An agency theory of unionism
An agency theory of unionism is developed to explain the diversity of union accomplishments by the diversity of principals, the diversity of costs of providing union benefits, and the potential for agent malfeasance. The theory produces a number of testable hypotheses, including: larger plants will...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1987 |
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| Reproduktion: |
Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization - Amsterdam : Elsevier, 8(1987), 1, Seite 39-60 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:8 ; year:1987 ; number:1 ; pages:39-60 |
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An agency theory of unionism is developed to explain the diversity of union accomplishments by the diversity of principals, the diversity of costs of providing union benefits, and the potential for agent malfeasance. The theory produces a number of testable hypotheses, including: larger plants will unionize before smaller plants; the scope of union representation will grow as members go from untrained to specifically trained to generally trained; employers will pay for union representation of unskilled employees, but not for others; and the slope of earnings with respect to seniority will be flatter in union firms than in non-union firms |
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An agency theory of unionism is developed to explain the diversity of union accomplishments by the diversity of principals, the diversity of costs of providing union benefits, and the potential for agent malfeasance. The theory produces a number of testable hypotheses, including: larger plants will unionize before smaller plants; the scope of union representation will grow as members go from untrained to specifically trained to generally trained; employers will pay for union representation of unskilled employees, but not for others; and the slope of earnings with respect to seniority will be flatter in union firms than in non-union firms |
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An agency theory of unionism is developed to explain the diversity of union accomplishments by the diversity of principals, the diversity of costs of providing union benefits, and the potential for agent malfeasance. The theory produces a number of testable hypotheses, including: larger plants will unionize before smaller plants; the scope of union representation will grow as members go from untrained to specifically trained to generally trained; employers will pay for union representation of unskilled employees, but not for others; and the slope of earnings with respect to seniority will be flatter in union firms than in non-union firms |
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