Multi-Agent Models for Consumer Choice and Retailer Strategies in the Competitive Electricity Market
The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
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Englisch |
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The Berkeley Electronic Press ; 2007 |
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Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals |
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In: International journal of emerging electric power systems - Berkeley, Calif. : BePress, 2004, 8.2007, 2, art4 |
Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:8 ; year:2007 ; number:2 ; pages:4 |
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(DE-627)NLEJ219560285 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Multi-Agent Models for Consumer Choice and Retailer Strategies in the Competitive Electricity Market The Berkeley Electronic Press 2007 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational consumers. Hence, a model appropriate to represent this aspect of the market is needed. The paper proposes a general model of the interaction among retailers and consumers in the electricity market based on the theory of multi-agent systems. The model incorporates different assumptions concerning the behavior of the players that corresponds to different levels of interaction in determining the market outcomes. The model is validated interpretively by the results provided in terms of Game Theory equilibrium. The results of an extensive set of simulations on a population of 1,000 consumers is presented and discussed. Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals flat rate time-of-use (TOU) pricing multi-agent retail competition Electricity Markets Bompard, Ettore F. oth Abrate, Graziano oth Napoli, Roberto oth Wan, Bo oth In International journal of emerging electric power systems Berkeley, Calif. : BePress, 2004 8.2007, 2, art4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ219537097 (DE-600)2207265-2 1553-779X nnns volume:8 year:2007 number:2 pages:4 http://www.bepress.com/ijeeps/vol8/iss2/art4 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-BEP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 8 2007 2 4 8.2007, 2, art4 |
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(DE-627)NLEJ219560285 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Multi-Agent Models for Consumer Choice and Retailer Strategies in the Competitive Electricity Market The Berkeley Electronic Press 2007 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational consumers. Hence, a model appropriate to represent this aspect of the market is needed. The paper proposes a general model of the interaction among retailers and consumers in the electricity market based on the theory of multi-agent systems. The model incorporates different assumptions concerning the behavior of the players that corresponds to different levels of interaction in determining the market outcomes. The model is validated interpretively by the results provided in terms of Game Theory equilibrium. The results of an extensive set of simulations on a population of 1,000 consumers is presented and discussed. Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals flat rate time-of-use (TOU) pricing multi-agent retail competition Electricity Markets Bompard, Ettore F. oth Abrate, Graziano oth Napoli, Roberto oth Wan, Bo oth In International journal of emerging electric power systems Berkeley, Calif. : BePress, 2004 8.2007, 2, art4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ219537097 (DE-600)2207265-2 1553-779X nnns volume:8 year:2007 number:2 pages:4 http://www.bepress.com/ijeeps/vol8/iss2/art4 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-BEP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 8 2007 2 4 8.2007, 2, art4 |
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(DE-627)NLEJ219560285 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Multi-Agent Models for Consumer Choice and Retailer Strategies in the Competitive Electricity Market The Berkeley Electronic Press 2007 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational consumers. Hence, a model appropriate to represent this aspect of the market is needed. The paper proposes a general model of the interaction among retailers and consumers in the electricity market based on the theory of multi-agent systems. The model incorporates different assumptions concerning the behavior of the players that corresponds to different levels of interaction in determining the market outcomes. The model is validated interpretively by the results provided in terms of Game Theory equilibrium. The results of an extensive set of simulations on a population of 1,000 consumers is presented and discussed. Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals flat rate time-of-use (TOU) pricing multi-agent retail competition Electricity Markets Bompard, Ettore F. oth Abrate, Graziano oth Napoli, Roberto oth Wan, Bo oth In International journal of emerging electric power systems Berkeley, Calif. : BePress, 2004 8.2007, 2, art4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ219537097 (DE-600)2207265-2 1553-779X nnns volume:8 year:2007 number:2 pages:4 http://www.bepress.com/ijeeps/vol8/iss2/art4 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-BEP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 8 2007 2 4 8.2007, 2, art4 |
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(DE-627)NLEJ219560285 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Multi-Agent Models for Consumer Choice and Retailer Strategies in the Competitive Electricity Market The Berkeley Electronic Press 2007 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational consumers. Hence, a model appropriate to represent this aspect of the market is needed. The paper proposes a general model of the interaction among retailers and consumers in the electricity market based on the theory of multi-agent systems. The model incorporates different assumptions concerning the behavior of the players that corresponds to different levels of interaction in determining the market outcomes. The model is validated interpretively by the results provided in terms of Game Theory equilibrium. The results of an extensive set of simulations on a population of 1,000 consumers is presented and discussed. Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals flat rate time-of-use (TOU) pricing multi-agent retail competition Electricity Markets Bompard, Ettore F. oth Abrate, Graziano oth Napoli, Roberto oth Wan, Bo oth In International journal of emerging electric power systems Berkeley, Calif. : BePress, 2004 8.2007, 2, art4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ219537097 (DE-600)2207265-2 1553-779X nnns volume:8 year:2007 number:2 pages:4 http://www.bepress.com/ijeeps/vol8/iss2/art4 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-BEP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 8 2007 2 4 8.2007, 2, art4 |
