Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence
It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrat...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1992 |
|---|
| Reproduktion: |
Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
in: International Review of Economics and Finance - Amsterdam : Elsevier, 1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:1 ; year:1992 ; number:4 ; pages:347-369 |
| Links: |
|---|
| Katalog-ID: |
NLEJ176811702 |
|---|
| LEADER | 01000caa a22002652 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | NLEJ176811702 | ||
| 003 | DE-627 | ||
| 005 | 20210706032829.0 | ||
| 007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
| 008 | 070505s1992 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-627)NLEJ176811702 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBVNLZ176811702 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | |a eng | ||
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence |
| 264 | 1 | |c 1992 | |
| 336 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b zzz |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b z |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a nicht spezifiziert |b zu |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 520 | |a It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated. | ||
| 533 | |f Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Garvey, G. |4 oth | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |i in |t International Review of Economics and Finance |d Amsterdam : Elsevier |g 1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369 |w (DE-627)NLEJ176810757 |w (DE-600)2026509-8 |x 1059-0560 |7 nnns |
| 773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:1 |g year:1992 |g number:4 |g pages:347-369 |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/1059-0560(92)90023-6 |
| 912 | |a GBV_USEFLAG_H | ||
| 912 | |a ZDB-1-SDJ | ||
| 912 | |a GBV_NL_ARTICLE | ||
| 951 | |a AR | ||
| 952 | |d 1 |j 1992 |e 4 |h 347-369 | ||
| matchkey_str |
article:10590560:1992----::oocnrtdhrhligmtgttegnyrbeofe |
|---|---|
| hierarchy_sort_str |
1992 |
| publishDate |
1992 |
| allfields |
(DE-627)NLEJ176811702 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176811702 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence 1992 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Economics and Finance Amsterdam : Elsevier 1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369 (DE-627)NLEJ176810757 (DE-600)2026509-8 1059-0560 nnns volume:1 year:1992 number:4 pages:347-369 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/1059-0560(92)90023-6 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 1 1992 4 347-369 |
| spelling |
(DE-627)NLEJ176811702 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176811702 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence 1992 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Economics and Finance Amsterdam : Elsevier 1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369 (DE-627)NLEJ176810757 (DE-600)2026509-8 1059-0560 nnns volume:1 year:1992 number:4 pages:347-369 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/1059-0560(92)90023-6 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 1 1992 4 347-369 |
| allfields_unstemmed |
(DE-627)NLEJ176811702 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176811702 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence 1992 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Economics and Finance Amsterdam : Elsevier 1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369 (DE-627)NLEJ176810757 (DE-600)2026509-8 1059-0560 nnns volume:1 year:1992 number:4 pages:347-369 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/1059-0560(92)90023-6 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 1 1992 4 347-369 |
| allfieldsGer |
(DE-627)NLEJ176811702 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176811702 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence 1992 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Economics and Finance Amsterdam : Elsevier 1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369 (DE-627)NLEJ176810757 (DE-600)2026509-8 1059-0560 nnns volume:1 year:1992 number:4 pages:347-369 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/1059-0560(92)90023-6 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 1 1992 4 347-369 |
| allfieldsSound |
(DE-627)NLEJ176811702 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176811702 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence 1992 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Garvey, G. oth in International Review of Economics and Finance Amsterdam : Elsevier 1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369 (DE-627)NLEJ176810757 (DE-600)2026509-8 1059-0560 nnns volume:1 year:1992 number:4 pages:347-369 http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/1059-0560(92)90023-6 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 1 1992 4 347-369 |
| language |
English |
| source |
in International Review of Economics and Finance 1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369 volume:1 year:1992 number:4 pages:347-369 |
| sourceStr |
in International Review of Economics and Finance 1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369 volume:1 year:1992 number:4 pages:347-369 |
| format_phy_str_mv |
Article |
| institution |
findex.gbv.de |
| isfreeaccess_bool |
false |
| container_title |
International Review of Economics and Finance |
| authorswithroles_txt_mv |
Garvey, G. @@oth@@ |
| publishDateDaySort_date |
1992-01-01T00:00:00Z |
| hierarchy_top_id |
NLEJ176810757 |
| id |
NLEJ176811702 |
| language_de |
englisch |
