Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed Firms
This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Wen, Yu [verfasserIn] Rwegasira, Kami [verfasserIn] Bilderbeek, Jan [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
E-Artikel |
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| Erschienen: |
Oxford, UK and Boston, USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd ; 2002 |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Umfang: |
Online-Ressource |
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| Reproduktion: |
2002 ; Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Corporate governance - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993, 10(2002), 2, Seite 0 |
| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:10 ; year:2002 ; number:2 ; pages:0 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1111/1467-8683.00271 |
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NLEJ242515126 |
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| 520 | |a This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. | ||
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10.1111/1467-8683.00271 doi (DE-627)NLEJ242515126 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Wen, Yu verfasserin aut Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed Firms Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. 2002 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2002|||||||||| Corporate governance Rwegasira, Kami verfasserin aut Bilderbeek, Jan verfasserin aut In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 10(2002), 2, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:10 year:2002 number:2 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00271 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 10 2002 2 0 |
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10.1111/1467-8683.00271 doi (DE-627)NLEJ242515126 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Wen, Yu verfasserin aut Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed Firms Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. 2002 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2002|||||||||| Corporate governance Rwegasira, Kami verfasserin aut Bilderbeek, Jan verfasserin aut In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 10(2002), 2, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:10 year:2002 number:2 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00271 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 10 2002 2 0 |
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10.1111/1467-8683.00271 doi (DE-627)NLEJ242515126 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Wen, Yu verfasserin aut Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed Firms Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. 2002 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2002|||||||||| Corporate governance Rwegasira, Kami verfasserin aut Bilderbeek, Jan verfasserin aut In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 10(2002), 2, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:10 year:2002 number:2 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00271 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 10 2002 2 0 |
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10.1111/1467-8683.00271 doi (DE-627)NLEJ242515126 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Wen, Yu verfasserin aut Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed Firms Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. 2002 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2002|||||||||| Corporate governance Rwegasira, Kami verfasserin aut Bilderbeek, Jan verfasserin aut In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 10(2002), 2, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:10 year:2002 number:2 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00271 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 10 2002 2 0 |
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10.1111/1467-8683.00271 doi (DE-627)NLEJ242515126 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Wen, Yu verfasserin aut Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed Firms Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. 2002 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2002|||||||||| Corporate governance Rwegasira, Kami verfasserin aut Bilderbeek, Jan verfasserin aut In Corporate governance Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993 10(2002), 2, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ24392593X (DE-600)2062255-7 1467-8683 nnns volume:10 year:2002 number:2 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00271 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 10 2002 2 0 |
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This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. |
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This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. |
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This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature. |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">NLEJ242515126</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210707160234.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">120427s2002 xx |||||o 00| ||und c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1111/1467-8683.00271</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)NLEJ242515126</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wen, Yu</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Decisions of the Chinese Listed Firms</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Oxford, UK and Boston, USA</subfield><subfield code="b">Blackwell Publishers Ltd</subfield><subfield code="c">2002</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper studies the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm’s capital structure in Chinese listed firms. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face stronger corporate governance from the board. However, the empirical results of the relationships are statistically significant only in the case of the board composition and the CEO tenure. The results are statistically insignificant in the case of the board size and fixed CEO compensation. This may in general suggest that, up to the time period of our investigation, the corporate board structures and processes in Chinese listed firms might not as yet be fully working in the manner, or as well, as might have been so far assumed on the basis of Western theoretical finance literature.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">2002</subfield><subfield code="f">Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005</subfield><subfield code="7">|2002||||||||||</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Corporate governance</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rwegasira, Kami</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bilderbeek, Jan</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">Corporate governance</subfield><subfield code="d">Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1993</subfield><subfield code="g">10(2002), 2, Seite 0</subfield><subfield code="h">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)NLEJ24392593X</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2062255-7</subfield><subfield code="x">1467-8683</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:10</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2002</subfield><subfield code="g">number:2</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00271</subfield><subfield code="q">text/html</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">Deutschlandweit zugänglich</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-DJB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_NL_ARTICLE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">10</subfield><subfield code="j">2002</subfield><subfield code="e">2</subfield><subfield code="h">0</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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