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(DE-627)NLEJ219560285 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Multi-Agent Models for Consumer Choice and Retailer Strategies in the Competitive Electricity Market The Berkeley Electronic Press 2007 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational consumers. Hence, a model appropriate to represent this aspect of the market is needed. The paper proposes a general model of the interaction among retailers and consumers in the electricity market based on the theory of multi-agent systems. The model incorporates different assumptions concerning the behavior of the players that corresponds to different levels of interaction in determining the market outcomes. The model is validated interpretively by the results provided in terms of Game Theory equilibrium. The results of an extensive set of simulations on a population of 1,000 consumers is presented and discussed. Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals flat rate time-of-use (TOU) pricing multi-agent retail competition Electricity Markets Bompard, Ettore F. oth Abrate, Graziano oth Napoli, Roberto oth Wan, Bo oth In International journal of emerging electric power systems Berkeley, Calif. : BePress, 2004 8.2007, 2, art4 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ219537097 (DE-600)2207265-2 1553-779X nnns volume:8 year:2007 number:2 pages:4 http://www.bepress.com/ijeeps/vol8/iss2/art4 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-BEP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 8 2007 2 4 8.2007, 2, art4 |
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Multi-Agent Models for Consumer Choice and Retailer Strategies in the Competitive Electricity Market |
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The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational consumers. Hence, a model appropriate to represent this aspect of the market is needed. The paper proposes a general model of the interaction among retailers and consumers in the electricity market based on the theory of multi-agent systems. The model incorporates different assumptions concerning the behavior of the players that corresponds to different levels of interaction in determining the market outcomes. The model is validated interpretively by the results provided in terms of Game Theory equilibrium. The results of an extensive set of simulations on a population of 1,000 consumers is presented and discussed. |
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The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational consumers. Hence, a model appropriate to represent this aspect of the market is needed. The paper proposes a general model of the interaction among retailers and consumers in the electricity market based on the theory of multi-agent systems. The model incorporates different assumptions concerning the behavior of the players that corresponds to different levels of interaction in determining the market outcomes. The model is validated interpretively by the results provided in terms of Game Theory equilibrium. The results of an extensive set of simulations on a population of 1,000 consumers is presented and discussed. |
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The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational consumers. Hence, a model appropriate to represent this aspect of the market is needed. The paper proposes a general model of the interaction among retailers and consumers in the electricity market based on the theory of multi-agent systems. The model incorporates different assumptions concerning the behavior of the players that corresponds to different levels of interaction in determining the market outcomes. The model is validated interpretively by the results provided in terms of Game Theory equilibrium. The results of an extensive set of simulations on a population of 1,000 consumers is presented and discussed. |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">NLEJ219560285</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210707085758.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">090716s2007 xxu|||||o 00| ||eng c</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)NLEJ219560285</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Multi-Agent Models for Consumer Choice and Retailer Strategies in the Competitive Electricity Market</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="b">The Berkeley Electronic Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The benefit to end-users of electricity, mainly in terms of low prices, is strictly related to the interaction among the consumers themselves and retailers. The literature on retail competition has highlighted possible distortions in market outcomes due to unresponsive demand and boundedly rational consumers. Hence, a model appropriate to represent this aspect of the market is needed. The paper proposes a general model of the interaction among retailers and consumers in the electricity market based on the theory of multi-agent systems. The model incorporates different assumptions concerning the behavior of the players that corresponds to different levels of interaction in determining the market outcomes. The model is validated interpretively by the results provided in terms of Game Theory equilibrium. The results of an extensive set of simulations on a population of 1,000 consumers is presented and discussed.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="f">Berkeley Electronic Press Academic Journals</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">flat rate</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">time-of-use (TOU) pricing</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">multi-agent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">retail competition</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Electricity Markets</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bompard, Ettore F.</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Abrate, Graziano</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Napoli, Roberto</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wan, Bo</subfield><subfield code="4">oth</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">International journal of emerging electric power systems</subfield><subfield code="d">Berkeley, Calif. : BePress, 2004</subfield><subfield code="g">8.2007, 2, art4</subfield><subfield code="h">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)NLEJ219537097</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2207265-2</subfield><subfield code="x">1553-779X</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:8</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2007</subfield><subfield code="g">number:2</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://www.bepress.com/ijeeps/vol8/iss2/art4</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-BEP</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_NL_ARTICLE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">8</subfield><subfield code="j">2007</subfield><subfield code="e">2</subfield><subfield code="h">4</subfield><subfield code="y">8.2007, 2, art4</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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