Executive Compensation Policy and Company Performance in Japan
The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensif...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Kubo, Katsuyuki [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Erschienen: |
Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. ; 2005 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Umfang: |
Online-Ressource |
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| Reproduktion: |
2005 ; Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Corporate governance - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993, 13(2005), 3, Seite 0 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:13 ; year:2005 ; number:3 ; pages:0 |
| Links: |
|---|
| DOI / URN: |
10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x |
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NLEJ242513549 |
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| 520 | |a The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the performance–pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance. These results are consistent with previous studies that directors’ pay is not designed to motivate directors to work toward shareholders’ value. | ||
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10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x doi (DE-627)NLEJ242513549 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Kubo, Katsuyuki verfasserin aut Executive Compensation Policy and Company Performance in Japan Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the performance–pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance. These results are consistent with previous studies that directors’ pay is not designed to motivate directors to work toward shareholders’ value. 2005 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2005|||||||||| Executive compensation In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 13(2005), 3, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:13 year:2005 number:3 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 13 2005 3 0 |
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10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x doi (DE-627)NLEJ242513549 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Kubo, Katsuyuki verfasserin aut Executive Compensation Policy and Company Performance in Japan Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the performance–pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance. These results are consistent with previous studies that directors’ pay is not designed to motivate directors to work toward shareholders’ value. 2005 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2005|||||||||| Executive compensation In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 13(2005), 3, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:13 year:2005 number:3 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 13 2005 3 0 |
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10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x doi (DE-627)NLEJ242513549 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Kubo, Katsuyuki verfasserin aut Executive Compensation Policy and Company Performance in Japan Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the performance–pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance. These results are consistent with previous studies that directors’ pay is not designed to motivate directors to work toward shareholders’ value. 2005 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2005|||||||||| Executive compensation In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 13(2005), 3, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:13 year:2005 number:3 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 13 2005 3 0 |
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10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x doi (DE-627)NLEJ242513549 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Kubo, Katsuyuki verfasserin aut Executive Compensation Policy and Company Performance in Japan Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2005 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the performance–pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance. These results are consistent with previous studies that directors’ pay is not designed to motivate directors to work toward shareholders’ value. 2005 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2005|||||||||| Executive compensation In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 13(2005), 3, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:13 year:2005 number:3 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00437.x text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 13 2005 3 0 |
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The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the performance–pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance. These results are consistent with previous studies that directors’ pay is not designed to motivate directors to work toward shareholders’ value. |
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The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the performance–pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance. These results are consistent with previous studies that directors’ pay is not designed to motivate directors to work toward shareholders’ value. |
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The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether companies’“way to pay their director” matters or not. Firstly, we fail to find a positive relationship between the performance–pay sensitivity and company performance. Thus, these results do not support our hypothesis that those companies that intensify the performance–pay sensitivity are more likely to improve their performance. In addition, this research fails to find a positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance. These results are consistent with previous studies that directors’ pay is not designed to motivate directors to work toward shareholders’ value. |
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