV_ILN_2129 GBV_ILN_2143 GBV_ILN_2147 GBV_ILN_2148 GBV_ILN_2152 GBV_ILN_2153 GBV_ILN_2158 GBV_ILN_2188 GBV_ILN_2190 GBV_ILN_2232 GBV_ILN_2336 GBV_ILN_2446 GBV_ILN_2472 GBV_ILN_2507 GBV_ILN_2522 GBV_ILN_2548 GBV_ILN_2861 GBV_ILN_4012 GBV_ILN_4035 GBV_ILN_4037 GBV_ILN_4046 GBV_ILN_4112 GBV_ILN_4125 GBV_ILN_4126 GBV_ILN_4238 GBV_ILN_4242 GBV_ILN_4246 GBV_ILN_4249 GBV_ILN_4251 GBV_ILN_4305 GBV_ILN_4306 GBV_ILN_4307 GBV_ILN_4313 GBV_ILN_4322 GBV_ILN_4323 GBV_ILN_4324 GBV_ILN_4325 GBV_ILN_4326 GBV_ILN_4328 GBV_ILN_4333 GBV_ILN_4334 GBV_ILN_4335 GBV_ILN_4336 GBV_ILN_4338 GBV_ILN_4346 GBV_ILN_4367 GBV_ILN_4393 GBV_ILN_4700 GBV_ILN_4753 86.00 Recht: Allgemeines VZ 83.13 Theorie der Wirtschaftspolitik Wohlfahrtstheorie VZ AR 15 2019 2 06 03
source	Enthalten in Review of law and economics 15(2019), 2 vom: 06. März volume:15 year:2019 number:2 day:06 month:03
sourceStr	Enthalten in Review of law and economics 15(2019), 2 vom: 06. März volume:15 year:2019 number:2 day:06 month:03
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container_title	Review of law and economics
authorswithroles_txt_mv	Crettez, Bertrand @@aut@@ Deloche, Régis @@aut@@
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author	Crettez, Bertrand
spellingShingle	Crettez, Bertrand ddc 340 ssgn 2 fid INTRECHT bkl 86.00 bkl 83.13 A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator
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title_full	A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator
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title_sort	a law-and-economics perspective on cost-sharing rules for a condo elevator
title_auth	A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator
abstract	Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
abstractGer	Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
abstract_unstemmed	Abstract How to enhance the maintenance, repair and improvement of condo buildings? We address this issue by focusing on the case of an elevator installation whose benefits are not uniform across units. We examine the link between majority approval and cost sharing. Relying on a cooperative game theory approach, we prove the coalitional stability of any cost allocation which is such that the unit shares are a non-decreasing function of the floor level. Second, we show that the two surplus allocations induced, respectively, by the de facto cost-sharing rule used in France and the equal cost-sharing rule may fail to be coalitionally stable. By insisting that the cost sharing must depend on the relative individual advantages provided by an improvement, French law increases the risk of disputes between neighbors, compared to other sharing rules. © 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
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title_short	A Law-and-Economics Perspective on Cost-Sharing Rules for a Condo Elevator
url	https://dx.doi.org/10.1515/rle-2016-0001
remote_bool	true
author2	Deloche, Régis
author2Str	Deloche, Régis
ppnlink	490222692
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isOA_txt	false
hochschulschrift_bool	false
doi_str	10.1515/rle-2016-0001
up_date	2024-07-03T20:39:18.409Z
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