Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations
The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, a...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Knopf, Jeffrey W. [verfasserIn] |
|---|
| Format: |
E-Artikel |
|---|---|
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
New York: Cambridge University Press ; 1993 |
|---|
| Umfang: |
30 |
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| Reproduktion: |
Cambridge Journals Digital Archives |
|---|---|
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: International organization - Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947, 47(1993), 4, Seite 599-628 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:47 ; year:1993 ; number:4 ; pages:599-628 ; extent:30 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1017/S0020818300028113 |
|---|
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NLEJ225726041 |
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| 520 | |a The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation. | ||
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10.1017/S0020818300028113 doi (DE-627)NLEJ225726041 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Knopf, Jeffrey W. verfasserin aut Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations New York Cambridge University Press 1993 30 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation. Cambridge Journals Digital Archives In International organization Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947 47(1993), 4, Seite 599-628 (DE-627)NLEJ224554158 (DE-600)1481046-3 1531-5088 nnns volume:47 year:1993 number:4 pages:599-628 extent:30 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028113 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-CUP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 47 1993 4 599-628 30 |
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10.1017/S0020818300028113 doi (DE-627)NLEJ225726041 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Knopf, Jeffrey W. verfasserin aut Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations New York Cambridge University Press 1993 30 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation. Cambridge Journals Digital Archives In International organization Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947 47(1993), 4, Seite 599-628 (DE-627)NLEJ224554158 (DE-600)1481046-3 1531-5088 nnns volume:47 year:1993 number:4 pages:599-628 extent:30 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028113 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-CUP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 47 1993 4 599-628 30 |
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10.1017/S0020818300028113 doi (DE-627)NLEJ225726041 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Knopf, Jeffrey W. verfasserin aut Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations New York Cambridge University Press 1993 30 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation. Cambridge Journals Digital Archives In International organization Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947 47(1993), 4, Seite 599-628 (DE-627)NLEJ224554158 (DE-600)1481046-3 1531-5088 nnns volume:47 year:1993 number:4 pages:599-628 extent:30 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028113 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-CUP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 47 1993 4 599-628 30 |
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10.1017/S0020818300028113 doi (DE-627)NLEJ225726041 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Knopf, Jeffrey W. verfasserin aut Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations New York Cambridge University Press 1993 30 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation. Cambridge Journals Digital Archives In International organization Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947 47(1993), 4, Seite 599-628 (DE-627)NLEJ224554158 (DE-600)1481046-3 1531-5088 nnns volume:47 year:1993 number:4 pages:599-628 extent:30 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028113 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-CUP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 47 1993 4 599-628 30 |
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10.1017/S0020818300028113 doi (DE-627)NLEJ225726041 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng XD-US Knopf, Jeffrey W. verfasserin aut Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations New York Cambridge University Press 1993 30 nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation. Cambridge Journals Digital Archives In International organization Cambridge, Mass. : Cambridge University Press, 1947 47(1993), 4, Seite 599-628 (DE-627)NLEJ224554158 (DE-600)1481046-3 1531-5088 nnns volume:47 year:1993 number:4 pages:599-628 extent:30 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300028113 GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-CUP GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 47 1993 4 599-628 30 |
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Beyond two-level games: domestic–international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations |
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The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation. |
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The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation. |
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The currently popular concept of two-level games suffers from certain shortcomings as an approach to studying the interaction between domestic- and international-level variables. In the two-level game approach, different types of domestic-international interaction are insufficiently distinguished, and special dynamics of cases involving third parties like military allies are not adequately recognized. This article modifies the two-level game concept by specifying three forms of domestic-international interaction and adding a third level to the framework. The utility of this new “three-and-three” approach is illustrated through analysis of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations on intermediaterange nuclear forces in the 1980s. This analysis generates new hypotheses suggesting that domestic actors can shape the agenda for international negotiations and that certain forms of domestic-international interaction tend to bring about large changes in the positions of the principal parties to a negotiation. |
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