Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach
AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find...
Ausführliche Beschreibung
Gespeichert in:
| Autor*in: |
Eid, Mohamed S [verfasserIn] |
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| Format: |
Artikel |
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| Sprache: |
Englisch |
| Erschienen: |
2015 |
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| Rechteinformationen: |
Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers |
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| Schlagwörter: |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
Enthalten in: Journal of management in engineering - New York, NY : Soc., 1985, 31(2015), 6 |
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| Übergeordnetes Werk: |
volume:31 ; year:2015 ; number:6 |
| Links: |
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| DOI / URN: |
10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 |
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| Katalog-ID: |
OLC1957113286 |
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| 520 | |a AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the NetBeans IDE 7.4 platform using the Java programming language for a hypothetical case study. The results indicate that (1) resident families tend to prefer insurance plans with the lowest premium value and coverage; (2) insurance plans with the most comprehensive coverage experienced the least demand; and (3) the evolutionary stable strategy is an oscillating line of chosen plans and insurers as a result of the stochastic and dynamics nature of the factors associated with disaster management. Currently, the authors are working to develop the model further to better account for simultaneous actions by all stakeholders (not only resident families), population growth, changes in financial and income standards, integrating input from available natural hazard prediction software systems (e.g., HAZUS-MH), and continuous data. Ultimately, this evolutionary game theory model will be tested on post–Hurricane Katrina data representing real-life physical damage in Hancock County, Mississippi. | ||
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10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1957113286 (DE-599)GBVOLC1957113286 (PRQ)a1817-e16b9f6e2736860cb06bd07e27cca785270e6ef05034607d1b47487621147cfe0 (KEY)0138950520150000031000600000evolutionarystablestrategyforpostdisasterinsurance DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 600 ZDB 56.00 bkl 85.06 bkl Eid, Mohamed S verfasserin aut Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the NetBeans IDE 7.4 platform using the Java programming language for a hypothetical case study. The results indicate that (1) resident families tend to prefer insurance plans with the lowest premium value and coverage; (2) insurance plans with the most comprehensive coverage experienced the least demand; and (3) the evolutionary stable strategy is an oscillating line of chosen plans and insurers as a result of the stochastic and dynamics nature of the factors associated with disaster management. Currently, the authors are working to develop the model further to better account for simultaneous actions by all stakeholders (not only resident families), population growth, changes in financial and income standards, integrating input from available natural hazard prediction software systems (e.g., HAZUS-MH), and continuous data. Ultimately, this evolutionary game theory model will be tested on post–Hurricane Katrina data representing real-life physical damage in Hancock County, Mississippi. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Game theory Usage El-adaway, Islam H oth Coatney, Kalyn T oth Enthalten in Journal of management in engineering New York, NY : Soc., 1985 31(2015), 6 (DE-627)130411922 (DE-600)622799-5 (DE-576)015914895 0742-597X nnns volume:31 year:2015 number:6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_4700 56.00 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 31 2015 6 |
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10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1957113286 (DE-599)GBVOLC1957113286 (PRQ)a1817-e16b9f6e2736860cb06bd07e27cca785270e6ef05034607d1b47487621147cfe0 (KEY)0138950520150000031000600000evolutionarystablestrategyforpostdisasterinsurance DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 600 ZDB 56.00 bkl 85.06 bkl Eid, Mohamed S verfasserin aut Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the NetBeans IDE 7.4 platform using the Java programming language for a hypothetical case study. The results indicate that (1) resident families tend to prefer insurance plans with the lowest premium value and coverage; (2) insurance plans with the most comprehensive coverage experienced the least demand; and (3) the evolutionary stable strategy is an oscillating line of chosen plans and insurers as a result of the stochastic and dynamics nature of the factors associated with disaster management. Currently, the authors are working to develop the model further to better account for simultaneous actions by all stakeholders (not only resident families), population growth, changes in financial and income standards, integrating input from available natural hazard prediction software systems (e.g., HAZUS-MH), and continuous data. Ultimately, this evolutionary game theory model will be tested on post–Hurricane Katrina data representing real-life physical damage in Hancock County, Mississippi. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Game theory Usage El-adaway, Islam H oth Coatney, Kalyn T oth Enthalten in Journal of management in engineering New York, NY : Soc., 1985 31(2015), 6 (DE-627)130411922 (DE-600)622799-5 (DE-576)015914895 0742-597X nnns volume:31 year:2015 number:6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_4700 56.00 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 31 2015 6 |
