The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in South Korean Corporate Governance: some empirical evidence
South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the coun...
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| Autor*in: |
Solomon, Jill [verfasserIn] Solomon, Aris [verfasserIn] Park, Chang–Young [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Erschienen: |
Oxford, UK and Boston, USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd ; 2002 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Umfang: |
Online-Ressource |
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| Reproduktion: |
2002 ; Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Corporate governance - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993, 10(2002), 3, Seite 0 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:10 ; year:2002 ; number:3 ; pages:0 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1111/1467-8683.00285 |
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NLEJ242515053 |
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| 520 | |a South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the country’s economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for “good” corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; chaebol’s accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the chaebol’s activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis. | ||
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10.1111/1467-8683.00285 doi (DE-627)NLEJ242515053 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Solomon, Jill verfasserin aut The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in South Korean Corporate Governance: some empirical evidence Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the country’s economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for “good” corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; chaebol’s accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the chaebol’s activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis. 2002 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2002|||||||||| Corporate governance reform Solomon, Aris verfasserin aut Park, Chang–Young verfasserin aut In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 10(2002), 3, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:10 year:2002 number:3 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00285 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 10 2002 3 0 |
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10.1111/1467-8683.00285 doi (DE-627)NLEJ242515053 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Solomon, Jill verfasserin aut The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in South Korean Corporate Governance: some empirical evidence Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the country’s economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for “good” corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; chaebol’s accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the chaebol’s activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis. 2002 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2002|||||||||| Corporate governance reform Solomon, Aris verfasserin aut Park, Chang–Young verfasserin aut In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 10(2002), 3, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:10 year:2002 number:3 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00285 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 10 2002 3 0 |
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10.1111/1467-8683.00285 doi (DE-627)NLEJ242515053 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Solomon, Jill verfasserin aut The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in South Korean Corporate Governance: some empirical evidence Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the country’s economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for “good” corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; chaebol’s accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the chaebol’s activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis. 2002 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2002|||||||||| Corporate governance reform Solomon, Aris verfasserin aut Park, Chang–Young verfasserin aut In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 10(2002), 3, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:10 year:2002 number:3 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00285 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 10 2002 3 0 |
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10.1111/1467-8683.00285 doi (DE-627)NLEJ242515053 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Solomon, Jill verfasserin aut The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in South Korean Corporate Governance: some empirical evidence Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the country’s economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for “good” corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; chaebol’s accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the chaebol’s activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis. 2002 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2002|||||||||| Corporate governance reform Solomon, Aris verfasserin aut Park, Chang–Young verfasserin aut In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 10(2002), 3, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:10 year:2002 number:3 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00285 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 10 2002 3 0 |
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South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the country’s economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for “good” corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; chaebol’s accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the chaebol’s activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis. |
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South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the country’s economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for “good” corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; chaebol’s accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the chaebol’s activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis. |
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South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the country’s economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for “good” corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; chaebol’s accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the chaebol’s activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis. |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">NLEJ242515053</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210707160233.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">120427s2002 xx |||||o 00| ||und c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1111/1467-8683.00285</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)NLEJ242515053</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Solomon, Jill</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">The Evolving Role of Institutional Investors in South Korean Corporate Governance: some empirical evidence</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Oxford, UK and Boston, USA</subfield><subfield code="b">Blackwell Publishers Ltd</subfield><subfield code="c">2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">South Korea, one of East Asia’s most powerful tigers before the 1997 financial crisis, is in the process of extensive corporate governance reform. The excessive debt financing of the chaebol and the lack of accountability prevalent in Korea’s corporate governance system have been blamed for the country’s economy succumbing to the crisis. The current process of reform is taking place within a global agenda for corporate governance harmonisation, reflected in the publication of internationally acceptable principles for “good” corporate governance by, for example, the OECD and CalPERS. In this paper we present and analyse the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews conducted in Korea which canvassed the views of fund managers. Our findings indicate that Korea’s financial institutions support initiatives to reform the country’s corporate governance system. Further, they agree strongly that: investor relations need to be improved; chaebol’s accountability to shareholders should be improved; and shareholder activism should be encouraged. They also support the view that the chaebol’s activities were chiefly responsible for Korea succumbing to the East Asian crisis.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">2002</subfield><subfield code="f">Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005</subfield><subfield code="7">|2002||||||||||</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corporate governance reform</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Solomon, Aris</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Park, Chang–Young</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">Corporate governance</subfield><subfield code="d">Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993</subfield><subfield code="g">10(2002), 3, Seite 0</subfield><subfield code="h">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)NLEJ24392593X</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2062255-7</subfield><subfield code="x">1467-8683</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:10</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2002</subfield><subfield code="g">number:3</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00285</subfield><subfield code="q">text/html</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">Deutschlandweit zugänglich</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-DJB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_NL_ARTICLE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">10</subfield><subfield code="j">2002</subfield><subfield code="e">3</subfield><subfield code="h">0</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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