Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance
When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested i...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1994 |
|---|
| Reproduktion: |
Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
in: International Review of Law and Economics - Amsterdam : Elsevier, 14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:14 ; year:1994 ; number:3 ; pages:245-259 |
| Links: |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
NLEJ176659501 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | NLEJ176659501 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20210706030606.0 | ||
| 007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 070505s1994 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-627)NLEJ176659501 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLZ176659501 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance |
| 264 | 1 | |c 1994 | |
| 336 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b zzz |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b z |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b zu |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract. | ||
| 533 | |f Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Garvey, G. |4 oth | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i in |t International Review of Law and Economics |d Amsterdam : Elsevier |g 14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259 |w (DE-627)NLEJ176657762 |w (DE-600)2013718-7 |x 0144-8188 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:14 |g year:1994 |g number:3 |g pages:245-259 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0144-8188(94)90041-8 |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_H | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-SDJ | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_NL_ARTICLE | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 14 |j 1994 |e 3 |h 245-259 | ||
| matchkey_str |
article:01448188:1994----::oetasesessotgssurnosfota |
|---|---|
| hierarchy_sort_str |
1994 |
| publishDate |
1994 |
| allfields |
(DE-627)NLEJ176659501 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176659501 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance 1994 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Law and Economics Amsterdam : Elsevier 14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259 (DE-627)NLEJ176657762 (DE-600)2013718-7 0144-8188 nnns volume:14 year:1994 number:3 pages:245-259 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0144-8188(94)90041-8 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 14 1994 3 245-259 |
| spelling |
(DE-627)NLEJ176659501 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176659501 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance 1994 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Law and Economics Amsterdam : Elsevier 14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259 (DE-627)NLEJ176657762 (DE-600)2013718-7 0144-8188 nnns volume:14 year:1994 number:3 pages:245-259 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0144-8188(94)90041-8 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 14 1994 3 245-259 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
(DE-627)NLEJ176659501 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176659501 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance 1994 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Law and Economics Amsterdam : Elsevier 14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259 (DE-627)NLEJ176657762 (DE-600)2013718-7 0144-8188 nnns volume:14 year:1994 number:3 pages:245-259 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0144-8188(94)90041-8 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 14 1994 3 245-259 |
| allfieldsGer |
(DE-627)NLEJ176659501 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176659501 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance 1994 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Law and Economics Amsterdam : Elsevier 14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259 (DE-627)NLEJ176657762 (DE-600)2013718-7 0144-8188 nnns volume:14 year:1994 number:3 pages:245-259 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0144-8188(94)90041-8 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 14 1994 3 245-259 |
| allfieldsSound |
(DE-627)NLEJ176659501 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176659501 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance 1994 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Law and Economics Amsterdam : Elsevier 14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259 (DE-627)NLEJ176657762 (DE-600)2013718-7 0144-8188 nnns volume:14 year:1994 number:3 pages:245-259 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0144-8188(94)90041-8 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 14 1994 3 245-259 |
| language |
English |
| source |
in International Review of Law and Economics 14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259 volume:14 year:1994 number:3 pages:245-259 |
| sourceStr |
in International Review of Law and Economics 14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259 volume:14 year:1994 number:3 pages:245-259 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
International Review of Law and Economics |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Garvey, G. @@oth@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
1994-01-01T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
NLEJ176657762 |
| id |
NLEJ176659501 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">NLEJ176659501</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210706030606.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070505s1994 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)NLEJ176659501</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLZ176659501</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">1994</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="f">Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Garvey, G.</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">in</subfield><subfield code="t">International Review of Law and Economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Amsterdam : Elsevier</subfield><subfield code="g">14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)NLEJ176657762</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2013718-7</subfield><subfield code="x">0144-8188</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:14</subfield><subfield code="g">year:1994</subfield><subfield code="g">number:3</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:245-259</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0144-8188(94)90041-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_H</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-SDJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_NL_ARTICLE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">14</subfield><subfield code="j">1994</subfield><subfield code="e">3</subfield><subfield code="h">245-259</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| series2 |
Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)NLEJ176657762 |
| format |
electronic Article |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| collection |
NL |
| remote_str |
true |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
0144-8188 |
| topic_title |
Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance |
| format_facet |
Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
zu |
| author2_variant |
g g gg |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
International Review of Law and Economics |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
NLEJ176657762 |
| hierarchy_top_title |
International Review of Law and Economics |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)NLEJ176657762 (DE-600)2013718-7 |
| title |
Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance |
| spellingShingle |
Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)NLEJ176659501 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176659501 |
| title_full |
Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance |
| journal |
International Review of Law and Economics |
| journalStr |
International Review of Law and Economics |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
1994 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
zzz |
| container_start_page |
245 |
| container_volume |
14 |
| format_se |
Elektronische Aufsätze |
| title_sort |
money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance |
| title_auth |
Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance |
| abstract |
When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract. |
| abstractGer |
When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract. |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE |
| container_issue |
3 |
| title_short |
Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance |
| url |
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0144-8188(94)90041-8 |
| remote_bool |
true |
| author2 |
Garvey, G. |
| author2Str |
Garvey, G. |
| ppnlink |
NLEJ176657762 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
z |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| author2_role |
oth |
| up_date |
2024-07-06T07:23:02.564Z |
| _version_ |
1803813474864726016 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">NLEJ176659501</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210706030606.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070505s1994 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)NLEJ176659501</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLZ176659501</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Money transfers versus hostages as guarantors of contractual performance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">1994</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">When one party to a transaction posts a money bond to guarantee performance, the other party has an incentive to claim a breach of the contract merely to seize the bond. While the problem is overcome if the courts can determine which party actually caused the breach, an alternative often suggested is the use of ''hostages'' rather than money bonds. The critical feature of a hostage is that it is worth less to the party with whom it is posted than to the party who posts it. This paper first shows that in the absence of some supplementary enforcement mechanism, there is no value to using a hostage rather than a money bond. Two such supplementary mechanisms, namely, the courts and the reputation of the party holding the bond, are then compared. The analysis suggests some important advantages of court over reputational enforcement and implies that hostages should be used less often in ''one-shot'' deals where courts rather than reputation serve to enforce the contract.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="f">Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Garvey, G.</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">in</subfield><subfield code="t">International Review of Law and Economics</subfield><subfield code="d">Amsterdam : Elsevier</subfield><subfield code="g">14(1994), 3, Seite 245-259</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)NLEJ176657762</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2013718-7</subfield><subfield code="x">0144-8188</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:14</subfield><subfield code="g">year:1994</subfield><subfield code="g">number:3</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:245-259</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0144-8188(94)90041-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_H</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-SDJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_NL_ARTICLE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">14</subfield><subfield code="j">1994</subfield><subfield code="e">3</subfield><subfield code="h">245-259</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.401634 |