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10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1957113286 (DE-599)GBVOLC1957113286 (PRQ)a1817-e16b9f6e2736860cb06bd07e27cca785270e6ef05034607d1b47487621147cfe0 (KEY)0138950520150000031000600000evolutionarystablestrategyforpostdisasterinsurance DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 600 ZDB 56.00 bkl 85.06 bkl Eid, Mohamed S verfasserin aut Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the NetBeans IDE 7.4 platform using the Java programming language for a hypothetical case study. The results indicate that (1) resident families tend to prefer insurance plans with the lowest premium value and coverage; (2) insurance plans with the most comprehensive coverage experienced the least demand; and (3) the evolutionary stable strategy is an oscillating line of chosen plans and insurers as a result of the stochastic and dynamics nature of the factors associated with disaster management. Currently, the authors are working to develop the model further to better account for simultaneous actions by all stakeholders (not only resident families), population growth, changes in financial and income standards, integrating input from available natural hazard prediction software systems (e.g., HAZUS-MH), and continuous data. Ultimately, this evolutionary game theory model will be tested on post–Hurricane Katrina data representing real-life physical damage in Hancock County, Mississippi. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Game theory Usage El-adaway, Islam H oth Coatney, Kalyn T oth Enthalten in Journal of management in engineering New York, NY : Soc., 1985 31(2015), 6 (DE-627)130411922 (DE-600)622799-5 (DE-576)015914895 0742-597X nnns volume:31 year:2015 number:6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_4700 56.00 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 31 2015 6 |
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10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1957113286 (DE-599)GBVOLC1957113286 (PRQ)a1817-e16b9f6e2736860cb06bd07e27cca785270e6ef05034607d1b47487621147cfe0 (KEY)0138950520150000031000600000evolutionarystablestrategyforpostdisasterinsurance DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 600 ZDB 56.00 bkl 85.06 bkl Eid, Mohamed S verfasserin aut Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the NetBeans IDE 7.4 platform using the Java programming language for a hypothetical case study. The results indicate that (1) resident families tend to prefer insurance plans with the lowest premium value and coverage; (2) insurance plans with the most comprehensive coverage experienced the least demand; and (3) the evolutionary stable strategy is an oscillating line of chosen plans and insurers as a result of the stochastic and dynamics nature of the factors associated with disaster management. Currently, the authors are working to develop the model further to better account for simultaneous actions by all stakeholders (not only resident families), population growth, changes in financial and income standards, integrating input from available natural hazard prediction software systems (e.g., HAZUS-MH), and continuous data. Ultimately, this evolutionary game theory model will be tested on post–Hurricane Katrina data representing real-life physical damage in Hancock County, Mississippi. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Game theory Usage El-adaway, Islam H oth Coatney, Kalyn T oth Enthalten in Journal of management in engineering New York, NY : Soc., 1985 31(2015), 6 (DE-627)130411922 (DE-600)622799-5 (DE-576)015914895 0742-597X nnns volume:31 year:2015 number:6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_4700 56.00 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 31 2015 6 |
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10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 doi PQ20160617 (DE-627)OLC1957113286 (DE-599)GBVOLC1957113286 (PRQ)a1817-e16b9f6e2736860cb06bd07e27cca785270e6ef05034607d1b47487621147cfe0 (KEY)0138950520150000031000600000evolutionarystablestrategyforpostdisasterinsurance DE-627 ger DE-627 rakwb eng 600 ZDB 56.00 bkl 85.06 bkl Eid, Mohamed S verfasserin aut Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach 2015 Text txt rdacontent ohne Hilfsmittel zu benutzen n rdamedia Band nc rdacarrier AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the NetBeans IDE 7.4 platform using the Java programming language for a hypothetical case study. The results indicate that (1) resident families tend to prefer insurance plans with the lowest premium value and coverage; (2) insurance plans with the most comprehensive coverage experienced the least demand; and (3) the evolutionary stable strategy is an oscillating line of chosen plans and insurers as a result of the stochastic and dynamics nature of the factors associated with disaster management. Currently, the authors are working to develop the model further to better account for simultaneous actions by all stakeholders (not only resident