The logic of mate desertion
Since the fitness consequences of mate desertion are markedly affected by whether the partner also deserts, natural selection is expected to favour desertion decisions that take the mate's decision into account. A model for the evolution of mate desertion is described in which individuals make...
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E-Artikel |
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Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
1990 |
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| Reproduktion: |
Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
in: Animal Behaviour - Amsterdam : Elsevier, 39(1990), 4, Seite 672-684 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:39 ; year:1990 ; number:4 ; pages:672-684 |
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| 520 | |a Since the fitness consequences of mate desertion are markedly affected by whether the partner also deserts, natural selection is expected to favour desertion decisions that take the mate's decision into account. A model for the evolution of mate desertion is described in which individuals make desertion decisions repeatedly during the period of parental care, choosing the option (desert or stay) that gives them the greater fitness, taking into account whether their mate has already deserted. If the partner still remains, the optimal decision is made assuming that the partner responds optimally in turn. Four patterns of time-dependent payoffs define all possible desertion decisions, three of which produce different kinds of stable evolutionary outcome: both parents stay with the young; both desert; and one deserts, one stays. The fourth pattern ('pre-emptive desertion') also results in both parents deserting but paradoxically, in this case, they sacrifice fitness by so doing. Such uncooperative parents are caught in the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory and provide a link with recent thinking on the evolution of cooperation. Under conditions of mate choice or repeated interaction between potential mates the payoff pattern that normally produces pre-emptive desertion may result instead in a 'both stay' outcome. When desertion decisions are conditional on the partner's decision, in the way assumed here, desertion outcomes cannot be predicted simply by comparing the costs and benefits of desertion for the male and female at any one time. Rather, one needs to know the way in which these payoffs vary for each partner over the whole of the parental care period. Applications of the model are discussed, with particular reference to uniparental care in fish and biparental care in birds. | ||
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(DE-627)NLEJ176894209 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176894209 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng The logic of mate desertion 1990 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Since the fitness consequences of mate desertion are markedly affected by whether the partner also deserts, natural selection is expected to favour desertion decisions that take the mate's decision into account. A model for the evolution of mate desertion is described in which individuals make desertion decisions repeatedly during the period of parental care, choosing the option (desert or stay) that gives them the greater fitness, taking into account whether their mate has already deserted. If the partner still remains, the optimal decision is made assuming that the partner responds optimally in turn. Four patterns of time-dependent payoffs define all possible desertion decisions, three of which produce different kinds of stable evolutionary outcome: both parents stay with the young; both desert; and one deserts, one stays. The fourth pattern ('pre-emptive desertion') also results in both parents deserting but paradoxically, in this case, they sacrifice fitness by so doing. Such uncooperative parents are caught in the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory and provide a link with recent thinking on the evolution of cooperation. Under conditions of mate choice or repeated interaction between potential mates the payoff pattern that normally produces pre-emptive desertion may result instead in a 'both stay' outcome. When desertion decisions are conditional on the partner's decision, in the way assumed here, desertion outcomes cannot be predicted simply by comparing the costs and benefits of desertion for the male and female at any one time. Rather, one needs to know the way in which these payoffs vary for each partner over the whole of the parental care period. Applications of the model are discussed, with particular reference to uniparental care in fish and biparental care in birds. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Lazarus, J. oth in Animal Behaviour Amsterdam : Elsevier 39(1990), 4, Seite 672-684 (DE-627)NLEJ176893601 (DE-600)1461112-0 0003-3472 nnns volume:39 year:1990 number:4 pages:672-684 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0003-3472(05)80378-1 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 39 1990 4 672-684 |
