A survey of agency models of organizations
In recent years Neoclassical economists have begun to turn their attention to issues of firm organization, stimulated in large part by methodological advances in the economics of incentives and incomplete information. The paradigm on which much of this work is based views an organization as an agenc...
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| Autor*in: |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1988 |
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| Reproduktion: |
Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization - Amsterdam : Elsevier, 9(1988), 2, Seite 153-185 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:9 ; year:1988 ; number:2 ; pages:153-185 |
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| 520 | |a In recent years Neoclassical economists have begun to turn their attention to issues of firm organization, stimulated in large part by methodological advances in the economics of incentives and incomplete information. The paradigm on which much of this work is based views an organization as an agency relationship. Agency models incorporate two basic features of organizations: incomplete information and goal conflict among members of the organization. This essay characterizes and critiques the existing research on agency models of organizations in order to broaden the set of consumers of such models and to stimulate the production of new research. | ||
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(DE-627)NLEJ176714448 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176714448 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng A survey of agency models of organizations 1988 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier In recent years Neoclassical economists have begun to turn their attention to issues of firm organization, stimulated in large part by methodological advances in the economics of incentives and incomplete information. The paradigm on which much of this work is based views an organization as an agency relationship. Agency models incorporate two basic features of organizations: incomplete information and goal conflict among members of the organization. This essay characterizes and critiques the existing research on agency models of organizations in order to broaden the set of consumers of such models and to stimulate the production of new research. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Levinthal, D. oth in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Amsterdam : Elsevier 9(1988), 2, Seite 153-185 (DE-627)NLEJ176602550 (DE-600)1460618-5 0167-2681 nnns volume:9 year:1988 number:2 pages:153-185 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/0167-2681(88)90071-6 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 9 1988 2 153-185 |
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In recent years Neoclassical economists have begun to turn their attention to issues of firm organization, stimulated in large part by methodological advances in the economics of incentives and incomplete information. The paradigm on which much of this work is based views an organization as an agency relationship. Agency models incorporate two basic features of organizations: incomplete information and goal conflict among members of the organization. This essay characterizes and critiques the existing research on agency models of organizations in order to broaden the set of consumers of such models and to stimulate the production of new research. |
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In recent years Neoclassical economists have begun to turn their attention to issues of firm organization, stimulated in large part by methodological advances in the economics of incentives and incomplete information. The paradigm on which much of this work is based views an organization as an agency relationship. Agency models incorporate two basic features of organizations: incomplete information and goal conflict among members of the organization. This essay characterizes and critiques the existing research on agency models of organizations in order to broaden the set of consumers of such models and to stimulate the production of new research. |
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In recent years Neoclassical economists have begun to turn their attention to issues of firm organization, stimulated in large part by methodological advances in the economics of incentives and incomplete information. The paradigm on which much of this work is based views an organization as an agency relationship. Agency models incorporate two basic features of organizations: incomplete information and goal conflict among members of the organization. This essay characterizes and critiques the existing research on agency models of organizations in order to broaden the set of consumers of such models and to stimulate the production of new research. |
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