| fullrecord |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">NLEJ176811702</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210706032829.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070505s1992 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)NLEJ176811702</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLZ176811702</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">1992</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="f">Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Garvey, G.</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">in</subfield><subfield code="t">International Review of Economics and Finance</subfield><subfield code="d">Amsterdam : Elsevier</subfield><subfield code="g">1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)NLEJ176810757</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2026509-8</subfield><subfield code="x">1059-0560</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:1</subfield><subfield code="g">year:1992</subfield><subfield code="g">number:4</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:347-369</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/1059-0560(92)90023-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_H</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-SDJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_NL_ARTICLE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">1</subfield><subfield code="j">1992</subfield><subfield code="e">4</subfield><subfield code="h">347-369</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| series2 |
Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 |
| ppnlink_with_tag_str_mv |
@@773@@(DE-627)NLEJ176810757 |
| format |
electronic Article |
| delete_txt_mv |
keep |
| collection |
NL |
| remote_str |
true |
| illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
| issn |
1059-0560 |
| topic_title |
Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence |
| format_facet |
Elektronische Aufsätze Aufsätze Elektronische Ressource |
| format_main_str_mv |
Text Zeitschrift/Artikel |
| carriertype_str_mv |
zu |
| author2_variant |
g g gg |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
International Review of Economics and Finance |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
NLEJ176810757 |
| hierarchy_top_title |
International Review of Economics and Finance |
| isfreeaccess_txt |
false |
| familylinks_str_mv |
(DE-627)NLEJ176810757 (DE-600)2026509-8 |
| title |
Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence |
| spellingShingle |
Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence |
| ctrlnum |
(DE-627)NLEJ176811702 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176811702 |
| title_full |
Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence |
| journal |
International Review of Economics and Finance |
| journalStr |
International Review of Economics and Finance |
| lang_code |
eng |
| isOA_bool |
false |
| recordtype |
marc |
| publishDateSort |
1992 |
| contenttype_str_mv |
zzz |
| container_start_page |
347 |
| container_volume |
1 |
| format_se |
Elektronische Aufsätze |
| title_sort |
do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence |
| title_auth |
Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence |
| abstract |
It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated. |
| abstractGer |
It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated. |
| collection_details |
GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE |
| container_issue |
4 |
| title_short |
Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence |
| url |
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/1059-0560(92)90023-6 |
| remote_bool |
true |
| author2 |
Garvey, G. |
| author2Str |
Garvey, G. |
| ppnlink |
NLEJ176810757 |
| mediatype_str_mv |
z |
| isOA_txt |
false |
| hochschulschrift_bool |
false |
| author2_role |
oth |
| up_date |
2024-07-06T07:42:10.639Z |
| _version_ |
1803814678707568640 |
| fullrecord_marcxml |
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">NLEJ176811702</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210706032829.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070505s1992 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)NLEJ176811702</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLZ176811702</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of ''free cash flow''? some evidence</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">1992</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste ''free cash flow''. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge ''free cash flow'' is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="f">Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Garvey, G.</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">in</subfield><subfield code="t">International Review of Economics and Finance</subfield><subfield code="d">Amsterdam : Elsevier</subfield><subfield code="g">1(1992), 4, Seite 347-369</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)NLEJ176810757</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2026509-8</subfield><subfield code="x">1059-0560</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:1</subfield><subfield code="g">year:1992</subfield><subfield code="g">number:4</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:347-369</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/1059-0560(92)90023-6</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_H</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-SDJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_NL_ARTICLE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">1</subfield><subfield code="j">1992</subfield><subfield code="e">4</subfield><subfield code="h">347-369</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
|
| score |
7.401613 |