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(DE-627)NLEJ176894209 (DE-599)GBVNLZ176894209 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng The logic of mate desertion 1990 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier Since the fitness consequences of mate desertion are markedly affected by whether the partner also deserts, natural selection is expected to favour desertion decisions that take the mate's decision into account. A model for the evolution of mate desertion is described in which individuals make desertion decisions repeatedly during the period of parental care, choosing the option (desert or stay) that gives them the greater fitness, taking into account whether their mate has already deserted. If the partner still remains, the optimal decision is made assuming that the partner responds optimally in turn. Four patterns of time-dependent payoffs define all possible desertion decisions, three of which produce different kinds of stable evolutionary outcome: both parents stay with the young; both desert; and one deserts, one stays. The fourth pattern ('pre-emptive desertion') also results in both parents deserting but paradoxically, in this case, they sacrifice fitness by so doing. Such uncooperative parents are caught in the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory and provide a link with recent thinking on the evolution of cooperation. Under conditions of mate choice or repeated interaction between potential mates the payoff pattern that normally produces pre-emptive desertion may result instead in a 'both stay' outcome. When desertion decisions are conditional on the partner's decision, in the way assumed here, desertion outcomes cannot be predicted simply by comparing the costs and benefits of desertion for the male and female at any one time. Rather, one needs to know the way in which these payoffs vary for each partner over the whole of the parental care period. Applications of the model are discussed, with particular reference to uniparental care in fish and biparental care in birds. Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002 Lazarus, J. oth in Animal Behaviour Amsterdam : Elsevier 39(1990), 4, Seite 672-684 (DE-627)NLEJ176893601 (DE-600)1461112-0 0003-3472 nnns volume:39 year:1990 number:4 pages:672-684 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0003-3472(05)80378-1 GBV_USEFLAG_H ZDB-1-SDJ GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 39 1990 4 672-684 |
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Since the fitness consequences of mate desertion are markedly affected by whether the partner also deserts, natural selection is expected to favour desertion decisions that take the mate's decision into account. A model for the evolution of mate desertion is described in which individuals make desertion decisions repeatedly during the period of parental care, choosing the option (desert or stay) that gives them the greater fitness, taking into account whether their mate has already deserted. If the partner still remains, the optimal decision is made assuming that the partner responds optimally in turn. Four patterns of time-dependent payoffs define all possible desertion decisions, three of which produce different kinds of stable evolutionary outcome: both parents stay with the young; both desert; and one deserts, one stays. The fourth pattern ('pre-emptive desertion') also results in both parents deserting but paradoxically, in this case, they sacrifice fitness by so doing. Such uncooperative parents are caught in the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory and provide a link with recent thinking on the evolution of cooperation. Under conditions of mate choice or repeated interaction between potential mates the payoff pattern that normally produces pre-emptive desertion may result instead in a 'both stay' outcome. When desertion decisions are conditional on the partner's decision, in the way assumed here, desertion outcomes cannot be predicted simply by comparing the costs and benefits of desertion for the male and female at any one time. Rather, one needs to know the way in which these payoffs vary for each partner over the whole of the parental care period. Applications of the model are discussed, with particular reference to uniparental care in fish and biparental care in birds. |
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Since the fitness consequences of mate desertion are markedly affected by whether the partner also deserts, natural selection is expected to favour desertion decisions that take the mate's decision into account. A model for the evolution of mate desertion is described in which individuals make desertion decisions repeatedly during the period of parental care, choosing the option (desert or stay) that gives them the greater fitness, taking into account whether their mate has already deserted. If the partner still remains, the optimal decision is made assuming that the partner responds optimally in turn. Four patterns of time-dependent payoffs define all possible desertion decisions, three of which produce different kinds of stable evolutionary outcome: both parents stay with the young; both desert; and one deserts, one stays. The fourth pattern ('pre-emptive desertion') also results in both parents deserting but paradoxically, in this case, they sacrifice fitness by so doing. Such uncooperative parents are caught in the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory and provide a link with recent thinking on the evolution of cooperation. Under conditions of mate choice or repeated interaction between potential mates the payoff pattern that normally produces pre-emptive desertion may result instead in a 'both stay' outcome. When desertion decisions are conditional on the partner's decision, in the way assumed here, desertion outcomes cannot be predicted simply by comparing the costs and benefits of desertion for the male and female at any one time. Rather, one needs to know the way in which these payoffs vary for each partner over the whole of the parental care period. Applications of the model are discussed, with particular reference to uniparental care in fish and biparental care in birds. |