families), population growth, changes in financial and income standards, integrating input from available natural hazard prediction software systems (e.g., HAZUS-MH), and continuous data. Ultimately, this evolutionary game theory model will be tested on post–Hurricane Katrina data representing real-life physical damage in Hancock County, Mississippi. Nutzungsrecht: © 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers © COPYRIGHT 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers Technical Papers Game theory Usage El-adaway, Islam H oth Coatney, Kalyn T oth Enthalten in Journal of management in engineering New York, NY : Soc., 1985 31(2015), 6 (DE-627)130411922 (DE-600)622799-5 (DE-576)015914895 0742-597X nnns volume:31 year:2015 number:6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000357 Volltext GBV_USEFLAG_A SYSFLAG_A GBV_OLC SSG-OLC-TEC GBV_ILN_70 GBV_ILN_2006 GBV_ILN_4700 56.00 AVZ 85.06 AVZ AR 31 2015 6 |
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Evolutionary Stable Strategy for Postdisaster Insurance: Game Theory Approach |
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AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the NetBeans IDE 7.4 platform using the Java programming language for a hypothetical case study. The results indicate that (1) resident families tend to prefer insurance plans with the lowest premium value and coverage; (2) insurance plans with the most comprehensive coverage experienced the least demand; and (3) the evolutionary stable strategy is an oscillating line of chosen plans and insurers as a result of the stochastic and dynamics nature of the factors associated with disaster management. Currently, the authors are working to develop the model further to better account for simultaneous actions by all stakeholders (not only resident families), population growth, changes in financial and income standards, integrating input from available natural hazard prediction software systems (e.g., HAZUS-MH), and continuous data. Ultimately, this evolutionary game theory model will be tested on post–Hurricane Katrina data representing real-life physical damage in Hancock County, Mississippi. |
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AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the NetBeans IDE 7.4 platform using the Java programming language for a hypothetical case study. The results indicate that (1) resident families tend to prefer insurance plans with the lowest premium value and coverage; (2) insurance plans with the most comprehensive coverage experienced the least demand; and (3) the evolutionary stable strategy is an oscillating line of chosen plans and insurers as a result of the stochastic and dynamics nature of the factors associated with disaster management. Currently, the authors are working to develop the model further to better account for simultaneous actions by all stakeholders (not only resident families), population growth, changes in financial and income standards, integrating input from available natural hazard prediction software systems (e.g., HAZUS-MH), and continuous data. Ultimately, this evolutionary game theory model will be tested on post–Hurricane Katrina data representing real-life physical damage in Hancock County, Mississippi. |
| abstract_unstemmed |
AbstractMitigation of the financial impacts associated with natural disasters is becoming an urgent objective at both the national and international levels, as the rate and magnitude of natural disasters are continuing to increase. Using an evolutionary game theory approach, this paper aims to find an equilibrium profile of postdisaster insurance plans purchased by resident families and sold by insurance companies, as well as ex-postdisaster relief implemented by a government agency. This dynamic integrated assessment minimizes the total losses for the three aforementioned associated stakeholders, thus maximizing welfare within natural disaster host community systems. To this end, the authors determined a plausible set of actions and utility functions for the associated stakeholders. Also, they created a hypothetical sample of 1,000 resident families accounting for heterogeneous income levels, three insurance companies offering three unique insurance plans per company—each with different premium and coverage—and two different types of government compensation plans for postdisaster damage mitigation. The proposed model was implemented on the NetBeans IDE 7.4 platform using the Java programming language for a hypothetical case study. The results indicate that (1) resident families tend to prefer insurance plans with the lowest premium value and coverage; (2) insurance plans with the most comprehensive coverage experienced the least demand; and (3) the evolutionary stable strategy is an oscillating line of chosen plans and insurers as a result of the stochastic and dynamics nature of the factors associated with disaster management. Currently, the authors are working to develop the model further to better account for simultaneous actions by all stakeholders (not only resident families), population growth, changes in financial and income standards, integrating input from available natural hazard prediction software systems (e.g., HAZUS-MH), and continuous data. Ultimately, this evolutionary game theory model will be tested on post–Hurricane Katrina data representing real-life physical damage in Hancock County, Mississippi. |
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