Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk
The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystemati...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Autor*in: |
Fargher, Neil L. [verfasserIn] Wilkins, Michael S. [verfasserIn] Holder-Webb, Lori M. [verfasserIn] |
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Format: |
E-Artikel |
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Erschienen: |
Oxford, UK and Boston, USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd ; 2001 |
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Schlagwörter: |
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Umfang: |
Online-Ressource |
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Reproduktion: |
2003 ; Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |
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Übergeordnetes Werk: |
In: Journal of business finance & accounting - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1974, 28(2001), 3/4, Seite 0 |
Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:28 ; year:2001 ; number:3/4 ; pages:0 |
Links: |
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DOI / URN: |
10.1111/1468-5957.00381 |
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Katalog-ID: |
NLEJ243368380 |
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10.1111/1468-5957.00381 doi (DE-627)NLEJ243368380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Fargher, Neil L. verfasserin aut Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress. 2003 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2003|||||||||| debt covenant violation Wilkins, Michael S. verfasserin aut Holder-Webb, Lori M. verfasserin aut In Journal of business finance & accounting Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1974 28(2001), 3/4, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ243927193 (DE-600)2020001-8 1468-5957 nnns volume:28 year:2001 number:3/4 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00381 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 28 2001 3/4 0 |
spelling |
10.1111/1468-5957.00381 doi (DE-627)NLEJ243368380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Fargher, Neil L. verfasserin aut Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress. 2003 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2003|||||||||| debt covenant violation Wilkins, Michael S. verfasserin aut Holder-Webb, Lori M. verfasserin aut In Journal of business finance & accounting Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1974 28(2001), 3/4, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ243927193 (DE-600)2020001-8 1468-5957 nnns volume:28 year:2001 number:3/4 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00381 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 28 2001 3/4 0 |
allfields_unstemmed |
10.1111/1468-5957.00381 doi (DE-627)NLEJ243368380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Fargher, Neil L. verfasserin aut Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress. 2003 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2003|||||||||| debt covenant violation Wilkins, Michael S. verfasserin aut Holder-Webb, Lori M. verfasserin aut In Journal of business finance & accounting Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1974 28(2001), 3/4, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ243927193 (DE-600)2020001-8 1468-5957 nnns volume:28 year:2001 number:3/4 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00381 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 28 2001 3/4 0 |
allfieldsGer |
10.1111/1468-5957.00381 doi (DE-627)NLEJ243368380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Fargher, Neil L. verfasserin aut Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress. 2003 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2003|||||||||| debt covenant violation Wilkins, Michael S. verfasserin aut Holder-Webb, Lori M. verfasserin aut In Journal of business finance & accounting Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1974 28(2001), 3/4, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ243927193 (DE-600)2020001-8 1468-5957 nnns volume:28 year:2001 number:3/4 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00381 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 28 2001 3/4 0 |
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10.1111/1468-5957.00381 doi (DE-627)NLEJ243368380 DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb Fargher, Neil L. verfasserin aut Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2001 Online-Ressource nicht spezifiziert zzz rdacontent nicht spezifiziert z rdamedia nicht spezifiziert zu rdacarrier The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress. 2003 Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005 |2003|||||||||| debt covenant violation Wilkins, Michael S. verfasserin aut Holder-Webb, Lori M. verfasserin aut In Journal of business finance & accounting Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1974 28(2001), 3/4, Seite 0 Online-Ressource (DE-627)NLEJ243927193 (DE-600)2020001-8 1468-5957 nnns volume:28 year:2001 number:3/4 pages:0 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00381 text/html Verlag Deutschlandweit zugänglich Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_U ZDB-1-DJB GBV_NL_ARTICLE AR 28 2001 3/4 0 |
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Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk |
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress. |
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress. |
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress. |
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01000caa a22002652 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">NLEJ243368380</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-627</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20210707180144.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">cr uuu---uuuuu</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">120427s2001 xx |||||o 00| ||und c</controlfield><datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">10.1111/1468-5957.00381</subfield><subfield code="2">doi</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-627)NLEJ243368380</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="c">DE-627</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Fargher, Neil L.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Initial Technical Violations of Debt Covenants and Changes in Firm Risk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Oxford, UK and Boston, USA</subfield><subfield code="b">Blackwell Publishers Ltd</subfield><subfield code="c">2001</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ressource</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zzz</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">z</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">nicht spezifiziert</subfield><subfield code="b">zu</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether initial technical debt covenant violations are associated with significant increases in the equity risk of violating firms. Our results indicate that first-time violations are associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic risk. The increase in systematic risk is attributable primarily to rising levels of financial leverage as opposed to changes in the underlying asset beta. We also find that the change in unsystematic risk experienced by first-time debt covenant violators is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing financial distress.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">2003</subfield><subfield code="f">Blackwell Publishing Journal Backfiles 1879-2005</subfield><subfield code="7">|2003||||||||||</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">debt covenant violation</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Wilkins, Michael S.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Holder-Webb, Lori M.</subfield><subfield code="e">verfasserin</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">In</subfield><subfield code="t">Journal of business finance & accounting</subfield><subfield code="d">Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 1974</subfield><subfield code="g">28(2001), 3/4, Seite 0</subfield><subfield code="h">Online-Ressource</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-627)NLEJ243927193</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-600)2020001-8</subfield><subfield code="x">1468-5957</subfield><subfield code="7">nnns</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="773" ind1="1" ind2="8"><subfield code="g">volume:28</subfield><subfield code="g">year:2001</subfield><subfield code="g">number:3/4</subfield><subfield code="g">pages:0</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00381</subfield><subfield code="q">text/html</subfield><subfield code="x">Verlag</subfield><subfield code="z">Deutschlandweit zugänglich</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_USEFLAG_U</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ZDB-1-DJB</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">GBV_NL_ARTICLE</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="951" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">AR</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="952" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="d">28</subfield><subfield code="j">2001</subfield><subfield code="e">3/4</subfield><subfield code="h">0</subfield></datafield></record></collection>
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