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Since the fitness consequences of mate desertion are markedly affected by whether the partner also deserts, natural selection is expected to favour desertion decisions that take the mate's decision into account. A model for the evolution of mate desertion is described in which individuals make desertion decisions repeatedly during the period of parental care, choosing the option (desert or stay) that gives them the greater fitness, taking into account whether their mate has already deserted. If the partner still remains, the optimal decision is made assuming that the partner responds optimally in turn. Four patterns of time-dependent payoffs define all possible desertion decisions, three of which produce different kinds of stable evolutionary outcome: both parents stay with the young; both desert; and one deserts, one stays. The fourth pattern ('pre-emptive desertion') also results in both parents deserting but paradoxically, in this case, they sacrifice fitness by so doing. Such uncooperative parents are caught in the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory and provide a link with recent thinking on the evolution of cooperation. Under conditions of mate choice or repeated interaction between potential mates the payoff pattern that normally produces pre-emptive desertion may result instead in a 'both stay' outcome. When desertion decisions are conditional on the partner's decision, in the way assumed here, desertion outcomes cannot be predicted simply by comparing the costs and benefits of desertion for the male and female at any one time. Rather, one needs to know the way in which these payoffs vary for each partner over the whole of the parental care period. Applications of the model are discussed, with particular reference to uniparental care in fish and biparental care in birds. |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">NLEJ176894209</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210706034058.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070505s1990 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)NLEJ176894209</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBVNLZ176894209</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="4"><subfield code="a">The logic of mate desertion</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="c">1990</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Since the fitness consequences of mate desertion are markedly affected by whether the partner also deserts, natural selection is expected to favour desertion decisions that take the mate's decision into account. A model for the evolution of mate desertion is described in which individuals make desertion decisions repeatedly during the period of parental care, choosing the option (desert or stay) that gives them the greater fitness, taking into account whether their mate has already deserted. If the partner still remains, the optimal decision is made assuming that the partner responds optimally in turn. Four patterns of time-dependent payoffs define all possible desertion decisions, three of which produce different kinds of stable evolutionary outcome: both parents stay with the young; both desert; and one deserts, one stays. The fourth pattern ('pre-emptive desertion') also results in both parents deserting but paradoxically, in this case, they sacrifice fitness by so doing. Such uncooperative parents are caught in the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma of game theory and provide a link with recent thinking on the evolution of cooperation. Under conditions of mate choice or repeated interaction between potential mates the payoff pattern that normally produces pre-emptive desertion may result instead in a 'both stay' outcome. When desertion decisions are conditional on the partner's decision, in the way assumed here, desertion outcomes cannot be predicted simply by comparing the costs and benefits of desertion for the male and female at any one time. Rather, one needs to know the way in which these payoffs vary for each partner over the whole of the parental care period. Applications of the model are discussed, with particular reference to uniparental care in fish and biparental care in birds.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="f">Elsevier Journal Backfiles on ScienceDirect 1907 - 2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Lazarus, J.</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">in</subfield><subfield code="t">Animal Behaviour</subfield><subfield code="d">Amsterdam : Elsevier</subfield><subfield code="g">39(1990), 4, Seite 672-684</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)NLEJ176893601</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)1461112-0</subfield><subfield code="x">0003-3472</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:39</subfield><subfield code="g">year:1990</subfield><subfield code="g">number:4</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:672-684</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0003-3472(05)80378-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_H</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-SDJ</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_NL_ARTICLE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">39</subfield><subfield code="j">1990</subfield><subfield code="e">4</subfield><subfield code="h">672-684</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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